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 I 
 
Abstract 
Drawing on the institutional lens and the global political economy (GPE) perspective, the 
thesis firstly examines the role of home-government support and interstate relational factors 
in shaping Chinese multinational enterprises’ (MNEs) overseas subsidiary performance. The 
author tackles two aspects of home-government support: financial support and non-financial 
policy support. Moreover, their effects under the contingency of interstate relational factors 
are considered. Using survey data, the findings show that Chinese MNEs’ subsidiary 
performance is positively related to the degree of home-government non-financial policy 
support but not financial support. The effect of non-financial policy support is moderated by 
interstate political and economic relations. Stronger interstate political relations augment the 
impact of non-financial policy support on subsidiary performance, whereas interstate 
economic relations have a substitutive effect.  
The thesis further addresses the role of home-country legitimacy on the level of political risk 
faced by Chinese MNEs when venturing internationally. Highlighting the notion of 
legitimacy under the institutional perspective, the author suggests that the level of political 
risk encountered by Chinese firms is jointly determined by the institutional governance 
quality and firms’ home-country legitimacy with key stakeholders in a host country. While 
host-country political and regulatory governance quality remain important factors in 
explaining the political risk faced by Chinese MNEs, their effects tend to diminish due to the 
lack of social acceptance of a firm’s home country with the host-country government, 
industrial agencies and general public.  
Finally, this thesis explores how political risk is conceived by Chinese MNEs when 
competing in the global arena. Based on qualitative interviews with managers of Chinese 
firms, the study provides a fine-grained analysis about the way that political risk is perceived 
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by Chinese companies operating in developed and developing host countries, specifically, the 
European Union (EU) and Africa. The findings reveal that Chinese MNEs perceive that 
political risk can go beyond the conventional source of host-country political turmoil. The 
baggage carried by Chinese firms due to different ideologies between their home and host 
countries, and the host-government’s concern over the motives behind these firms’ activities, 
represent a source of political risk arise from firms’ home country. The study shows that 
Chinese MNEs regard their home-country origin and industry-specific restrictions as major 
political risks in the EU. By contrast, they consider the volatile political environment in some 
African countries as the main source of political risk. In addition to the sharp contrast of the 
political and regulatory environments between the EU and Africa, Chinese firms commonly 
face political risk in both markets due to their own behaviours. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
Outward foreign direct investment (FDI) conducted by emerging market multinational 
enterprises (EMMNEs) has become an important source in stimulating global economic 
growth. The term ‘emerging markets’ has been defined in various ways by focusing on 
income levels such as mid- or low-income economies with growth potential, economic size 
such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China, or geographies such as Central and Eastern Europe, 
developing Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Financial Times, 2006). In this thesis, the author 
adopts one of the most broadly used definitions in international business research by 
understanding emerging markets as countries or economies with lower levels of economic 
development, institutional governance quality, and standard of living than developed 
countries and with significant institutional and market reforms (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau & 
Wright, 2000; Khanna & Palepu, 2010; Marano, Tashman & Kostova, 2017). EMMNEs are 
firms from these markets that conduct outward FDI to ‘exercise effective control and 
undertake value-adding activities in one or more foreign countries’ (Luo & Tung, 2007: 482).  
The arrival of EMMNEs represents a significant development in international business. 
Among them, the international expansion of firms from China has attracted much attention. 
Chinese MNEs expand to a variety of industries worldwide, and the political motivations 
associated with their investment not only have received significant media coverage and 
spurred political debates, but also present a strong case for theoretical extension. This thesis 
uses China as the research setting to examine the role of external contextual forces in shaping 
Chinese MNEs’ post-entry operations, hence their success. In the next section, the author will 
explain the research context.  
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1.2 Research Context 
Few emerging markets have received as much attention as China given the country’s 
importance in driving global investment flows, especially the phenomenal growth of its 
outward FDI in the past few decades. China’s FDI outflows have risen from a negligible 
amount in the 1980s to approximately US$12 billion in 2005, and surged to US$127 billion 
in 2015 (see Figure 1.1). It is expected that the country will invest US$750 billion more in the 
next five years, making it one of the world’s biggest investors by 2020 (World Economic 
Forum, 2017). While early Chinese investment focused on energy and natural resource assets, 
Chinese MNEs have shown growing ambitions by expanding to virtually all sectors and 
countries around the globe in recent years. According to the Ministry of Commerce of China 
(MOFCOM), 20,200 Chinese companies set up operations in 188 countries and regions by 
2015. Additionally, the number of Chinese MNEs on the Fortune Global 500 list has 
increased from zero in 1990 to 106 firms in 2015 (The Wall Street Journal, 2016).  
Figure 1.1 China's Outward FDI stock and flow 1980 – 2015 
 Source: www.unctad.org  
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The rise of Chinese MNEs and their interactions with the external contextual environment 
has received growing attention. As scholarship tends to be interested in the unique 
characteristics of Chinese MNEs and their implications (Deng, 2013), investigating the role 
of external environmental factors in shaping the overseas success of these new players 
provides an important opportunity to advance knowledge in the field. For this thesis, the 
author suggests that China serves as an appropriate research setting for the following reasons.  
First, the international expansion of Chinese firms has been characterized by substantial 
home-country government involvement (Buckley, Yu, Liu, Munjal & Tao, 2016; Peng, 2012). 
Based on the appeals to national interests, the Chinese government announced its ‘go global’ 
strategy in the late 1990s to encourage firms to seek opportunities in the international market. 
Since then, incentives such as low-interest financing, favourable exchange rates and the 
streamlining of administrative procedures have been introduced to enable Chinese MNEs to 
undertake outward FDI and enhance their competitiveness in the global marketplace (Luo, 
Xue & Han, 2010).  
Second, the growth of Chinese MNEs has been regarded as an integral part of China’s 
national strategy (Child & Marinova, 2014). As home-country institutions can influence 
business activities both within and across national boundaries, the Chinese government has 
actively built up relations with other countries in addition to support at domestic level 
(Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev & Peng, 2013; Luo et al., 2010). International initiatives 
such as the signing of bilateral economic agreements, the establishment of the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the ongoing negotiation of the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) have been undertaken by the Chinese 
government to accommodate their firms’ cross-border operations.  
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Third, the involvement of the home-country government in Chinese MNEs’ foreign 
expansion has worried regulators and the public in many parts of the world. Recent examples 
include: some U.S. lawmakers’ concern about Chinese Wanda’s venture into the American 
entertainment industry and its potential political motives (The New York Times, 2016); the 
anti-subsidy investigation launched by the European Commission (EC) targeting a range of 
products from China (Financial Times, 2015); and public outcry against Chinese investment 
in some Southeast Asian and African states for the negative impact on local employment 
opportunities (The Economist, 2015). Hence, the influence of the home-country government 
may become a double-edged sword for Chinese firms, by offering various supports on the 
one hand, and imposing political challenges in overseas markets on the other hand.  
Overall, the abovementioned aspects indicate that external contextual factors, especially the 
home-country government, play a key role in shaping Chinese MNEs’ operations abroad. 
Thus, the author suggests that China represents a suitable and important research context not 
only due to the sheer size of its outward FDI, but also its distinctive home-country 
institutional background in affecting Chinese MNEs’ success in global markets. Next, the 
author will explicate the research rationale of this thesis.  
1.3 Research Rationale 
When doing business abroad, firms are exposed to multiple external environments including 
their home and host countries, as well as the interplay between the two in the international 
realm (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Extant literature has documented how the host-country 
institutional environment affects Chinese MNEs’ overseas expansion, notably locational 
choices (Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; Quer, Claver & Rienda, 2012), entry strategies (Meyer, Ding, 
Li & Zhang, 2014), and performance (Liu, Gao, Lu & Lioliou, 2016). However, our 
understanding about the relationship between home-country institutions and the overseas 
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success of these new players remains limited (Hoskisson et al., 2013). As Child and 
Marinova (2014) established, the involvement of the Chinese state in firms’ foreign 
expansion demands research to be sensitive to both home- and host-country contexts, and 
account for the implications of the institutional and political systems in those contexts for 
cross-border business operations. Therefore, the goal of this thesis is to uncover the 
importance of the home-country institutional environment and its interplay with other 
external contextual factors in shaping Chinese MNEs’ post-entry operations.  
Home-country institutions play a key role in explaining firms’ ability to maintain competitive 
advantages by enabling or constraining the acquisition of strategic resources and capabilities, 
which ultimately impact performance both at home and abroad (Marano, Arregle, Hitt, 
Spadafora & Essen, 2016). The lack of established market systems in China has made the 
Chinese government particularly influential in economic transactions (Child & Rodrigues, 
2005). Previous research has suggested that conformity to home-country institutional 
environment, especially government policies and strategies help Chinese MNEs receive 
support that allows them to leapfrog into foreign markets (Peng, 2012). However, little has 
been said about the importance of home-country institutional embeddedness, especially 
supportive policy in explaining firms’ post-entry performance. It has been posited that home-
government support is important to boost these new players’ competitiveness in global 
markets (Hoskisson et al., 2013). Yet, the effect of specific supportive measures, for example 
financial and non-financial incentives, on Chinese MNEs’ overseas performance has not been 
examined in greater depth.  
Moreover, extant research has assumed that the impact of institutional forces on MNEs’ 
operations is limited by state boundaries (Makino & Tsang, 2010; Meyer & Thein, 2014). As 
countries become increasingly interdependent with one another and embedded in the global 
system, the effectiveness of home-government policies in shaping firms’ success in overseas 
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markets may depend on the contextual combination and degree of interaction between firms’ 
home and host-country governments (Child & Marinova, 2014). This implies that the effect 
of home-country government policies on their firms’ operations abroad should be considered 
in combination with interstate relational factors to allow a comprehensive understanding of 
their joint impacts on MNEs’ international performance (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011). However, 
extant research tends to neglect such extra-territorial effects of home-country governments 
and their interface with interstate relational forces on cross-border business operations. To 
address this research gap regarding the role of the home-country government on Chinese 
firms’ international performance, this thesis examines the impact of home-government 
supportive measures on Chinese MNEs’ post-entry performance and their effects under the 
contingency of interstate relational factors.  
Mainstream literature focusing on developed country MNEs has maintained that the defective 
institutional governance conditions in many developing countries escalate the level of 
political risk faced by firms operating in these markets (Globerman & Shapiro, 2003). More 
recent research has pointed out that firms’ home-country origins may generate legitimacy or 
illegitimacy spill-over effects on cross-border business operations (Stevens & Newenham-
Kahindi, 2017). Yet, little is known about the implications of home-country legitimacy for 
the level of political risk encountered by MNEs operating in the global marketplace.  
The underdeveloped home-country institutional environment often leads EMMNEs to 
experience political challenges that go beyond a host-country’s institutional governance 
conditions (Globerman & Shapiro, 2009; Satyanand, 2010). It has been noted that these new 
contenders tend to face resistance in the host country (Child & Marinova, 2014). This may 
largely be ascribed to the lack of acceptance of their home country by host-country interested 
social stakeholders (Madhok & Keyhani, 2012). Such a legitimacy deficit may generate 
political consequences as these stakeholders are paramount in issuing firms with the ‘social 
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license to stay’ and are tightly intertwined with a country’s institutional governance rules to 
influence cross-border investment activities (Stevens, Xie & Peng, 2015). Despite the 
importance of these legitimacy-granting actors, scant attention has been paid to their role in 
shaping the level of political risk faced by EMMNEs operating abroad. To remedy this 
research gap regarding the implications of home-country legitimacy for the level of political 
risk encountered by EMMNEs, this thesis investigates the role of a set of legitimacy-granting 
actors and their interactions with a host-country’s governance conditions in shaping Chinese 
firms’ perceived level of such a risk in overseas markets.  
In addition to considering what determines the level of political risk faced by Chinese MNEs 
venturing abroad, an immediate follow on question is how such a risk is conceived from the 
viewpoint of these new players. Extant literature has commonly defined political risk as 
unexpected political changes in the host country that unfavourably influence business 
operations (Butler & Joaquin, 1998). Empirical research has taken the view for granted to 
examine how host-country political hazards such as regulatory and government instabilities 
affect Chinese MNEs’ overseas operations (Buckley et al., 2016). A core theme from this line 
of literature is that Chinese firms tend to exhibit confidence of operating in underdeveloped 
institutional environments, but that it is fraught with subtle obstacles such as political and 
regulatory suspicions in developed countries with established market systems (Child & 
Marinova, 2014). While interesting insights have been generated, the existing literature has 
mainly drawn from assumptions and theoretical frameworks used to study developed country 
MNEs (Hoskisson et al., 2013). Yet, a systematic body of analysis of how political risk is 
understood from Chinese firms’ perspective remains absent.  
Given the distinctive characteristics of Chinese MNEs, such as substantial home government 
influence in business operations and their lack of familiarity with international norms, the 
political issues they experience abroad are more heterogeneous than their developed country 
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counterparts (Bremmer, 2014). It has been recognized that the existing conceptualization of 
political risk focusing on host-country institutional deficiencies is too narrow to account for 
the diversity and complexity of issues faced by EMMNEs (Satyanand, 2010). Although calls 
have been made for more fine-grained analysis of political risk in international business 
(Stevens et al., 2015), few studies have considered how such a risk is conceived by Chinese 
MNEs operating in different institutional environments, for example developed and 
developing countries. To fill this research gap regarding the conceptualization of political 
risk from Chinese MNEs’ perspective, this thesis uncovers the way that political risk is 
conceived by these new players when competing in the global arena.  
1.4 Research Questions 
This dissertation aims to fulfil the abovementioned research gaps. Specifically, the author 
intends to investigate the following three research questions:  
Q1. Whether and to what extent does home-country government support have an 
impact on Chinese MNEs’ post-entry performance? Whether is their effect contingent 
upon the strength of interstate relations between firms’ home and host countries?  
Q2. How can we explain Chinese MNEs’ perceived level of host-country political risk 
in light of their home-country legitimacy with key stakeholders in the host country? 
Q3. How is political risk conceived by Chinese MNEs when operating in diverse 
institutional contexts such as developed and developing countries?  
The first research question looks at the effect of home-government support and their 
interactions with interstate relational factors on Chinese MNEs’ overseas subsidiary 
performance. The second research question addresses the role of home-country legitimacy 
with host-country interested stakeholders in shaping the level of political risk faced by 
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Chinese MNEs in international marketplaces. Additionally, the third research question 
explores how the notion of political risk is conceived from the perspective of these new 
contenders venturing in foreign markets. In the next section, the author will outline the 
intended contributions of this research project.  
1.5 Potential Contributions 
This thesis answers the above research questions by drawing insights from international 
business, GPE, and risk management literatures. The author intends to make a number of 
contributions to the research on MNEs in general and Chinese MNEs in particular.  
To address research question Q1, this thesis departs from existing research that assumes the 
immobility of contextual forces, which focuses on examining the impact of home-country 
government policy on business operations within national borders. Instead, it looks at 
whether such institutional forces travel abroad with firms and exert extra-territorial influence 
on their overseas performance. Moving beyond the generic proposition about home-country 
government support, it complements extant literature by differentiating the impact of two 
critical aspects of home-government support, namely financial and non-financial policy 
measures, on EMMNEs’ post-entry performance. Moreover, this thesis extends the existing 
research which builds upon the institutional perspective by incorporating insights from the 
GPE perspective. While the effect of both home and host-country institutional forces on 
EMMNEs’ foreign expansion has been documented (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Lu et al., 2014), 
research tends to neglect the fact that countries are embedded in the wider international 
relational context (Demirbag, McGuinness & Altay, 2010). Hence, the effect of home-
country government policies on EMMNEs’ activities abroad may be substantially shaped by 
the strength of relations between a firm’s home and host countries. By juxtaposing the 
institutional perspective with insights from the GPE perspective, we broaden the impact of 
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institutional forces beyond national borders by capturing the importance of interstate 
cooperation for facilitating cross-border economic activities at transnational level. In doing so, 
this research expands the theoretical boundary of the institutional perspective to interstate 
contexts, thus providing insights about the interplay of institutional forces at domestic and 
interstate levels in shaping EMMNEs’ post-entry performance. Additionally, the author 
examines two types of interstate relations, political and economic relations between firms’ 
home and host countries helps to uncover the different facets of interstate contexts in 
influencing EMMNEs’ post-entry performance. Thus, this study advances existing research 
on EMMNEs by systematically identifying various boundary conditions at an interstate level 
through which the impact of home-country government support on the subsidiary 
performance of EMMNEs varies. 
To answer research question Q2, the author highlights the notion of legitimacy under the 
institutional perspective to discover the role of home-country legitimacy with key 
stakeholders in the host country in explaining the level of political risk faced by Chinese 
MNEs in overseas markets. The findings shed new light on the determinants of Chinese firms’ 
perceived level of host-country political risk and fill the research gap in which previous 
research has mostly overlooked the importance of home-country’s social acceptance in 
determining the political perils faced by firms venturing internationally. In doing so, this 
research underscores home-country legitimacy as a determinant of MNEs’ perceived level of 
political risk in addition to host-country institutional governance factors. The author uncovers 
the relevance of MNEs’ home-country acceptance when examining political risk in 
international business research. Additionally, it adds to the existing literature by revealing the 
interaction effect of a host-country’s institutional governance conditions and legitimacy 
judgement by key stakeholders including host-country government, industrial agencies, and 
general public in shaping the level of political risk experienced by MNEs.  
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To address research question Q3, the author adopts a qualitative case study method to analyse 
how political risk is conceived by Chinese MNEs operating in the EU and Africa. This study 
departs from previous research, which assumed that political risks faced by EMMNEs are 
consistent with traditional definitions based on the experience of developed country MNEs by 
systematically unpacking the concept from Chinese MNEs’ perspective. Moreover, it 
enriches our understanding by revealing that these new players regard political risk as a 
multidimensional concept which is rooted in a number of home and host country, industry, 
and firm-behaviour sources. This finding is in stark contrast to the conventional belief that 
political risk is mostly related to host-country political volatilities. Furthermore, this study 
finds that Chinese MNEs’ perception of political risk varies depending on the external 
institutional environment. In more developed EU market settings, the home-country identity, 
industrial regulations and Chinese firms’ own behaviours are major sources of political risk. 
By contrast, political risk is rooted in host-country governance deficiencies and firms’ own 
behaviours for those operating in less developed African markets. These findings provide 
new insights by highlighting that the boundaries of political risk perceived by Chinese firms 
are much broader than those derived from developed country MNEs. 
1.6 The Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis contains five chapters. The main body of the thesis consists of three chapters 
which aim to address the research questions mentioned in Section 1.4.  
Chapter 2 examines the role home-government support and interstate relations on Chinese 
MNEs’ post-entry performance. The author looks at two critical aspects of home-government 
support, financial and non-financial policy incentives, in explaining Chinese MNEs’ overseas 
performance. Moreover, their effects under the contingency of interstate political and 
economic relations will be investigated.  
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Chapter 3 addresses the determinants of Chinese MNEs’ perceived levels of political risk in 
overseas markets. The author looks at how Chinese MNEs’ perceived level of host-country 
political risk can be explained in light of their home-country legitimacy with key stakeholders 
in the host-country. This chapter considers the role of host-country interested social 
stakeholders and their interactions with the country’s institutional governance conditions in 
explaining the level of political risk faced by Chinese firms.  
In Chapter 4, the author provides an in-depth account about how political risk is conceived 
from Chinese MNEs’ perspective using a qualitative case study approach. This chapter 
compares Chinese firms operating in institutionally and economically more stable EU 
member states and those in relatively underdeveloped African countries. The political risk 
experienced by Chinese MNEs that arise from a variety of country, industry, and firm-
behaviour sources will be identified and discussed.  
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the thesis by summarizing the key findings and research 
outcomes, discussing contributions, as well as pointing out the research limitations. This 
chapter will also offer the implications of the study for managers and policymakers, and 
suggest potential avenues for future research.  
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2. Implications of Home-country Government Support for Chinese 
MNEs’ Post-entry Performance 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the author addresses the first research question outlined in Chapter 1 – 
‘Whether and to what extent does home-country government support have an impact on 
Chinese MNEs’ post-entry performance? Whether is their effect contingent upon the strength 
of interstate relations between firms’ home and host countries?’  
The growing importance of emerging economies in the world economy accompanied by the 
surge of outward FDI by EMMNEs has spurred widespread academic attention (Demirbag & 
Yaprak, 2015; Luo & Tung, 2007; Keohane & Underdal, 2011; Ramamurti & Singh, 2009). 
One stream of existing research has focused on the role of home-country institutions, such as 
governments, in motivating and regulating EMMNEs (Child & Marinova, 2014; Lu, Liu & 
Wang, 2011; Luo et al., 2010). Findings of existing studies show that home-country 
government support compensates for EMMNEs’ lack of international experience and 
ownership disadvantages, and helps explain the puzzle concerning why these new contenders 
have rapidly internationalized in a short period of time (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Hong, Wang & 
Kafouros, 2015; Lu, Liu, Wright & Filatotchev, 2014). While extant research has enhanced 
our understanding of whether home-country government support influences the patterns, 
motivations and entry mode selections of outward FDI by EMMNEs, little attention has been 
paid to whether home-country government support can be translated into post-entry 
performance (Globerman & Shapiro, 2009; Hoskisson et al., 2013). This omission limits our 
understanding of the role of home-country government as a source of competitive advantage 
through EMMNEs’ institutional embeddedness at home and abroad, in shaping their post-
entry performance.  
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Moreover, extant research based on the institutional perspective has traditionally assumed 
that the impact of institutional forces on MNEs’ operations is bounded within national 
borders, thus providing few insights on institutional impact which resides in the broader 
international political and economic relations on cross-border business operations (Demirbag 
et al., 2010). As countries are embedded in the international context, home-government 
policies in shaping firms’ activities abroad are subject to the legitimacy approval of host-
country governments (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011). This implies that the effect of home-country 
government support on EMMNEs’ overseas performance may vary, depending on the level 
of interaction and strength of interstate relations between firms’ home and host countries 
(Lattemann, Alon, Spigrelli & Marinova, 2017). Therefore, research builds upon the 
institutional perspective by assuming the immobility of institutional forces overlooks 
interstate relations and its interaction with domestic institutional support from the home-
country government, jointly affecting EMMNEs’ post-entry performance. To remedy this 
omission, we adopt a more holistic framework which considers the interplay between within-
country institutional and interstate relational forces in affecting the overseas operations of 
EMMNEs. 
Drawing insights from the GPE perspective, we consider interstate relations as the boundary 
conditions of EMMNEs’ post-entry performance. GPE scholars emphasise the role of a set of 
commonly accepted rules and norms by a group of countries in governing their relationships 
with each other (Claes & Knutsen, 2011). While the principles and rules under the 
international regime may not have any binding or legally enforceable power, they help 
countries to establish stable mutual expectations about the patterns of behaviours for each 
other and allow countries to adapt themselves to new situations (Keohane, 1984). They also 
help promote information flow and reduce uncertainty, as well as facilitating cooperation at 
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intergovernmental level and hence help countries to gain from economic exchanges and 
pursue national objectives (Keohane & Underdal, 2011). 
Both the institutional and the GPE perspectives highlight the impact of rules and norms on 
cross-border economic exchange. Yet, the latter embraces the importance of institutional 
forces operating at transnational level in shaping firms’ international operations (Keohane, 
2005; Ruggie, 1975). A number of international business scholars have pointed out the 
importance of considering both home-country government support and interstate relations to 
understand the implications of broad institutional embeddedness for EMMNEs’ international 
success (Child & Marinova, 2014; Li, Newenham-Kahindi, Shapiro & Chen, 2013). This 
chapter investigates whether home-country government support has an impact on Chinese 
MNEs’ post-entry performance and the extent to which such an impact is contingent on 
interstate relations between firms’ home and host countries. By doing so, it helps to extend 
our understanding about the joint effect of institutional forces at domestic and interstate level 
in affecting cross-border business operations.  
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the existing literature about the role 
of the home-country government and interstate relations on MNEs’ international performance, 
followed by the theoretical background in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4, a number of hypotheses 
are developed by leveraging insights from the institutional perspective and GPE perspective. 
The author describes the sample and variables used in the study in Section 2.5, while the 
empirical results are presented in the subsequent section. Finally, the findings are discussed 
in Section 2.7, followed by the conclusion. 
2.2 Literature Review 
This section reviews extant research regarding the impact of the home-country government 
and interstate relational factors on MNEs’ overseas performance based on the institutional 
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and the GPE perspectives. The aim is to critically evaluate previous research that looked at 
contextual forces at both domestic and interstate levels in explaining MNEs’ international 
performance. 
2.2.1 Institutional perspective and MNEs’ international performance 
The institutional perspective has become one of the key theoretical lenses in international 
business research (Bruton, Ahlstrom & Li, 2010; Meyer & Peng, 2016; Wu & Chen, 2014). It 
integrates distinct intellectual foundations including institutional economics which 
conceptualizes institutions as incentive structures to enable or constrain economic exchange 
(North, 1990; Wan, 2005), organizational sociology that regards institutions as pressures for 
legitimacy on members within a given organizational field (Cui & Jiang, 2012; DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983), and the political bargaining perspective which considers institutions as the 
outcome of bargaining between business and governments (Lecraw, 1984; Li, Peng & 
Macaulay, 2013). Although these approaches emphasize different aspects of business-
environment interactions, they tend to hinge on the point that organizational actions are 
shaped by contextual forces in the wider institutional environment. 
The term ‘institution’ broadly refers to the regulatory, normative and cognitive structures that 
define the socially acceptable behaviours within a society (Bruton et al., 2010; North, 1990; 
Scott, 2003). Regulatory (formal) institutions are codified rules that establish a country’s 
political and regulatory arrangements (Peng, Wang & Jiang, 2008). Normative and cognitive 
(informal) institutions involve durable beliefs and norms that determine societal structures 
and behaviours (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Research built upon the institutional perspective 
has examined the impact of regulatory, normative and cognitive forces in shaping cross-
border business operations. This review focuses on the regulatory institutional domain, 
especially the role of the home-country government, given its importance in affecting firms to 
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develop resources and capabilities that allow them to interact with other players in the global 
marketplace (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011). 
To date, a sizeable body of literature has analysed how host-country government affects 
MNEs’ foreign entry strategies, human resource management practices, survival, and 
performance (Meyer & Thein, 2014; Peng et al., 2008). In contrast, the effect of the home-
country government in shaping firms’ international performance has generally been an 
underappreciated area. Extant research has noted that home government plays a vital role in 
determining business ownership types, affecting market efficiency, and setting the rules of 
competition (Hobdari, Gammeltoft, Li & Meyer, 2017). Thus, its relevance in shaping MNEs’ 
success in the global market deserves greater scrutiny. Here, the author provides an account 
of the role of the home-country government in explaining the international expansion and 
performance of both developed country MNEs and EMMNEs.  
The effect of the home-country government on developed country MNEs’ international 
performance 
Previous research focused on MNEs from advanced economies has reached a consensus that 
well-established home-country political and regulatory systems have enabled these firms to 
flourish globally. For instance, Aoki (2001) noted the presence of home-government support 
in explaining the different types of resources available to the U.S. and Japanese companies. 
Wan and his co-authors observed that the munificent home-country institutional environment 
in terms of adequate intellectual property protection and antitrust regulations augments 
developed country MNEs’ competitiveness in overseas markets (Wan, 2005; Wan & 
Hoskisson, 2003). Jackson and Deeg (2008) posited that the different institutional 
configurations in liberal market economies (U.S., UK, and Canada) and coordinated 
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economies (Germany, Sweden, and Austria) confer firms with different competitive 
advantages in innovative capabilities and resource access. 
In addition to supports that are available at domestic level, the home-country government has 
been found to influence MNEs’ operations outside the country’s boundaries. By looking at 
MNEs from sixteen high-income economies, Elango and Sethi (2007) reported that the well-
functioning market systems in these countries tend to generate positive spill-over effects to 
promote their firms’ image and performance when competing globally. Thus, a central theme 
to emerge from this line of research suggests that home-government support can boost 
developed country MNEs’ international performance both within and across state borders. 
Table 2.1 provides a summary of previous research that looked at the effect of home-country 
government support on developed country MNEs’ international competitiveness and success.  
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Table 2.1 A summary of existing research on the relationship between the home-country government and developed country MNEs’ international performance 
Author(s) (Year) Theme(s) Methodology and Sample Role of the Home Government Key Findings 
Aoki (2001) How does the home-
country institutional 
environment influence the 
effectiveness of national 
innovation system? 
Case study. National 
innovation systems and 
organizational forms in the 
U.S. and Japan 
Supportive within state borders Home-government support is a key 
determinant of resources available to 
firms. It explains the U.S. and 
Japanese MNEs' competitive 
advantages in innovation and 
organizational capabilities 
Wan & Hoskisson (2003) Determinants of MNEs' 
overseas performance 
Empirical. Panel data on 
MNEs from six Western 
European countries 
Supportive within state borders Home-government support in terms 
of adequate intellectual property 
protection and anti-trust regulations 
augments MNEs' overseas 
performance 
Wan (2005) How does the home-
country institutional 
environment influence 
MNEs’ overseas 
performance?  
Conceptual. Supportive within state borders The munificent home-country 
institutional environment prompts 
developed country MNEs to develop 
market capabilities such as superior 
brands and technologies, which 
contribute to their performance in the 
overseas market 
Elango & Sethi (2007) Determinants of MNEs' 
overseas performance 
Empirical. Panel data on 
MNEs from sixteen high-
income economies  
Supportive across state borders The well-established home-country 
market system plays an important role 
to promote developed country MNEs' 
overseas performance 
 20 
 
Jackson & Deeg (2008) How do institutional 
configurations in liberal 
market economies (U.S., 
UK, and Canada) and 
coordinated market 
economies (Austria, 
Germany, and Sweden) 
affect firms' performance? 
Conceptual. Supportive within state borders Different institutional configurations 
in these two types of capitalism have 
different implications for their MNEs' 
organizational and innovative 
capabilities 
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The effect of the home-country government on EMMNEs’ international expansion and 
performance 
Unlike their counterparts from advanced economies, the role of the home-country 
government in explaining EMMNEs’ international expansion and performance tends to be 
more complicated (Luo et al., 2010; Peng, 2012). Research probing into the impact of 
EMMNEs’ home-country government has provided mixed arguments, which may be 
classified as an ‘institutional escapism’ perspective, a ‘supportive’ perspective, and a 
‘political’ perspective.  
The ‘institutional escapism’ perspective has contended that the institutional weakness of 
EMMNEs’ home countries such as limited property rights protection, government 
bureaucracy, and poor legal enforcement considerably heighten business costs (Boisot & 
Meyer, 2008). Outward FDI is a response of EMMNEs to escape from their burdensome 
home-country environment (Lu et al., 2011). For instance, Boisot and Meyer (2008) showed 
that local protectionism and adverse domestic policies have prompted Chinese companies to 
seek for less repressive institutional environments abroad. Kalotay and Sulstarova (2010) 
noted Russian MNEs invest abroad to guard themselves against domestic interventions. 
Hoskisson et al. (2013) documented how various restrictions imposed by the home-country 
government have limited EMMNEs to operate and compete in international markets. 
Although previous research built upon the institutional escapism view has generated insights 
about the impact of the home-country government on EMMNEs’ international expansion, 
little attention has been paid to their effect in shaping the performance of these new players in 
global marketplaces.  
In contrast to the ‘institutional escapism’ view, a second line of research has argued that the 
home-country government plays a facilitating role to promote EMMNEs’ international 
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expansion. Research that rests upon this ‘supportive’ view has maintained that outward FDI 
from emerging markets has been substantially enabled by the liberalization of regulatory 
frameworks and supportive policies at home. Kumar (2007) observed that home-government 
policy reforms have allowed Indian firms to invest in both developed and developing 
countries. Similarly, Buckley et al. (2007) suggested that the surge of FDI from China has 
been explained by the country’s capital market imperfections and policy liberalizations. Lu et 
al. (2014) showed that knowledge and information support offered by home government can 
enhance Chinese firms’ risk-taking capabilities in foreign markets. Using a sample of 
Vietnamese companies, Nguyen, Le and Bryant (2013) reported that home-country policy 
transparency helps to elevate firms’ exporting performance. Therefore, with few exceptions 
(e.g. Nguyen et al., 2013), research that adopts the ‘supportive view’ has not yet 
systematically examined the role of home-country government support in shaping EMMNEs’ 
post-entry performance.  
As the institutional environment in many emerging markets evolves, research has recognized 
that the home-country government plays both positive and negative roles behind the 
international expansion, hence the success of these new contenders (Peng, 2012; Rui & Yip, 
2008). The changing attitudes of EMMNEs’ home-country government toward outward FDI 
activities to a large extent reflect their national political and economic objectives (Luo et al., 
2010). This necessitates assessing the interactions between the home-country government and 
EMMNEs through a ‘political’ lens. Luo et al.’s (2010) seminal work illustrated the evolution 
of Chinese state policy toward outward FDI activities and the intention of the government in 
fostering top MNEs to project the country’s global influence. A number of studies have 
reported that Chinese firms’ political affiliations and alignment with home-government 
development agendas affect the support available for their foreign expansions (Buckley et al., 
2016; Cui & Jiang, 2012). Additionally, Child and Marinova (2014) pointed out that Chinese 
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outward FDI is an extended arm of the country’s foreign policy, thus analysis of home-
government support should be sensitive to different combinations of home- and host-country 
institutional contexts. However, few have explicitly considered the role of the home-country 
government and its extra-territorial influence in different host-country contexts in affecting 
EMMNEs’ international success. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 present a summary of previous research 
that investigated the effect of the home-country government in driving EMMNEs’ 
international expansion and success. 
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Table 2.2 A summary of existing research on the relationship between the home-country government and EMMNEs’ international expansion 
Author(s) (Year)        Theme(s) Methodology and Sample Role of the Home Government         Key Findings 
Child & Rodrigues (2005) How does the home-
country institutional 
environment affect MNEs' 
international expansion? 
Conceptual. Both supportive and restrictive 
within state borders 
The substantial involvement of state 
government in Chinese firms' foreign 
expansion highlight the need of 
considering the role of the home-
country government in the research of 
EMMNEs 
Buckley et al. (2007) Determinants of FDI 
outflow 
Empirical.                                  
Panel data on Chinese 
outward FDI 
Supportive within state borders Home-government financial support 
and policy liberalization are key 
determinants in explaining the surge of 
Chinese outward FDI 
Kumar (2007) Determinants of FDI 
outflow 
Empirical.                                  
Panel data on Indian 
MNEs 
Supportive within state borders Home-government policy 
liberalizations have enabled Indian 
MNEs to invest in both developed and 
developing countries 
Witt & Lewin (2007) How does the home-
country institutional 
environment affect MNEs' 
decision to invest abroad? 
Conceptual. Restrictive within state borders Outward FDI is a response to escape 
from the misalignment between 
business objectives and firms’ home-
country institutional environment 
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Boisot & Meyer (2008) How does the home-
country institutional 
environment affect MNEs' 
decision to invest abroad? 
Conceptual. Restrictive within state borders Strategic exit from burdensome 
domestic institutional environment 
rather than strategic entry into foreign 
markets may explain the 
internationalization of many Chinese 
MNEs 
Rui & Yip (2008) How does the home-
country institutional 
environment affect MNEs' 
international strategies? 
Empirical.                             
Case studies with three 
Chinese firms 
Both supportive and restrictive 
within state borders 
Chinese MNEs not only take outward 
FDI to overcome constraints, but also 
augment supports from their home-
country government. 
Kalotay & Sulstarova (2010) Determinants of FDI 
outflow 
Empirical.                                  
Panel data on Russian 
outward FDI 
Restrictive within state borders Some Russian MNEs use outward FDI 
to avoid domestic interventions 
Lu et al. (2011) Determinants of MNEs' 
motives for outward FDI 
Empirical.                 
Questionnaire survey 
with Chinese private 
firms 
Supportive within state borders Supportive home-government policies 
are important motivators for both 
strategic asset-seeking and market-
seeking Chinese outward FDI 
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Cui & Jiang (2012) Determinants of MNEs' 
foreign entry strategies  
Empirical.               
Questionnaire survey 
with Chinese MNEs 
Supportive within and across state 
borders 
Chinese MNEs' political affiliations 
with their home government increase 
firms' resource dependency on home-
country institutions and influence its 
image perceived by host-country 
institutional constituents 
Peng (2012) How does the home-
country institutional 
environment affect MNEs' 
international expansion? 
Conceptual. Both supportive and restrictive 
within state borders 
Chinese government has played both a 
positive and a negative role behind 
Chinese outward FDI 
Hoskisson et al. (2013) How does the home-
country institutional 
environment affect MNEs' 
international expansion? 
Conceptual. Both supportive and restrictive 
within state borders 
Home-country institutional 
development exerts considerable 
influence over the international 
strategies of firms from emerging 
economies. 
Lu et al. (2014) Determinants of MNEs' 
locational strategies 
Empirical.                             
Panel data on Chinese 
MNEs 
Supportive within state borders Home-government support enables 
Chinese firms' internationalization by 
supplying information and enhancing 
firms' risk-taking capabilities in 
foreign countries 
Buckley et al. (2016) Determinants of MNEs' 
locational strategies 
Empirical.                               
Panel data on Chinese 
MNEs 
Supportive within and across state 
borders 
The industrial and geographical 
distributions of Chinese outward FDI 
are influenced by the political and 
strategic objectives of the Chinese 
government 
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Table 2.3 A summary of existing research on the relationship between the home-country government and EMMNEs’ international performance 
Author(s) (Year)        Theme(s) Methodology and Sample Role of the Home Government          Key Findings 
Luo et al. (2010) How does the home-
country institutional 
environment affect MNEs' 
international success? 
Conceptual. Supportive within and across state 
borders 
Home government influence on 
Chinese outward FDI need to be 
considered from a political economy 
perspective.  
Nguyen et al. (2013) Determinants of MNEs' 
overseas performance 
Empirical.             
Questionnaire survey with 
Vietnamese private firms 
Supportive within state borders Home-government policy transparency 
and information provision augment the 
export performance of Vietnamese 
companies 
Child & Marinova (2014) How do contextual forces 
affect MNEs' international 
success? 
Conceptual. Supportive within and across state 
borders 
Outward FDI is an extended arm of 
China’s foreign policy which is 
motivated by the country's strategic 
interests. Analysis of Chinese MNEs' 
international success should be 
sensitive to both home- and host-
country institutional contexts 
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2.2.2 GPE perspective and MNEs’ international performance 
Technological breakthroughs and globalization have made international economic activities 
and international political activities more relevant to one another. This has given rise to the 
GPE perspective which integrates the study of international economics and international 
politics to look at the mutual interaction of state and market across national boundaries 
(Gilpin, 2001; O’Brien & Williams, 2013).  
While powerful market forces such as trade and investment are motivated to jump across 
state borders to pursue profit maximization, the objective of the state government is to 
channel such activities to serve the perceived national interests (Keohane, 2005). The 
establishment of interstate relations with other countries are important means for the state to 
influence cross-border economic exchanges (Rangan & Sengul, 2009). Here, the author 
reviews extant literature about how political and economic relational factors have been 
leveraged at interstate level to affect MNEs’ expansions and success in overseas markets.   
The effect of interstate political relations on MNEs’ international expansion and performance 
Research drawn from the GPE perspective posits that firms respond to international political 
factors in their investment decisions (Biglaiser & DeRouen, 2007; Desbordes, 2010). 
Empirical studies examining the role of interstate political relations have shown how military 
conflict and alliance, as well as foreign policy alignment between firms’ home and host 
countries can affect MNEs’ international expansion and performance.  
(i) Interstate military conflict and alliance 
States step into military conflicts and security alliances for a variety of reasons: to adjust 
power distributions; to react to threats; to balance security and autonomy; or because of 
similar or different political ideologies (Arikan & Shenkar, 2013; Li & Vashchilko, 2010). 
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Studies built upon the GPE-based literature found that the strength of interstate security 
relations, as indicated by the occurrence of military tensions and formation of security 
alliances, substantially affects FDI outflows from developed countries. By examining U.S. 
manufacturing MNEs’ global expansions, Nigh (1985) observed that interstate conflicts 
reduce the flow of U.S. investment to a host country whilst interstate cooperation increase it. 
Li and Vashchilko (2010) revealed comparable findings where military tensions and security 
alliances are critical in determining bilateral investment flows from OECD countries to non-
OECD countries. Desbordes (2010) similarly reported that the frequency of military conflicts 
has a negative effect on the U.S. FDI flow into developing countries. Additionally, Makino 
and Tsang (2011) noted that Vietnam’s military engagements with the U.S. and China 
respectively hampered FDI outflows from these two countries.  
Previous research has mainly analysed the effect of interstate military conflict and 
cooperation on FDI outflows from developed countries. Yet, the role of interstate political 
relations in shaping MNEs’ post-entry performance remains an underexplored area. 
Additionally, the changing political and economic climates, especially the proliferation of 
supra-national institutions governing global affairs such as the United Nations (UN) and the 
growing salience of emerging economies in international affairs, have motivated scholars to 
consider whether and how foreign policy positions between firms’ home and host countries 
can influence the international expansion and success of MNEs from both developed and 
developing countries.  
(ii) Foreign policy alignment 
The affinity of foreign policy positions between countries has been found to play a pivotal 
role in promoting cross-border investment activities for firms from both developed countries 
and emerging markets. Using country-level data on U.S. FDI to 126 developing countries, 
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Biglaiser and DeRouen (2007) found that the alignment of foreign policies signified by the 
presence of U.S. troops in the host country are positively related to their likelihood of 
receiving investment from the U.S. Dai, Eden and Beamish (2013) posited that the affinity in 
foreign policy positions indicated by countries’ voting patterns at the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) may increase Japanese MNEs’ chances of survival in volatile political 
environments. 
Additionally, the remarkable economic growth of emerging markets and rise of EMMNEs 
have made them an increasingly important power in today’s multi-polar global system. 
Duanmu (2014) maintained that the shared foreign policy positions between China and the 
host country has served as useful political leverage to shield Chinese MNEs from host-
government expropriation. Gao, Liu and Lioliou (2015) reported that aid donation by the 
Chinese government has enabled their firms to receive favourable treatment in some 
underdeveloped African countries.  
Thus, despite MNEs investing abroad to pursue profitability, the strength of interstate 
political relations can substantially shape their expansion and success in foreign markets. The 
author summarizes existing research about the role of interstate political relations in affecting 
MNEs’ international expansion and performance in Tables 2.4 and 2.5, respectively.  
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Table 2.4 A summary of existing research on the relationship between interstate political relations and MNEs’ international expansion 
Author(s) (Year) Theme(s) Methodology & Sample Measurement of Interstate Political Relations Key Findings       
Panel A: Outward FDI by developed country MNEs        
Nigh (1985) Determinants of FDI 
outflow 
Empirical.                               
Panel data on U.S. 
manufacturing MNEs to 24 
developed and developing 
countries 
Frequency of interstate conflict and cooperation 
between the U.S. and the host country during a 
given year 
Interstate conflicts 
reduce U.S. MNEs' 
investment to a 
host country 
whereas interstate 
cooperation 
increases it 
   
Biglaser & DeRouen (2007) Determinants of FDI 
outflow 
Empirical.                               
Panel data on U.S. FDI to 
126 developing countries                            
The presence of the U.S. troops in the host 
country 
Shared foreign 
policy positions are 
positively 
associated with 
U.S. FDI to a host 
country 
   
Desbordes (2010) Determinants of FDI 
outflow 
Empirical.                           
Panel data on U.S. FDI to 
20 developing countries  
The occurrence and intensity of interstate 
military events between the U.S. and the host 
country 
Interstate military 
tensions have a 
negative effect on 
U.S. MNEs 
investing in 
developing 
countries 
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Li & Vashchilko (2011) Determinants of FDI 
outflow 
Empirical.                               
Panel data on FDI outflow 
from OECD countries to 
other OECD countries and 
non-OECD countries  
The occurrence of interstate military conflicts 
and formation of security alliances between 
OECD countries and non-OECD countries 
Interstate military 
conflicts are 
negatively 
influence outward 
FDI from OECD 
countries to non-
OECD countries 
whereas security 
alliances increase it 
   
Makino & Tsang (2011) 
 
 
 
 
Determinants of MNEs' 
entry timing 
Empirical.                              
Panel data on wholly-
owned subsidiaries and 
joint ventures formed in 
Vietnam by MNEs from 35 
countries and regions                          
The occurrence of interstate military conflict 
between MNEs' home countries and Vietnam 
Interstate relational 
factors affect the 
institutional 
development in 
Vietnam. MNEs 
from home 
countries that 
experienced 
military tensions 
with Vietnam tend 
to be latecomers to 
the country  
   
 
Panel B: Outward FDI by EMMNEs 
Duanmu (2014) Determinant of FDI 
outflow 
Empirical.                                     
Panel data on Chinese 
outward FDI 
Countries' voting pattern at the UNGA Foreign policy alignments 
have enabled Chinese 
MNEs to navigate through 
host-government 
expropriation risk 
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Table 2.5 A summary of existing research on the relationship between interstate political relations and MNEs’ international performance 
Author(s) (Year) Theme(s) Methodology & Sample Measurement of Interstate Political Relations Key Findings       
Panel A: Outward FDI by developed country MNEs        
Dai et al. (2013) Determinants of MNEs' 
likelihood of survival in 
overseas markets 
Empirical.                            
Panel data on wholly-
owned subsidiaries and 
joint ventures formed 
between Japanese MNEs 
and local partners in 25 
high-risk countries  
Countries' voting pattern at the UNGA Foreign policy 
affinity may 
enhance Japanese 
MNEs' chances of 
survival in political 
conflict zones 
   
 
    Panel B: Outward FDI by EMMNEs 
Gao et al. (2015)  How do within-country 
institutional factors and 
interstate political relations 
influence Chinese MNEs' 
post-entry operations? 
Case study.                              
Five Chinese MNEs 
operating in developed and 
developing countries 
N/A Aid donations have 
allowed Chinese 
MNEs to receive 
favourable treatment 
in some 
underdeveloped 
African countries. 
By contrast, 
ideological 
differences tend to 
impose additional 
barriers to firms' 
expansion in 
developed countries.  
   
 34 
 
The effect of interstate economic relations on MNEs’ international expansion and 
performance 
While attention has been paid to the impact of interstate political relations on MNEs’ 
expansion and success in foreign markets, cooperation and conflict between countries in 
international affairs are not mutually exclusive (Desbordes & Vicard, 2009). It is common to 
see that states collaborate in certain fields but antagonize in other areas. Thus, the quality of 
interstate economic relations has been suggested to exert critical influence over the 
effectiveness of international business transactions (Desbordes & Vicard, 2009; Jandhyala & 
Weiner, 2014). Extant research has considered two economic relational factors – trade 
dependency and interstate economic agreements – in affecting MNEs’ expansion and success 
in global marketplaces. 
(i) Trade dependency 
An important consequence of market activities for states is due to the fact that economic 
interdependence creates a hierarchical, dependent, and power relationships among groups and 
societies (Gilpin, 2001). The asymmetry of economic power generates vulnerabilities that can 
be manipulated by those hold relatively stronger power against others (Pfeffer, 1987). This 
theoretical insight has been extended to economic exchange activities in the international 
realm (Duanmu, 2014; Rangan & Sengul, 2009).  
Despite states desiring autonomy, they may depend on specific other nations to provide them 
with markets, security, and energy access (Askari, Forrer, Yang & Hachem, 2005; Flores-
Macías & Kreps, 2013). Power dependency in these key domains leads them to establish 
relations with certain other states. Ramamurti’s (2001) two-tier bargaining model explained 
that states possessing greater bargaining powers in the economic and security realms tend to 
obtain more favourable treatment for their firms operating in the host country. The 
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asymmetrical trading relations generate state-on-state power that has frequently been used by 
some governments to constrain the behaviours and decisions of their trading partners (Askari 
et al., 2005). Duanmu (2014) followed this logic by arguing that the asymmetry of trading 
powers between China and other countries has been exploited by the Chinese government to 
safeguard their firms’ operations in overseas markets.  
In relation to MNEs’ international performance, Rangan and Sengul (2009) noted that MNEs 
from home countries with stronger trading powers vis-à-vis the host country tend to enjoy 
greater economic success there. Hence, a key tenet of research built upon the power 
dependency lens highlights that the asymmetry of trading power between countries can be 
manipulated by MNEs’ home government to enable their firms’ expansion and success 
abroad.  
(ii) Interstate economic agreements 
The GPE-based literature has maintained that common membership in socio-economic 
organizations helps to foster trust and smooth economic activities among participating states 
(Keohane, 1984; Büthe & Milner, 2008). In a bilateral context, economic cooperation 
represents an institutionalized commitment to promote investment flows and business 
operations between countries (Desbordes & Vicard, 2009; Jandhyala & Weiner, 2014). 
Empirical studies resting upon this argument have shown mixed evidence regarding the role 
of interstate economic agreements in driving MNEs’ expansion and success in foreign 
countries. Some found that economic cooperation through the presence of interstate economic 
treaties has a significant and positive effect in attracting FDI from developed countries. For 
instance, it has been shown that the enforcement of interstate investment agreements helps to 
stimulate FDI from developed countries by alleviating host-country’s defective institutional 
governance conditions and protecting MNEs from deteriorating interstate political relations 
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(Desbordes & Vicard, 2009; Egger & Pfaffermayr, 2004; Jandhyala & Weiner, 2014; 
Neumayer & Spess, 2005). Others have contended that the effect of such agreements on 
MNEs’ foreign expansion is limited in the face of national sovereignty and the protection of 
environment and society (Berger, Busse, Nunnenkamp & Roy, 2011; Spears, 2010).  
Although research has reaped interesting insights about the importance of interstate economic 
agreements in stimulating investment flows, their impact upon MNEs’ post-entry 
performance has largely been neglected. Additionally, the majority of existing research has 
examined how the presence of economic treaties helps to explain investment from developed 
countries. Yet, their effect on firms from emerging markets has received relatively little 
attention. Given the growing salience of EMMNEs, it highlights the need for understanding 
the role of interstate economic agreements in shaping the post-entry success of these new 
players. Tables 2.6 and 2.7 summarize previous research on the role of interstate economic 
relations in explaining MNEs’ international expansion and performance. 
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Table 2.6 A summary of existing research on the relationship between interstate economic relations and MNEs’ international expansion 
Author(s) (Year) Theme(s) 
Methodology & 
Sample 
Measurement of                         
Interstate Economic Relations Key Findings 
Panel A: Outward FDI by developed country MNEs     
Egger & Pfaffermayr (2004) Determinants of 
FDI outflow 
Empirical.                
Panel data on 
outward FDI from 
OECD countries 
The enforcement of interstate 
economic treaties between a pair of 
countries 
The enforcement of interstate 
economic treaties has a significant 
positive effect on outward FDI from 
OECD countries to other OECD and 
non-OECD countries 
Neumayer & Spess (2005) Determinants of 
FDI outflow 
Empirical.                
Panel data on 
outward FDI from 
OECD countries 
The cumulative number of 
interstate economic treaties 
developing countries have signed 
with OECD countries 
A higher number of economic 
treaties signed between a developing 
country and OECD member states 
raises FDI to the country 
Desbordes & Vicard (2009) Determinants of 
FDI outflow 
Empirical.                   
Panel data on 
bilateral FDI stock 
among OECD 
countries, and 
between OECD and 
non-OECD 
countries 
 
The enforcement of interstate 
investment treaty between two 
countries 
The enforcement of interstate 
economic treaties shield MNEs from 
deteriorating interstate political 
relations 
Berger et al. (2011) Determinants of 
inward FDI 
Empirical.                              
Panel data on 
outward FDI from 
14 source countries 
to 83 developing 
countries  
The presence of bilateral/regional 
trade agreement, double taxation 
treaty, and a common currency 
The effect of interstate economic 
agreements in promoting FDI inflow 
to developing countries tends to be 
limited 
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Spears (2010) How can 
countries strike a 
balance between 
the enforcement 
of investment 
treaties and 
protection of 
environment and 
society? 
 
Conceptual N/A The implementation of international 
investment treaties presents 
considerable challenges to the 
protection of environment and 
society.  
Jandhyala & Weiner (2014) 
 
 
 
 
Determinants of 
the level of 
political risk 
faced by MNEs 
in overseas 
markets 
Empirical.                   
Panel data on 
petroleum reserve-
transaction 
announcements in 
45 countries 
The presence of interstate 
investment agreement between 
countries and membership in the 
Energy Charter Treaty 
The presence of interstate investment 
agreements lower the degree of 
political risk faced by MNEs in the 
host country 
Panel B: Outward FDI by EMMNEs 
Duanmu (2014) Determinants of FDI 
outflow 
Empirical.                          
Panel data on Chinese 
outward FDI 
Degree of export dependence between 
China and the host country 
The degree of export dependence of the 
host country on China alleviates the 
expropriation risks faced by Chinese 
MNEs in the host country 
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Table 2.7 A summary of existing research on the relationship between interstate economic relations and MNEs’ international performance 
Author(s) (Year) Theme(s) Methodology & Sample 
Measurement of                         
Interstate Economic Relations Key Findings 
Ramamurti (2001) How does the bargaining 
power between a firm's 
home and host countries 
influence its operation 
abroad? 
 Conceptual N/A The treatment that an MNE receives 
abroad depends on the bargaining 
power of its home-country 
government in interstate security and 
economic domains in relation to the 
host-country government.  
Rangan & Sengul (2009) Determinants of MNEs' 
overseas performance 
 Empirical.                          
Cross-sectional data on 
MNEs from 23 home 
countries 
Degree of export dependence 
between a firm's home and host 
countries 
MNEs from home countries with 
stronger trading power in relation to 
the host country enjoy greater 
success there 
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In summary, while extant literature has underscored the importance of the home-country 
government in encouraging EMMNEs to undertake FDI activities, little is known about its 
role in shaping the post-entry performance of these new contenders. Moreover, a predominant 
assumption of previous research built upon the institutional perspective was the immobility of 
contextual forces in affecting cross-border investment (Makino & Tsang, 2011). Yet, the 
heavy involvement of the home-country government in EMMNEs’ international expansion 
may challenge this conventional wisdom. Despite liberalizations having taken place in the 
past few decades, state government in many emerging markets remain a key force in 
directing business activities both within and beyond state borders. Thus, there is the need to 
complement research built upon the institutional perspective with insights from other 
research fields such as the GPE perspective to understand the role of the home-country 
government in explaining EMMNEs’ post-entry performance. In this chapter, the author is 
motivated to look at two questions: (1) whether home-government support can be extended to 
boost Chinese MNEs’ post-entry performance; and (2) whether their effect is subject to the 
strength of interstate relations between firms’ home and host countries.  
2.3 Theoretical Background 
This study examines the impact of home-government support on Chinese firms’ post-entry 
performance. Furthermore, the strength of their association in the context of interstate 
relations will be investigated by combining arguments from the institutional perspective and 
the GPE perspective.  
2.3.1 Institutional embeddedness and EMMNEs’ post-entry performance 
Institutions are defined as a set of external isomorphic pressures that lay down the legitimate 
norms with respect to how things should be conducted, thereby provide the social structures 
and create templates for organizational action (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Peng, 
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2016). As firms are embedded in the institutional context, conformity to institutional 
prescriptions of appropriate conduct helps them to gain legitimacy from powerful 
institutional constituents (Baum & Oliver, 1992). Institutional embeddedness refers to the 
interconnections or institutional linkages between firms and key institutions in the 
environment in which they operate (Oliver, 1997). Such embeddedness increases firms’ 
survival and success by conferring resource access and acting as buffers to protect firms from 
environmental uncertainty (Hung, 2005; Kostova, 1999; Kostova, Roth & Dacin, 2008). 
More specifically, EMMNEs are embedded in institutional contexts of both home and host 
countries. Home-country embeddedness implies that EMMNEs can obtain support from their 
home-country government when their strategy is aligned with their home-country 
government (Meyer, Mudambi & Narula, 2011). This is particularly the case for Chinese 
MNEs, given that the Chinese government has adopted the ‘going global’ strategy as a 
strategic pathway for economic development at country level and has implemented 
government policy, including both financial and non-financial support aiming at promoting 
Chinese firms’ international expansion (Lu et al., 2014; Luo et al., 2010). Thus, home-
country government support represents an enabler which enhances the international 
competitiveness of its MNEs.  
As emerging economies become increasingly integrated with the global market, the 
governments of these countries have realized that supporting their firms to become world-
class MNEs can project their influence beyond national boundaries (Child & Marinova, 
2014). Thus, they become a powerful ally to EMMNEs by not only offering direct support 
such as providing capital and information, but also indirect support including negotiation of 
interstate treaties with host-country governments to further enhance their firms’ 
competitiveness when operating in host countries (Hoskisson et al., 2013). However, the 
impact of home-country institutional environment, such as government support channeled 
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through interstate relations has received little attention due to the assumption that institutional 
forces tend to be internationally immobile (Meyer et al., 2011; Mudambi & Navarra, 2002). 
This line of enquiry overlooks the fact that countries are themselves embedded in a broader 
international context. Interactions and relations between EMMNEs’ home and host countries 
may either enhance or constrain the effectiveness of home-country government support in 
EMMNE’s post-entry operations through institutional embeddedness in host countries 
(Lattemann et al., 2017). Thus, it is important to unpack the role of home-government support 
in EMMNEs’ international success by bringing in the GPE perspective which takes into 
account the impact of interstate relations on cross-border business operations (Keohane, 
2005). 
2.3.2 GPE perspective and EMMNEs’ post-entry performance 
The GPE perspective concerns the interaction of economic and political phenomena across 
national borders and proposes that states are self-interested actors who would engage in 
cooperation with each other if there are sufficient shared interests (Keohane, 1984; O’Brien 
& Williams, 2013). Cooperation among states is based on mutual desires to increase 
efficiency of the economic exchange in which they engage (Jandhyala & Weiner, 2014). 
Without any pre-existed harmony, cross-border economic exchange has been made possible 
through a process of policy coordination where countries adjust their policies and are brought 
into conformity with one another so that the adverse consequence of decisions by countries to 
their counterparts are reduced (Keohane & Underdal, 2011). Therefore, the impact of one 
government’s policies is no longer limited by its national border but can trigger a series of 
reactions from other countries which will consequently influence the operations of MNEs in 
those countries (Makino & Tsang, 2011; Ravenhill, 2008).  
The GPE scholars propose that a set of rules, norms, and decision-making procedures which 
have been accepted by a group of countries in regulating their relationships may serve as an 
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important mechanism to facilitate economic cooperation between countries (Keohane & Nye, 
1977; Keohane & Underdal, 2011; Ruggie, 1975). These rules and norms provide the basic 
institutional infrastructure that governs trans-boundary economic activities (Keohane, 2012). 
As countries are increasingly embedded in the world political and economic systems, 
adherence to the commonly accepted rules and practices in international arena not only helps 
them to gain opportunities to cooperate with one another, but also to affect domestic 
policymaking and is a useful institutional device for governments that wish to solve common 
problems and pursue complementary interests at interstate level (Claes & Knutsen, 2011). 
The presence of international relations not only helps to promote communications at 
intergovernmental level, but also to reduce transaction cost in economic exchanges by 
dealing with a range of issues when engaging in interstate cooperation (Jandhyala & Weiner, 
2014). Hence, engaging in international relations serves as an additional platform for national 
governments to shape their MNEs’ operations in global marketplaces (Li, Meyer, Zhang & 
Ding, 2017; Ravenhill, 2008). By integrating institutional embeddedness with the GPE 
perspective, our study expands existing research focusing on within-country institutions by 
suggesting that interstate relations may interact with domestic institutional forces in affecting 
EMMNEs’ post-entry performance.  
2.4 Hypotheses Development 
Building upon the theoretical background discussed above, this section develops several 
hypotheses in relation to the role of home-government supportive measures, namely financial 
support and non-financial policy support, in shaping Chinese MNEs’ post-entry performance, 
as well as the moderating effects of interstate relational factors.  
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2.4.1 Home-country government support 
From the institutional perspective, a government as the primary actor in the institutional 
environment plays an important role in shaping economic exchanges through policy 
instruments (Lu et al., 2014). As governments in emerging economies are supportive to 
outward FDI, embeddedness in the institutional context of the home country and alignment 
with the government’s macro-level strategy enables EMMNEs to gain home-country 
government support, including social approval, subsidies, and favorable legislative changes 
that are important to firms’ overseas success (Meyer et al. 2011; Lu, et al., 2011). Due to 
under-developed market mechanisms, the influence of home-government policies of 
emerging economies tends to be stronger in affecting their firms’ international operations 
than that from developed countries (Hong et al., 2015). In this study, we investigate both 
financial and non-financial policies to unpack the effect of home-country government support 
on EMMNEs’ overseas performance.  
Home-government financial support 
EMMNEs are deemed to have weak ownership advantages and suffer from liability of 
foreignness in their internationalization process (Luo & Tung, 2007), which leads to 
difficulties and high costs in securing financial access in host countries (Yiu, Lau & Bruton, 
2007). However, home-country government support can compensate for EMMNEs’ 
competitive disadvantages and organizational deficiencies so that they can better compete 
against their developed country counterparts for two main reasons (Lu et al., 2014). First, as a 
key institutional device, direct financial support from the home-country government provides 
valuable financial resources which help EMMNEs overcome financial constraints when 
venturing abroad (Globerman & Shapiro, 2009). Such support from the home-country 
government enables EMMNEs to access state funds at below market rates when engaging in 
international operations (Buckley et al., 2007). Credit support offered by policy banks, for 
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example the Export-Import Bank of China, can provide financial security for Chinese MNEs’ 
global expansion and help them reach global customers, update production lines, and develop 
distribution networks, thus contributing to growing market share in the international market 
(The Economist, 2013). Moreover, the provision of valuable financial resources may assist 
Chinese MNEs to employ host-country skilled personnel and gain access to advanced 
technologies that complement firms’ existing resources. The combined and enlarged resource 
base helps Chinese MNEs build their competitive advantages and enables them to better 
serve local customers’ needs in overseas markets, which can further boost their overseas 
performance.  
In addition to cheap capital provided by state banks, relaxed control on the financial markets 
by the home-country government in relation to borrowing and payback terms may satisfy 
firms’ need for easier capital access (Hoskisson et al., 2013). The liberalization of home-
country financial markets may give EMMNEs confidence when devoting resources to 
upgrading their global value chain and developing new products that help to generate higher 
sales margin abroad. Recently, the Chinese government has updated several financial 
regulations. For example, the Commercial Bank M&A Loan Risk Management Guidelines 
(2015) has extended the term of loans issued by China’s commercial banks from five to seven 
years to facilitate Chinese MNEs’ overseas investment activities. A longer payback period 
alleviates firms’ financial stress and offers greater financial flexibility to integrate strategic 
assets acquired abroad with firms’ existing ones to create new source of competitive 
advantage (Commercial Bank M&A Loan Risk Management Guidelines, 2015), hence 
contributing to firm performance in overseas markets.  
Hypothesis 1a: Chinese MNEs’ overseas subsidiary performance is positively related to 
the level of home-country government financial support.  
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Home-government non-financial policy support 
The home-country government not only provides financial support, but also non-financial 
support. The non-financial policy support of the home-country government refers to schemes 
aiming at streamlining the administrative process, the provision of information and the 
protection of firms’ overseas rights. Policy support in non-financial forms not only helps 
firms to reduce operational costs, but also serves as a competence-enhancing device to 
enhance EMMNEs’ international competitiveness (Lu et al., 2014). There are three main 
channels through which non-financial policy support from EMMNEs’ home governments 
may affect post-entry performance.  
First, a supportive home-government policy can help firms cut operational costs and improve 
efficiency as the streamlining of administrative procedures reduces bureaucracy involved in 
business activities (Luo et al., 2010). With a more efficient administrative environment, 
EMMNEs are able to respond to foreign market opportunities quicker without waiting for 
bureaucratic approval by the home-country government. This helps EMMNEs compete more 
effectively in the overseas market. For instance, China’s ‘go-global’ strategy has prompted 
the government to provide a ‘one-stop’ service to review firms’ outward FDI projects. 
Investments under $1billion no longer need be approved by the home government (Measures 
for Overseas Investment Management, 2014). This enables Chinese companies to reduce the 
costs of dealing with multiple state authorities, and dedicate resources for market-related 
activities such as R&D to develop tailored products and services for the local market, thus 
contributing to increasing market share abroad. 
Second, policy support offered by the home-country government can play a key role in 
helping firms to enhance their knowledge base, which can help overcome constraints due to 
the lack of experience as latecomers (Lu et al., 2011). A critical barrier that hinders 
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EMMNEs’ global success is related to the lack of knowledge about foreign markets (Luo & 
Tung, 2007). By offering effective information service support regarding a host country’s 
industrial and market climates, the home-country government enables its firms to adopt 
appropriate management and marketing strategies. Guidelines published by the home-country 
government assist EMMNEs to develop a better understanding about host-country consumers’ 
tastes and demands which enables EMMNEs to overcome the liability of foreignness.  
Finally, a home-country government’s policy support may enhance EMMNEs’ post-entry 
performance by providing risk-safeguard mechanisms to shield firms from complex host 
environments and facilitate communications between MNEs and host-country key 
stakeholders. The presence of home-state agencies abroad can offer two types of support to 
enhance EMMNEs’ operational effectiveness at post-entry stage. First, the provision of 
stronger diplomatic support safeguards cross-border business operations in the face of 
increasing international political risks (Gao et al., 2015). The Chinese government has helped 
firms to develop more effective risk control systems for overseas subsidiaries through its 
personnel training programmes, and enhanced consular support (MOFCOM, 2016). These 
provide more effective protection to Chinese MNEs’ assets and personnel in overseas 
markets, and reduce operational costs. Second, home-state agencies abroad can boost 
EMMNEs’ competitiveness by acting as a bridge to link firms with host-country government 
and business communities so that firms can become better embedded in host markets and 
work with reliable local partners to pursue success (Li et al., 2017). Diplomatic pressure is 
regarded as an important means for EMMNEs to gain competitive advantages. For example, 
an important mission of the Chinese commercial consulates and investment chambers abroad 
is to help firms communicate with host-country governments and business networks (Foreign 
Affairs, 2016). This can help Chinese MNEs adapt their operational standards to meet host-
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country government requirements and collaborate with local suppliers and distributors to 
develop new products and pre-empt the market. 
Hypothesis 1b: Chinese MNEs’ overseas subsidiary performance is positively related to 
the level of home-country government non-financial policy support.  
2.4.2 The moderating role of interstate relations 
Cross-border business operations imply that MNEs are embedded in multiple institutional 
environments (Demirbag et al., 2010; Meyer et al., 2011). Differences in institutional 
pressures between home and host countries make embeddedness challenging as it increases 
transaction cost for monitoring and coordinating in foreign markets (Buckley & Munjal, 
2017). We suggest that the strength of interstate relations between firms’ home and host 
countries enables national governments to coordinate policies, hence moderating the impact 
of home-country government support on the post-entry performance of EMMNEs. In this 
study, we consider two new mechanisms at the interstate level. The first is interstate political 
relations, which is the degree of alignment between a firm’s home and host government in 
international political affairs (Dai et al., 2013). The second is interstate economic relations, 
such as investment agreements reached at intergovernmental level, which aim to promote 
mutual economic gains (Jandhyala & Weiner, 2014). Political and economic issues constitute 
the most important components of interstate relations (Desbordes & Vicard, 2009). This is 
the main reason why we focus on these two mechanisms.  
Interstate political relations 
EMMNEs are subject to the jurisdictions of both home and host-country governments that 
not only regulate domestic policy environments, but also manage interstate political relations 
which affect cross-border economic activities (O’Brien & Williams, 2013). The political 
frameworks at domestic and international levels are tightly intertwined and jointly impact on 
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firms’ cross-border operations (Keohane, 2005). Hence, mutual political interests at interstate 
level may act as an institutional device to reinforce the effectiveness of home-government 
support on EMMNEs’ post-entry performance.  
Interstate political relations and home-government financial support 
Governments with favourable political relations are more likely to work in a co-operative 
manner and reach mutually beneficial agreements in economic affairs as shared foreign 
policy positions between home and host-country governments promote greater trust and 
information symmetry at interstate level (Flores-Macías & Kreps, 2013). With stronger 
political relations at interstate level, countries are more likely to provide preferential 
treatment to each other (Keohane, 2005). They may engage in more open discussions in the 
financial policy domain which helps to establish a network for government officials such as 
finance ministers and central bank directors with regular patterns of interaction. This enables 
the home-country government to communicate with the host-country government more 
effectively in relation to the various kinds of financial support that it offers to firms, thus 
enhancing the understanding and acceptance of such support by the host country (Ikenberry 
& Lim, 2017). Good interstate political relations can prompt a host-country government to 
develop a positive attitude towards MNEs from these partner countries (Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2011). Chinese MNEs often carry the identity of their home-country government in the eyes 
of host countries, especially when they receive direct financial support from the government 
(Cui & Jiang, 2012). This has raised national security concerns in some countries as they 
suspect that Chinese MNEs may come with a political agenda (Globerman & Shapiro, 2009), 
thus creating challenges for Chinese MNEs being embedded in the local institutional context. 
However, countries with good political relations tend to have established trust through past 
interactions (Gao et al., 2015). This helps to alleviate concerns over national security (Li & 
Vashchilko, 2010) and negative views about Chinese MNEs receiving support from the 
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home-country government. As a result, home-government financial support may be seen in a 
positive light in host countries and thereafter reach its full potential. In particular, the trust 
between home- and host-country governments based on close interstate political relations 
may create a favourable business climate which helps EMMNEs acquire strategic assets in 
the host countries without raising political and public concerns, thus ensuring smooth 
operations and avoiding disruption.   
Additionally, with the presence of close interstate political relations, the policies followed by 
one government may be viewed by the other as conducive to the realization of its own 
interests (Keohane & Underdal, 2011). Hence, the host government may be more willing to 
cooperate by introducing incentives to accommodate firms’ home-government financial 
supportive schemes. For example, good interstate political relations may prompt the host 
government to adopt an MNE’s home-country currency as a method of payment that helps to 
avoid exchange risk and reduces transaction cost in cross-border operations. In the context of 
Chinese MNEs, host-country governments with favourable interstate political relations with 
China may be willing to cooperate with the Chinese government in monetary issues such as 
the internationalization of RMB (Financial Times, 2015). Chinese MNEs can benefit from 
such cooperation at interstate level as it lowers the cost associated with exchange rate 
fluctuations if RMB is accepted as the trading currency, and this can further boost the 
positive effect of the financial support offered by their home-country government on post-
entry performance.  
Hypothesis 2a: The positive relationship between home-government financial support 
and Chinese MNEs’ overseas performance is stronger when there are stronger political 
relations between China and the host country.  
 
 51 
 
Interstate political relations and home-government non-financial policy support 
With stronger political relations at interstate level, countries are likely to adjust their 
behaviours to the preference of each other and intergovernmental coordination can take place 
among subunits of governments (Keohane, 2005). This facilitates home-country government 
interacting or communicating with the host government more effectively which enables the 
home-country government agencies to gather up-to-date information regarding host markets 
(Ikenberry & Lim, 2017). This knowledge can then be passed onto EMMNEs investing in 
these countries, thus enlarging their knowledge base and helping them better understand local 
markets. In this regard, closeness in political relations between home and host countries may 
motivate the host country government to provide updated information about the host country 
market and economic development, thus complementing home-country government policy 
support and further enhancing the effectiveness of home-country government policy support 
on the post-entry performance of EMMNEs.  
In addition, when there is a greater degree of foreign policy alignment between countries, it 
promotes more institutionalized commitments at intergovernmental level (Li & Vashchilko, 
2010), which enhance the effectiveness of the risk-safeguard mechanism provided by the 
home-country government. The host-country government may pay greater attention to the 
issues brought by the home-country government agencies as it may help to enhance political 
co-operation. Previous research posited that the co-operative interplay between firms’ home 
and host-country governments in the international political system can be useful leverage to 
protect cross-border operations (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011). Thus, favourable political relations 
enable local Chinese embassies to negotiate with the host-country government more 
effectively for the protection of Chinese MNEs’ overseas assets and personnel safety.  
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Furthermore, close political relations between home and host countries may result in 
endorsement of EMMNEs by the host countries (Li et al., 2017). The favourable attitude of 
the host-country government towards EMMNEs increases the possibility of these firms being 
accepted by other local stakeholders (Ang. Benischke & Doh, 2015), thus helping attract 
potential partners for collaboration as well as enabling them to tap into valuable local 
resources. This suggests that quality interstate political relations enhance EMMNEs’ 
embeddedness in a host country which complements the non-financial support from the home 
country and makes EMMNEs more able to exploit local market opportunities, thus boosting 
post-entry performance (Andersson, Forsgren & Holm, 2002; Heidenreich, 2012). 
Hypothesis 2b: The positive relationship between home-government non-financial policy 
support and Chinese MNEs’ overseas performance is stronger when there are stronger 
political relations between China and the host country.  
Interstate economic relations 
International economic exchanges are characterized by both common and conflicting interests 
on multiple crucial economic issues where countries may worry about being exploited 
(Keohane, 1984). Although international institutions such as the World Trade Organization 
have been effective in promoting non-discrimination and market liberalization, the difficulty 
of reaching deals and monitoring state behaviours incurs considerable costs for cooperation at 
multilateral level (Keohane & Underdal, 2011). As a result, governments started negotiating 
economic agreements at interstate level that allow them to identify common interests and 
compromise on an acceptable scale.  
Given the growing interdependence between countries in today’s world political economy, 
favourable interstate economic relations as exemplified by the enforcement of economic 
agreements allow national governments to organize their activities in a mutually beneficial 
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way (Jandhyala & Weiner, 2014). The most prevalent interstate economic treaties are 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and double taxation treaties (DTTs) (Sauvant & Sachs, 
2009). Accordingly, BITs are signed between pairs of countries to encourage and protect 
investments between them (Ginsburg, 2005). Similarly, DTTs are used to harmonize the 
calculation methods and definitions on tax subjects, mitigate the uncertainty faced by 
investors in foreign fiscal systems, and reduce administrative complexities (Barthel, Busse & 
Neumayer, 2010). As a specific institutional link between the home and host countries, 
interstate economic treaties may enhance EMMNEs’ post-entry performance through 
defining legal rights and liabilities, reducing uncertainty, and providing reliable information 
(Zong, Lu & Wang, 2012), thus reinforcing the positive impact of the financial and non-
financial support from the home-country government.  
Interstate economic relations and home-government financial support 
In order to promote outward FDI, emerging economy governments have actively signed BITs 
and DTTs with other countries. The enforcement of such treaties specifies the legal rights and 
liabilities between signatory states. BITs typically include a ‘national treatment’ clause that 
entitles foreign firms from signatory countries to be treated equally in comparison with 
domestic firms (Jandhyala & Weiner, 2014). Such a clause creates institutional conditions 
through which EMMNEs are better able to be embedded in the local context, thus reducing 
the liability of foreignness. It also confers EMMNEs with the legal rights of participating in 
the host-country’s financial market and receiving financial support from host-country FDI 
promoting agencies (Sauvant & Sachs, 2009). These can reduce Chinese MNEs’ costs of 
accessing overseas assets. As financial support offered by the Chinese government can attach 
certain political conditions and/or performance requirements (Luo et al., 2010), gaining 
access to the host-country financial market may alleviate firms’ reliance on home-country 
government financial support and serves as an alternative source of financial resources.  
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Furthermore, DTTs provide MNEs with the immediate benefit of cost saving. Standardisation 
of tax definitions and solidification of tax jurisdictions between treaty partners may help 
firms to alleviate the burden of paying tax to both their home and host countries (Blonigen & 
Davies, 2004). Compared with financial support from the home-country government, DTTs 
may be a better received option internationally as some host governments consider subsidies 
provided by the home-country government to be a source of unfair competition (Globerman 
& Shapiro, 2009). In this regard, effective BITs and DTTs can facilitate economic exchanges 
between EMMNEs and local firms in host countries, thus enhancing local embeddedness of 
EMMNEs. As a result, BITs and DTTs can act as substitutes for home-country government 
support. Favourable economic conditions at interstate level reduce the importance of home-
country financial support for EMMNEs’ post- entry performance.  
Hypothesis 3a: The positive relationship between home-government financial support 
and Chinese MNEs’ overseas performance is weaker when there are stronger economic 
relations between China and the host country. 
Interstate economic relations and home-government non-financial policy support 
Interstate economic agreements cover a wide range of crucial economic issues between 
countries (Keohane, 1984). These treaties or agreements provide extensive and effective 
protection for foreign investors with regard to admission and establishment conditions, 
treatment of foreign investments once established, dispute settlement, and double taxation 
avoidance (Büthe & Milner, 2008). The specification of dispute settlement mechanisms and 
right to compensation in the event of nationalization reduces uncertainty facing EMMNEs 
when operating in the host country (Sauvant & Sachs, 2009). As most treaties have specific 
clauses to govern disputes between investors and the host-country government, they have 
enabled firms to seek arbitration and compensation without the need to involve the home-
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country government in the process (Jandhyala & Weiner, 2014). The adoption of an 
arbitrational approach under economic treaties may reduce the need for diplomatic support 
from local Chinese embassies, thus easing political scepticism. As a result, the risk-safeguard 
mechanism provided by home-government support can be replaced by well-defined bilateral 
treaties. This suggests that good interstate economic relations may reduce the importance of 
non-financial policy support from home-country government in affecting Chinese firms’ 
overseas performance. 
In addition, the enforcement of interstate economic treaties can be an alternative channel for 
firms seeking to obtain more detailed and country-specific information, which can reduce 
their reliance on information provided by the home government. A typical BIT between 
signatory states provides information regarding MNEs’ entitlement of national treatment, the 
rights of profit repatriation, and compensational mechanisms in the event of nationalization 
(Sauvant & Sachs, 2009). Similarly, the implementation of DTTs between countries can 
effectively inform firms on tax matters covering a wide range of issues including tax relief on 
specific projects and dispute settlement procedures between firms and host-country tax 
bureaus (Barthel et al., 2010). Hence, the presence of interstate economic treaties may 
provide more specific information regarding the host-country’s investment and taxation 
policies than the general guidance from EMMNEs’ home-country government. Thus, the 
presence of interstate economic relations in the forms of BITs and DTTs enables EMMNEs 
to access an alternative source of information in the host country and reduces Chinese MNEs’ 
reliance on home-country government information support.  
Hypothesis 3b: The positive relationship between home-government non-financial policy 
support and Chinese MNEs’ overseas performance is weaker when there are stronger 
economic relations between China and the host country.  
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2.5 Sample and Data 
2.5.1 Sample 
The hypotheses are tested using survey data on Chinese enterprises’ outward FDI collected 
by the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) in 2011. The sample 
contained firms from 16 provinces and municipalities across China and provided a wide 
coverage of geographical diversity.1 The survey targeted firms that have already engaged in 
outward FDI. Therefore, the data obtained from this survey offers a suitable context to 
analyse overseas subsidiary performance of Chinese companies.  
Due to cost and administrative constraints, 2,000 firms that were the CCPIT’s membership 
enterprises, and also appeared on the MOFCOM’s registration list for their outward FDI 
activities, were approached. The target respondents were those in charge of firms’ 
international strategy and investment activities. A total of 365 questionnaires were received 
which covered 14 industrial sectors. Responses that were either incomplete or not applicable 
were eliminated; for example, firms operating abroad mainly through setting up export 
agencies or foreign wholly-owned subsidiaries in China. This provided us with 183 
observations. To examine the relevance of interstate political and economic relations, the 
author excluded outward FDI flowing to the British Virgin Islands, Hong Kong, and Macao 
as they are not members of the UNGA. As a result, the survey yielded 148 observations as 
our final sample. 
2.5.2 Measurements 
Overseas subsidiary performance. The dependent variable is the overseas subsidiary 
performance of a Chinese firm. As Hult et al. (2008) suggested, since objective financial data 
                                            
1 The sample firms are located in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing, Shangdong, Guangdong, Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, Fujian, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Yunnan and Shaanxi. 
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are not easily accessible in emerging markets, the use of perceptual data becomes appropriate 
as such a measure helps us understand the values and priorities that corporate executives 
place on specific objectives. The construct was operationalised by asking the respondents to 
provide their satisfaction with their firm’s most recently established overseas branches on a 
7-point Likert scale (1 = very dissatisfied, 7 = very satisfied) regarding three items: (i) sales 
growth, (ii) local market share growth, and (iii) sales margin growth.  
Home-country government financial support. Home-country government financial support 
was measured by the actual level of support the sample firms received from home-country 
governments in terms of financial and capital access in their overseas investment (1= very 
low support, 7= very high support).  
Home-country government non-financial policy support. Home-government non-financial 
policy support was operationalised by asking the respondents to evaluate the level of policy 
support that they received during overseas expansion on a 7-point scale in terms of: (i) 
simplifying the approval of foreign investment, (ii) simplifying procedures for demonstrating 
firms have sufficient capital in foreign investment projects, (iii) investment guidelines by 
industries, (iv) the protection of firms’ rights overseas, and (v) investment guidelines by 
countries.  
Interstate political relations. Following previous research (Dai et al., 2013), this study 
adopted Voeten, Strezhnev and Bailey’s (2013) Affinity of Nations Index to capture interstate 
political relations between China and a host country.2 This index is based on countries’ 
voting behaviours in the UNGA in 2010. States with good political relations tend to share 
more similar foreign policy positions in international affairs and it should be reflected in their 
                                            
2 The Affinity of Nations Index was first developed by Gartzke (2006) and updated by Voeten, Strezhnev and 
Bailey from 2008 onwards: http://pages.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/htmlpages/data.html [Accessed 15 June 2017] 
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voting behaviours at the UNGA (Knill, Lee & Mauck, 2012). Within the index, the affinity 
between any two countries at any point in time falls in the range of -1 to 1. In which, -1 
indicates that two countries’ voting behaviours at the UNGA are completely dissimilar and 1 
suggests that they are identical (Gartzke, 2006; Voeten et al., 2013). Hence, the higher values 
indicate a stronger political relationship between two countries (Dai et al., 2013). 
Interstate economic relations. This study measures interstate economic relations as the 
number of BITs and DTTs enforced between China and a host country. Data on BITs were 
drawn from the database of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) 3. DTTs data were extracted from the China Commerce Yearbook 2011.  
Control variables. At a country level, research has found that EMMNEs tend to enjoy greater 
prevalence when operating in other underdeveloped institutional environments (Liu et al., 
2016). Thus, this study controls for host-country risk using the World Governance Indicators 
(WGI) in 2010 (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2009). 4 The WGI reports the institutional 
governance quality for 215 economies annually and covers six dimensions: voice and 
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption (Globerman & Shapiro, 2003). The 
WGI scores are on a scale between -2.5 to 2.5, where higher scores indicate better 
governance quality. To allow for a comprehensive interpretation, the author rescaled the 
index by using 2.5 minus the original scores for all observations. Hence, for this analysis, 0 
means best governance quality while 5 indicates the most risky environment. Furthermore, 
following previous research (Wu & Chen, 2014), the author employs the marketization index 
published by China’s National Economic Research Institute (NERI) to capture the degree of 
                                            
3 BIT data are available at: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/42#iiaInnerMenu           
[Accessed 15 June 2017]  
 
4 The WGI scores are available at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports 
[Accessed 15 June 2017]  
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regional marketization given the heterogeneities of institutional development within China 
(Fan, Wang & Zhu, 2010). The index reports the relative position of each province in the 
progress towards a market-based economy compared to other provinces. It covers five 
dimensions including the importance of regional government in resource allocation, the 
percentage of non-state-owned sectors in the regional economy, regional government control 
on price setting and inter-regional trade barriers, the mobility of capital, investment, and 
labour, and the development of legal supporting institutions in the region (Fan, Wang & 
Zhang, 2001). In addition, it is recognized that investment agreements signed at the 
multilateral level provide mechanisms to protect foreign investors (Büthe & Milner, 2008). 
Thus, the present study includes a dummy variable by assigning 1 if a multilateral investment 
agreement has been enforced between China and a host country and 0 otherwise. The data has 
been drawn from the UNCTAD database.5                                                                       
At industry level, this study includes a dummy variable by differentiating manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing companies (Brouthers, 2002). Moreover, a host country’s degree of 
industry competition is measured using three items from the survey: (i) difficulties of 
obtaining raw materials, (ii) technology for innovation, and (iii) completion of upstream and 
downstream industries in the host market.  
At firm level, the author measures firm size as the natural logarithm value of total employees 
(Cui & Jiang, 2012). Existing research shows that MNEs may benefit from their previous 
international and host-country experiences (Delios & Beamish, 2001). Thus, a firm’s 
international experience is captured by the number of years that it has engaged in 
international activities (Lu, Zhou, Bruton & Li, 2010). Host-country experience is measured 
                                            
5 Multilateral investment agreement data are available at 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryOtherIias/42#iiaInnerMenu [Accessed 15 June 2017] 
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as the number of years that a firm has operated in a host country (Wu & Lin, 2010). 
Moreover, this study accounts for the effect of state ownership using a dummy variable by 
assigning value 1 to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 0 otherwise. Finally, effective risk 
assessment may allow MNEs to employ appropriate strategies to manage potential hazards in 
their overseas operations (Holburn & Zelner, 2010; Satyanand, 2010). Thus, a dummy 
variable is used by assigning value 1 if firms have adopted risk assessment strategies and 0 
otherwise. (See Appendix 1 for a summary of questionnaire survey items).  
2.6 Empirical Results 
2.6.1 Common method bias 
As some variables were drawn from the same survey respondents, this may entail a threat of 
common method bias (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). In addition to introducing objective 
measurements, such as host-country risk, interstate political relations and economic relations 
as well as the regional marketization index, the author tested for this potential issue by 
performing the Harman single-factor test (Podsakoff, Mackenzie, Lee & Podsakoff, 2003). 
The result indicates that the single factor model demonstrated a poor fit to the data, which 
only accounted for 10% of the variance. Therefore, common method bias is unlikely to be a 
major concern in this study.  
2.6.2 Construct reliability and validity 
Descriptive statistics and variable correlations are presented in Table 2.8 and variance 
inflation factors (VIF) are well below the acceptable level of 10 (Neter, Wasserman & Kutner, 
1985). Thus, it indicates no multicollinearity issue. The reliability of multi-item constructs 
has been assessed by examining their internal consistency with Cronbach’s alpha. The 
internal consistency values for all constructs were above 0.70, ranging from 0.766 to 0.975. 
The author conducted confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to test the convergent and 
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discriminant validities for these multi-item constructs. The result of the CFA model fits the 
data well (see Table 2.9), with all indices meeting their respective criteria (χ2(113) = 186.188; 
p<0.001; CMIN/DF=1.65; CFI=0.97; RMSEA=0.06; NNFI=0.97; SRMR=0.04). Table 2.10 
reports the CFA results, which support convergent validity. 
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Table 2.8 Correlation matrix 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Performance 3.91 0.81                             
2. Home-government financial support 3.23 0.85 0.14                           
3. Home-government policy support 5.05 1.21 0.42** 0.18*                         
4. Interstate political relations 0.61 0.57 0.09 -0.02 -0.12                       
5. Interstate economic relations 1.56 0.61 -0.06 -0.09 -0.02 0.19*                     
6. Regional marketization 9.36 1.41 0.15 0.34** 0.04 -0.01 -0.10                   
7. Ownership 0.26 0.44 -0.11 -0.16 -0.05 0.05 0.07 -0.16                 
8. Local experience 2.86 2.47 0.10 -0.02 -0.08 0.04 0.12 -0.12 -0.02               
9. Industry dummy 0.49 0.50 0.24** 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.16* -0.29 0.05             
10. Risk assessment 0.86 0.35 0.26** 0.16 0.22** 0.05 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.14 0.05           
11. Firm size 6.29 2.19 0.15 0.03 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.16* 0.29** 0.04 0.23** 0.06         
12. Host-country industry competition 3.20 0.96 0.13 -0.07 0.25** -0.23 0.29** -0.07 -0.07 0.00 0.13 0.12 0.03       
13. Host-country risk 2.07 1.17 0.13 -0.09 -0.12 0.64** -0.26 -0.07 -0.04 -0.07 -0.05 0.00 -0.11 -0.34     
14. Multilateral investment treaty 0.31 0.46 -0.10 0.09 -0.15 0.21** 0.29** 0.15 -0.06 -0.01 0.08 0.11 0.16 0.11 -0.06   
15. International experience 7.73 6.78 0.06 -0.06 -0.04 0.04 0.21* 0.02 0.12 0.29** 0.24** 0.19* 0.31** 0.10 -0.07 0.05 
Sample = 148 
*P<0.05; **P<0.01; ***P<0.001 
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Table 2.9 CFA model 
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Table 2.10 Measurement model and CFA results 
Constructs Operational Measures of Construct Factor Loadings t-value 
Chinese firms’ overseas performance     
(Cronbach’s alpha=0.880) Satisfaction with sales growth  0.86  11.12 
 Satisfaction with local market share growth  0.88  11.21 
 Satisfaction with sales margin growth  0.79 Fixed 
Home-country government policy support    
(Cronbach’s alpha=0.943) Simplifying procedures for demonstrating firms have 
sufficient capital in foreign currency 
0.81  14.05 
 Simplifying the approval of foreign investment 0.80  13.56 
 Investment guidelines by industries  0.92  19.13 
 Protection of firms’ rights overseas  0.93  19.65 
 Investment guidelines by countries 0.92 Fixed 
Host-country risk    
(Cronbach’s alpha= 0.975) Voice and accountability 0.82  16.54 
 Political instability 0.85  18.57 
 Government effectiveness 0.98  38.48 
 Regulatory quality 0.98  37.86 
 Rule of law 0.99  45.38 
 Control of corruption 0.97 Fixed 
Host-country industry competition    
(Cronbach’s alpha=0.766) Obtaining raw materials 0.77  6.77 
 Obtaining technology  0.71  6.68 
 Completion of upstream and downstream industries  0.70 Fixed 
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Additionally, the discriminant validity for those multi-item constructs was tested to make 
sure that each of them captured phenomena that others did not. Accordingly, the variance 
extracted for any construct in a pair of comparisons should be greater than 0.50 and larger 
than the squared correlations between the two constructs (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson & 
Tatham, 2006). As shown in Table 2.11, the variance extracted ranges from 0.73 to 0.94. 
Thus, the author suggests that these results provide evidence for discriminant validity.  
Table 2.11 Discriminant validity 
 
Host-country 
industry competition Host-country risk Performance 
Home-country 
government 
policy support 
Host-country industry 
competition (0.73)       
Host-country risk 0.31 (0.94)     
Performance 0.11 -0.12 (0.85)   
Home-country government 
policy support 0.22 0.11 0.39 (0.88) 
2.6.3 Hypotheses tests and results 
The results using the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression are presented in Table 2.12. 
Model 1 in Table 2.12 is a baseline model. Model 2 introduces the independent variables, 
home-government financial support and non-financial policy support. The moderating 
variables were included one by one in Model 3 and Model 4. Finally, Model 5 is a full model 
with all the variables. 
For the control variables, the degree of regional marketization is significant and positively 
related to firms’ overseas performance in Model 1, Model 4, and Model 5 (β=0.09, p<0.05), 
and at the 10% significance level in Model 2 and Model 3. A firm’s local experience in a host 
country is significant and positively associated with a firm’s overseas performance at the 5% 
significance level in Model 4 and Model 5, and at the 10% significance level in Model 2 and 
Model 3. The industry effect is significant at the 5% significance level in Model 1 and 
Models 3-5, and reaches 10% significance level in Model 2. A firm’s risk assessment is 
positively related to their overseas performance at the 1% significance level in Model 1 and 
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at the 5% significance level in Models 2-5. Firm size only reaches the 10% significance level 
in Model 1 and becomes insignificant when the main and interactive variables are included. 
The level of host-country industry competition is positively associated with Chinese firms’ 
overseas subsidiary performance at the 5% significant level in Model 1, but drops to the 10% 
significance level in Model 4 and Model 5. The level of host-country risk is positively related 
to Chinese MNEs’ post-entry performance at the 10% significance level in Model 1, and 
increases to the 5% significance level in Models 2-5. Additionally, the enforcement of 
multilateral investment agreement is negatively related to subsidiary performance at the 5% 
significance level in Model 1, but only reaches the 10% significance level in Model 4 and 
Model 5.  
For the independent variables, as home-country government financial support is statistically 
insignificant, Hypothesis 1a is not supported. By contrast, non-financial policy support is 
positive and statistically significant in Model 2 (β=0.23, p<0.001) and Model 5 (β=0.41, 
p<0.05) when all the variables are included. Thus, it lends support for Hypothesis 1b that 
Chinese MNEs’ overseas subsidiary performance is positively related to the level of home-
country government non-financial policy support.  
For the interaction effect between home-government financial support and interstate political 
relations, the coefficient of the interaction term in Model 3 and Model 5 is statistically 
insignificant. Hence, Hypothesis 2a is not supported. The interaction effect between non-
financial policy support and interstate political relations is positive and statistically 
significant in Model 3 (β=0.24, p<0.05) and Model 5 (β=0.27, p<0.05). This suggests that 
favourable interstate political relations strengthen the positive impact of non-financial policy 
support on subsidiary performance, thus supporting Hypothesis 2b.  
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With regard to the joint effect of home-government financial support and interstate economic 
relations, the interaction terms are positive but statistically insignificant in Model 4 and 
Model 5 which does not support Hypothesis 3a. For Hypothesis 3b, the interaction terms 
between non-financial policy support and interstate economic relations are negative and 
statistically significant in Model 4 (β=-0.23, p<0.01) and Model 5 (β=-0.24, p<0.01). This 
suggests that the impact of supportive schemes in the non-financial domain is weakened 
given strong interstate economic co-operation. There is a substitutive effect between home- 
government non-financial policy support and interstate economic relations. Thus, the results 
are consistent with Hypothesis 3b.  
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Table 2.12 Result of regression analysis 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Main Variable      
Home-country government financial support   0.02 0.02 -0.09 -0.09 
  (0.08) (0.09) (0.14) (0.14) 
Home-country government non-financial policy support  0.23*** 0.05 0.58*** 0.41* 
  (0.05) (0.10) (0.14) (0.16) 
Moderators      
Interstate political relations  -0.02 -0.06 -1.40* 0.03 -1.39* 
 (0.17) (0.16) (0.66) (0.16) (0.64) 
Interstate economic relations  -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.92Ɨ 0.97* 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.47) (0.47) 
Interactions      
Home-country government financial support * Interstate political relations   0.02  -0.01 
   (0.10)  (0.10) 
Home-country government non-financial policy support * Interstate political relations   0.24*  0.27* 
   (0.12)  (0.11) 
Home-country government financial support * Interstate economic relations    0.06 0.07 
    (0.10) (0.09) 
Home-country government non-financial policy support * Interstate economic relations    -0.23** -0.24** 
    (0.08) (0.08) 
Control Variables      
Degree of marketization  0.09* 0.09Ɨ 0.09Ɨ 0.09* 0.09* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Ownership -0.08 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Local experience  0.03 0.04Ɨ 0.04Ɨ 0.05* 0.05* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Industry dummy 0.28* 0.26Ɨ 0.26* 0.26* 0.27* 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Risk assessment 0.58** 0.38* 0.36* 0.44* 0.42* 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) 
Firm size  0.06Ɨ 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
International experience -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Host-country industry competition 0.16* 0.09 0.10 0.12Ɨ 0.12Ɨ 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Host-country risk 0.16Ɨ 0.17* 0.19* 0.16* 0.19* 
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 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Multilateral investment agreement enforced -0.32* -0.19 -0.18 -0.25Ɨ -0.24Ɨ 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Observations (N) 148 148 148 148 148 
R-square 0.17 0.26 0.28 0.29 0.31 
ƗP < 0.10; *P < 0.05; **P < 0.01; ***P<0.001
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To avoid overstating or understating the interaction results, the author follows previous 
research to evaluate the marginal effects of independent variables at different values of 
moderators through plotting graphic displays (Brambor, Clark & Golder, 2006; Chizema, Liu, 
Lu & Gao, 2015; Kingsley, Noordewier & Vanden Bergh, 2017). Figure 2.1 depicts the 
marginal effect of home-country government financial support on Chinese MNEs’ overseas 
performance when interstate political relations between China and the host country become 
stronger. The lower and higher 95 percent confidence lines fall on different sides of the  zero-
line. This corroborates the result of OLS regression analysis – Hypothesis 2a, which proposes 
favourable interstate political relations enhance the positive impact of home-government 
financial support on Chinese MNEs’ overseas subsidiary performance is not supported.  
Figure 2.1 The moderating effect of interstate political relations on the relationship between Chinese 
MNEs' overseas subsidiary performance and home-government financial support 
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As shown in Figure 2.2, there is an upward slope for the marginal effect of home-government 
non-financial policy support on Chinese firms’ overseas performance when interstate political 
relations between China and the host country become stronger. The lower 95% confidence 
line goes above the zero-line, when the voting pattern is greater than -0.2. This indicates that 
when the voting pattern exhibits a high degree of similarity and is greater than -0.2, the 
positive impact of home-government non-financial policy support on Chinese MNEs’ 
subsidiary performance becomes more significant when interstate political relations become 
stronger. Hence, Figure 2.2 lends further support for Hypothesis 2b, which postulates 
stronger interstate political relations augment the positive effect of home-country government 
non-financial policy support on the overseas subsidiary performance of Chinese firms.  
Figure 2.2 The moderating effect of interstate political relations on the relationship between Chinese 
MNEs’ overseas subsidiary performance and home-government non-financial policy support 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           95% Confidence interval 
M
arg
in
al effect o
f h
o
m
e-co
u
n
try
 g
o
v
ern
m
en
t n
o
n
-fin
an
cial p
o
licy
 
su
p
p
o
rt o
n
 C
h
in
ese M
N
E
s’ p
erfo
rm
an
ce
 
Interstate political relations measured by countries’ voting pattern at UNGA in 2010 
 72 
 
Figure 2.3 presents the marginal effect of home-government financial support on Chinese 
MNEs’ post-entry performance when the degree of interstate economic relations between 
China and the host country becomes more favourable. The higher and lower 95% confidence 
lines do not locate on the same side of the zero-line. Hence, the plotting result is consistent 
with the OLS regression analysis – Hypothesis 3a, which posits the positive impact of home-
government financial support on Chinese MNEs’ overseas performance is diminished in the 
face of stronger interstate economic relations, does not receive support.  
Figure 2.3 The moderating effect of interstate economic relations on the relationship between Chinese 
MNEs’ overseas subsidiary performance and home-government financial support 
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As shown in Figure 2.4, the marginal effect of home-government non-financial policy 
support on Chinese firms’ overseas performance diminishes when both BIT and DTT have 
been enforced between China and the host country. The downward slope corresponds to 
Hypothesis 3b, indicating that there is a substitutive effect between non-financial policy 
support and the strength of interstate economic relations on Chinese MNEs’ post-entry 
performance. Specifically, when interstate economic relations are equal to 1, the marginal 
effect of non-financial policy support on subsidiary performance becomes insignificant. This 
suggests that as the degree of interstate economic relations becomes stronger, the impact of 
home-government non-financial policy support on firms’ overseas performance becomes 
negligible.  
Figure 2.4 The moderating effect of interstate economic relations on the relationship between Chinese 
MNEs’ overseas subsidiary performance and home-government non-financial policy support. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      95% Confidence interval 
M
arg
in
al effect o
f h
o
m
e-co
u
n
try
 g
o
v
ern
m
en
t n
o
n
-fin
an
cial p
o
licy
 
su
p
p
o
rt o
n
 C
h
in
ese M
N
E
s’ p
erfo
rm
an
ce
 
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
0 1 2
Interstate economic relations measured by BIT and DTT enforced between China and the host country 
 74 
 
2.6.4 Robustness checks 
To deal with the issue of potential selection bias, the author employs Heckman’s (1976) two-
step estimation to test the robustness of the results. In the first stage, a probit model is used to 
estimate the probability of Chinese MNEs entering countries with high political risks. The 
inverse Mills ratio (IMR) was generated by regressing firms’ characteristics and home-
government financial support and non-financial policy support on host-country risk. Due to 
the absence of classification on countries’ governance quality under the WGI index, this 
study used China’s governance score in 2010 as a benchmark (WGI, 2010). Under the WGI’s 
six dimensions in 2010, China scored -1.63 for voice and accountability, -0.66 for political 
stability, 0.10 for government effectiveness, -0.22 for regulatory quality, -0.33 for rule of law, 
and -0.60 for control of corruption. Firstly, their mean was calculated (-0.55). Additionally, 
the author uses 2.5 to subtract the mean value, i.e. 2.5- (-0.55) = 3.05 to allow comprehensive 
interpretation. For the present study, countries scored equal or higher than 3.05 indicate 
greater risk.  
In the second stage, Chinese MNEs’ overseas subsidiary performance was estimated by 
including IMR as a regressor to capture the potential sample selection bias. As reported in 
Table 2.13, the IMR coefficient reaches only 10% significance level in Model 1 and becomes 
insignificant when all the variables are introduced. This indicates the absence of such bias. 
The coefficient of the independent variable, home-government non-financial policy support, 
and its interactions with interstate political and economic relations remain similar to those 
reported in the initial OLS regression.  
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Table 2.13 Robustness test 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Main Variable      
Home-country government financial support   -0.07 -0.09 -0.15 -0.15 
  (0.32) (0.33) (0.34) (0.34) 
Home-country government non-financial policy support  0.21** 0.03 0.58*** 0.39* 
  (0.07) (0.11) (0.15) (0.16) 
Moderators      
Interstate political relations  -0.03 -0.01 -1.40* 0.02 -1.39* 
 (0.17) (0.16) (0.66) (0.16) (0.64) 
Interstate economic relations  0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.92Ɨ 0.96* 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.47) (0.47) 
Interactions      
Home-country government financial support * Interstate political relations   0.02  -0.01 
   (0.10)  (0.10) 
Home-country government non-financial policy support * Interstate political relations   0.24*  0.26* 
   (0.12)  (0.11) 
Home-country government financial support * Interstate economic relations    0.06 0.07 
    (0.10) (0.10) 
Home-country government non-financial policy support * Interstate economic relations    -0.23** -0.24** 
    (0.08) (0.08) 
Control Variables      
Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) 2.01Ɨ 1.53 1.69 0.89 0.99 
 (1.12) (4.92) (4.87) (4.83) (4.77) 
Degree of Marketization  0.10* 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
 (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Ownership -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Local experience  -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Industry dummy 0.49** 0.42 0.45 0.35 0.37 
 (0.18) (0.55) (0.54) (0.54) (0.53) 
Risk assessment  0.95** 0.72 0.73 0.64 0.64 
 (0.27) (1.09) (1.08) (1.07) (1.05) 
Firm size  -0.09 -0.07 -0.09 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.09) (0.37) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) 
International experience  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Host-country industry competition -0.26 -0.23 -0.26 -0.07 -0.08 
 (0.25) (1.04) (1.03) (1.02) (1.01) 
 76 
 
Host-country risk 0.18* 0.17* 0.19* 0.16* 0.19* 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Multilateral investment agreement enforced -0.32* -0.19 -0.18 -0.25Ɨ -0.24Ɨ 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Observations (N) 148 148 148 148 148 
R-square 0.18 0.26 0.28 0.29 0.31 
ƗP < 0.10; *P < 0.05; **P < 0.01; ***P<0.001
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2.7 Discussion 
The international expansion of Chinese MNEs has been enabled considerably by their home-
government policy support (Hoskisson et al., 2013). However, we have limited understanding 
about the implications of home-government supportive measures for the post-entry 
performance of these new players. 
This chapter uncovers the impact of home-government financial support and non-financial 
policy impetus on Chinese firms’ overseas performance and the extent to which their effects 
are moderated by interstate political and economic relations. Empirical evidence shows that 
supportive home-government policies in non-financial domains enhance Chinese MNEs’ 
overseas subsidiary performance, whereas financial support does not have any significant 
impact on their post-entry success. This suggests that the supportive schemes provided by 
EMMNEs’ home-country government tend to have different implications for firms’ post-
entry operations. Non-financial policy measures, such as information support, streamlining of 
administrative process and increasing protection in overseas markets can directly enhance 
Chinese firms’ efficiency and reduce operational costs. This provides contrasting evidence to 
MNEs from developed countries which traditionally rely on market-based advantages such as 
superior managerial and technological resources to pursue international success (Hong et al., 
2015; Peng, 2012). In addition, the importance of home-government financial support in 
facilitating Chinese firms’ to undertake initial international expansion has been reported by 
previous studies (Buckley et al., 2007; Hoskisson et al., 2013). However, the result of the 
present research indicates that such support cannot be transferred into market and 
technological competencies to enhance firms’ competitiveness at post-entry stage.  
To validate the results from this study, the author conducted fieldwork interviews with 
managers of Chinese MNEs that have engaged in foreign market expansion. Findings from 
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the interviews are largely consistent with the empirical analysis by revealing that home-
government financial and non-financial measures have differential impacts at the post-entry 
stage. For instance, one interviewee, who is in charge of a Chinese telecommunication firm’s 
international expansion, reflected that: “We would like to see more help in the form of 
information provision and diplomatic support from the Chinese government but not much 
financial assistance as this may create the impression with the host country that we are doing 
business for the Chinese government.” Similar responses have been revealed by several other 
interviewees. Overall, the results of the present analysis complement previous studies by 
demonstrating that home-country government support affects not only Chinese MNEs’ 
motives of international expansion (e.g. Luo et al., 2010), but can also be extended to explain 
their overseas subsidiary performance.  
The findings of the present study also provide empirical support for the view that interstate 
relations can interact with domestic institutional forces to influence cross-border business 
operations (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011; Witt & Lewin, 2007). Specifically, the author finds that 
interstate political relations can serve as a promoting device to augment the positive link 
between home-government non-financial policy support and EMMNEs’ international success. 
Existing studies predominantly stress the relevance of within-country institutions on MNEs’ 
operational effectiveness (Makino & Tsang, 2011). However, it has been argued that the 
cross-border exchange of goods, services, and resources with another country can raise 
political concerns (Globerman & Shapiro, 2009). This is particularly true with Chinese firms, 
which are often considered to carry their home-country identity and political missions with 
their outward FDI (Child & Marinova, 2014; Cui & Jiang, 2012). Therefore, investing in 
countries with good interstate political relations with their home country can help firms 
minimise negative images associated with their national identities, as home-country 
government support may be seen as less intrusive in these countries. Furthermore, the 
 79 
 
Chinese government and embassies are more likely to be influential in countries with closer 
interstate political relations. As such, they can provide more effective protection and 
diplomatic assistance for their firms when needed. 
Previous research has argued that the presence of interstate economic agreements facilitates 
the flow of cross-border investment (Desbordes & Vicard, 2009; Jandhyala & Weiner, 2014). 
The results of the present study suggest that the enforcement of interstate economic treaties 
and non-financial policy support offered by the home-country government substitute each 
other in affecting Chinese MNEs’ overseas success. Stronger interstate economic relations 
provide firms with an alternative channel to access host-country information and markets, 
which reduce the importance of home-government non-financial policy support. When 
favourable interstate economic relations are in place, firms can gain access to direct economic 
benefits, such as tax reduction and tariff exemption. Additionally, interstate economic treaties 
provide country-specific information which can be more beneficial than generic guidelines 
issued by the home-country government. Therefore, strong interstate economic relations can 
replace the promotional measures of the home-country government in helping firms achieve 
overseas success. 
2.8 Summary 
Despite increasing attention to the role of the home-country government in the international 
expansion of EMMNEs, limited research has examined the interaction effect between home-
government support and interstate relations on EMMNEs’ post-entry performance. As these 
contextual factors jointly determine resources and institutional support available to EMMNEs 
(Child & Marinova, 2014), examining their interface helps to address the missing link 
between domestic and international environmental forces in explaining EMMNEs’ 
international success. Adopting the institutional perspective and the GPE perspective, this 
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chapter investigates the effects of home-government financial and non-financial support 
under the contingency of interstate relations on the subsidiary performance of Chinese MNEs. 
Based on survey data, the author found that home-government non-financial support 
positively affects the overseas performance of Chinese MNEs. The findings further reveal 
that there is a complementary effect between interstate political relations and home-country 
government non-financial support, but interstate economic relations are substituted for the 
importance of home-government non-financial support with regard to Chinese firms’ 
overseas subsidiary performance. Taken together, this chapter sheds new light on a ‘missing 
factor’ – interstate relations – in affecting the subsidiary performance of Chinese MNEs.  
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3. Implications of Home-country Legitimacy for the Level of Political Risk 
Faced by Chinese MNEs Abroad 
3.1 Introduction 
Having analysed the effect of home-country government support on Chinese MNEs’ post-
entry performance, the author tackles the role of home-country legitimacy in explaining the 
level of political risk encountered by these firms in overseas markets. This chapter 
investigates the second research question – ‘How can we explain Chinese MNEs’ perceived 
level of host-country political risk in light of their home-country legitimacy with key 
stakeholders in the host country?’  
The rise of EMMNEs and the political challenges associated with their international 
expansion have attracted increasing research interest. Extant literature in this field has mainly 
looked at the importance of host-country institutional governance conditions to EMMNEs’ 
foreign expansion but provided mixed evidence. Some found that EMMNEs tend to enter and 
operate in politically risky contexts (Buckley et al., 2016; Jiménez, 2010), whereas others 
reported that these new players tend to follow their developed country counterparts by 
avoiding underdeveloped institutional environments (Guo, Wang & Tung, 2014). Given the 
inconclusive findings of previous research, one may question the extent to which the 
traditional way of understanding political risk is still valid for EMMNEs. Yet, little attention 
has been paid to investigating what determines the level of political risk encountered by these 
new contenders competing in the global arena.  
A small but growing body of research has recognized that there may be factors other than 
host-country political and regulatory governance conditions that can influence the political 
risks experienced by these new players (Bremmer, 2014; Globerman & Shapiro, 2009). This 
stream of literature suggests that the current conception of political risk is too narrow and 
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does not adequately account for the issues experienced by EMMNEs (Satyanand, 2010). As 
extreme political hazards such as direct expropriation fade away, EMMNEs are now facing 
more sophisticated issues that remain underexplored (Meyer & Peng, 2016). For example, it 
has been suggested that EMMNEs’ expansion may be obstructed by the host government and 
public for political and social reasons (Fiaschi, Giuliani & Nieri, 2016). However, despite 
calls for a deeper understanding of political risk in cross-border business operations (Stevens 
et al., 2015), research has been mostly silent on factors that affect the level of political risk 
faced by EMMNEs in global marketplaces.  
International business scholars have pinpointed the need to understand political challenges 
faced by EMMNEs from a broader perspective by taking into account their distinctive home-
country institutional characteristics (Child & Marinova, 2014). While a number of studies 
have examined the effect of host-country governance conditions on firms’ foreign market 
success (Meyer & Thein, 2014), the implications of the home-country institutional 
environment for EMMNEs’ post-entry operations has received scant attention.  
Existing studies based upon the institutional perspective have pinpointed the importance of 
legitimacy judgements by a country’s interested social stakeholders such as professional 
associations, consumers, and media in shaping firms’ survival (Fiaschi et al., 2016). For firms 
doing business abroad, while regulatory requirements can be fulfilled by obeying a host 
country’s institutional governance framework, acquiring legitimacy, i.e. social acceptance, 
can be more challenging as it involves implicit societal values and norms (Webb, Tihanyi, 
Ireland & Sirmon, 2009). Additionally, as a country’s institutional governance rules and its 
underlying societal values can interact in multi-faceted ways, the legitimacy judgements 
made by these social stakeholders towards an MNE may either reinforce or constrain the 
effectiveness of explicitly stated laws (Meyer & Peng, 2016). Yet, despite the relevance of 
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legitimacy, little is known about its role and interplay with a host country’s institutional 
governance conditions in shaping the level of political risk faced by EMMNEs.  
This chapter addresses the above research gaps by examining the relationship between 
Chinese MNEs’ home-country legitimacy with key stakeholders in a host country and their 
perceived level of host-country political risk. The underdeveloped home-country institutional 
environment, such as lower levels of economic development and standard of living, and weak 
institutional governance conditions implies a legitimacy deficit for EMMNEs, which may be 
translated into political challenges when they operate abroad (Marano et al., 2017). Thus, the 
role of home-country legitimacy needs to be better understood to develop a holistic 
understanding about the political risk faced by MNEs competing globally. This study extends 
our knowledge by highlighting the relevance of home-country legitimacy in shaping the level 
of political risk experienced by Chinese firms.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature on 
political risk in international business drawing from the institutional perspective, followed by 
the theoretical background in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 develops a number of hypotheses. The 
sample and methodology is described in Section 3.5. Empirical results are then presented, 
followed by discussion of the main findings in Section 3.7. Section 3.8 concludes.  
3.2 Literature Review 
This section provides an account of how existing research has examined the effect of external 
contextual forces on MNEs’ perceived level of political risk in international markets by 
drawing insights from the institutional perspective. The goal is to systematically reveal 
shortcomings as well as innovative insights from the literature.  
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3.2.1 Institutional perspective and political risk 
In expanding overseas, MNEs face enormous risks in both economic and social domains. 
Research has traditionally adopted economic perspectives such as the resource-based view to 
emphasize the possession of valuable assets in helping firms to overcome the risks associated 
with international operations (Barney, 1991; Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Wu & Chen, 2014). A 
predominant assumption from this line of literature is that the presence of a stable political 
and regulatory framework supports firm actions (Brouthers, 2002). Yet, political events over 
the past several decades including the Cold War, revolutions, and terrorist attacks have 
profoundly changed the way that MNEs perceive their external environment (Casson & 
Lopes, 2013; Kobrin, 1979). This has pointed to the need to consider the role of external 
contextual forces in shaping cross-border business transactions (Kostova & Hult, 2016; 
Meyer & Peng, 2005; 2016). The institutional perspective has thus emerged as a key 
theoretical perspective to explain the political hazards faced by MNEs in international 
marketplaces.  
Unlike traditional economic perspectives, the institutional perspective looks beyond firm-
level factors by highlighting a country’s macro institutional conditions such as political, 
social, and legal rules that establish the basis for production and exchange (Peng et al., 2008; 
Scott, 2003). Research has drawn from this lens to analyse host-country governance 
conditions, for example political and regulatory infrastructure, in affecting both developed 
country MNEs’ and EMMNEs’ perceived level of political risk in overseas markets.  
Host-country governance conditions and developed country MNEs 
For MNEs from advanced economies, the weak governance conditions in many developing 
countries represent a critical source of political risk (Alon & Herbert, 2009; Casson & Lopes, 
2013; Simon, 1984; Slangen & van Tulder, 2009). A poorly developed governance 
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infrastructure featuring an unstable political regime and weak regulatory enforcement has 
been an unfortunate characteristic of many developing countries, which discourage 
investment confidence (Kobrin, 1979; Darendeli & Hill, 2016; Oh & Oetzel, 2011). Previous 
research has adopted a number of conceptual frameworks to look at the impact of host-
country political and regulatory conditions on the level of political hazards faced by 
developed country MNEs.  
Globerman and Shapiro (2003) suggested that host countries with effective governance 
infrastructure measured by the WGI index tend to imply lower degree of political hazards, 
thus are more likely to receive FDI from the U.S. Similarly, Slangen and van Tulder (2009) 
adopted this framework to argue that defective governance conditions in the host country 
denote greater political risk faced by Dutch MNEs. Using a sample of 83 developing 
countries covering 1984 to 2003, Busse and Hefeke (2007) found that a higher level of 
political risk measured by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) index significantly 
reduced FDI inflow to these countries. Additionally, Delios and Henisz (2003) showed that 
Japanese MNEs tend to report less political obstacles in countries with greater constraints on 
their government’s ability to alter existing policies captured by the political constraint index 
(POLCON). Thus, a common theme running across this strand of research is that a host 
country with strong governance conditions characterized by a transparent regulatory system, 
a stable political environment, and credible policy commitment reduces the degree of 
political risk faced by developed country MNEs.  
Host-country governance conditions and EMMNEs 
The rapid growth of EMMNEs has prompted research to understand the factors that influence 
the level of political risk being experienced by these new contenders when venturing abroad. 
Following analytical frameworks originating from developed country MNEs, research has 
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modelled the role of host-country political and regulatory arrangements in shaping these new 
competitors’ perceived level of political risk. While some maintained that hazardous political 
situations in the host country are top concerns for EMMNEs (Duanmu & Guney, 2009; Guo 
et al., 2014; Satyanand, 2010), others suggested that these new players tend to report fewer 
such risks when venturing into an underdeveloped institutional context. For instance, a 
number of studies have found that Chinese MNEs perceive lower degree of political risk in 
countries with weak political and regulatory conditions (Buckley et al., 2016; Kolstad & Wiig, 
2012; Liu et al., 2016; Quer et al., 2012). Similarly, Jiménez (2010) noted that Spanish MNEs 
have reported fewer political obstacles when operating in countries with corruption, 
discretionary policymaking, and weak protection of property rights. Furthermore, Cuervo-
Cazurra and Genc (2008) documented that EMMNEs tend to view operating in 
underdeveloped institutional contexts as representing a source of opportunity rather than 
political hazards. Hence, there has been inconsistent evidence regarding the role of host-
country governance conditions on the level of political risks faced by these new competitors. 
(See Table 3.1 for a summary of existing research about the role of host-country governance 
conditions on the level of political risk faced by MNEs). 
Moreover, although some studies suggest that EMMNEs face fewer political obstacles in 
countries with ‘difficult’ governance conditions (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Jiménez, 
2010; Liu et al., 2016; Ringov, 2012), this does not imply that they are shielded from 
changing external circumstances. International business scholars have recognized that the 
analysis of EMMNEs should be sensitive to both home and host-country contexts (Child & 
Marinova, 2014; Stevens & Newnham-Kahindi, 2017). EMMNEs’ underdeveloped home-
country institutional and economic environments may represent additional sources of political 
barriers to undermine these firms’ acceptance, hence survival in overseas markets (Fiaschi et 
al., 2016; Marano et al., 2017). However, the political implications of home-country 
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institutions for the international success of these new players have received little theoretical 
and empirical attention.  
While the impact of host-country institutional governance arrangements has already been 
discussed, existing research has not yet provided a comprehensive account about the political 
hazards faced by EMMNEs. Focusing on a host-country’s institutional governance conditions 
allows us to understand why operating in one country denotes a higher level of political risk 
than another (Stevens et al., 2015). Yet, it does not adequately explain why these new players 
tend to experience political issues that often go beyond the host country’s political and 
regulatory governance factors (Satyanand, 2010). Hence, a growing body of literature has 
considered the relevance of legitimacy, i.e. an organization’s degree of social acceptance, in 
affecting business operations within and across state borders.
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Table 3.1 A summary of existing research on the relationship between host-country institutional governance conditions and MNEs’ perceived level of political risk 
Author(s) (Year)       Theme(s) Methodology and Sample Measurement of Political Risk Key Findings     
Panel A: Outward FDI by developed country MNEs 
      
Delios & Henisz (2003) 
 
Determinants of 
MNEs’ foreign entry 
strategies 
 
Empirical.                                           
Panel data on 665 Japanese 
manufacturing MNEs 
 
POLCON index 
 
Japanese MNEs’ foreign entry decision 
is negatively related to a host country’s 
likelihood of political change  
  
 
 
Globerman & Shapiro (2003) 
 
 
Determinants of FDI 
outflow 
 
 
Empirical.                                         
Panel data on U.S. FDI 
flow to developed and 
developing countries 
 
 
WGI indicators 
 
 
U.S. FDI is unlikely to flow to host 
countries with underdeveloped 
governance conditions 
  
 
 
Busse & Hefeker (2007) 
 
 
Determinants of FDI 
inflow 
 
 
Empirical.                                             
Panel data on FDI flow into 
developing countries 
 
 
ICRG index 
 
 
A host country’s government stability, 
control of corruption, ethnic tensions, 
internal and external conflicts, law and 
order, democratic accountability of 
government, and quality of bureaucracy 
are key determinants of FDI inflows to 
developing countries 
 
  
Slangen & van Tulder (2009) Determinants of 
MNEs’ foreign entry 
strategies 
Empirical.                                      
Questionnaire survey with 
Dutch MNEs  
WGI indicators Dutch MNEs are more likely to enter 
countries with underdeveloped 
governance conditions using joint 
ventures than wholly-owned 
subsidiaries 
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Casson & Lopes (2013) 
 
How MNEs perceive 
and manage risk 
 
Conceptual.                                       
 
N/A
 
Host-country government policy 
change, discrimination against foreign 
investors, wars, international sanctions, 
independent movement, and radical 
social upheavals are major sources of 
political risk faced by U.S. and 
European MNEs in high-risk countries 
    
 
Panel B: Outward FDI by EMMNEs   
    
Buckley et al. (2007) 
 
Determinants of FDI 
outflow 
 
Empirical.  
Panel data on Chinese 
FDI outflow 
 
ICRG index 
 
Chinese FDI is likely to flow to host 
countries with a high level of political risk  
 
 
Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc (2008) 
 
 
Determinants of MNEs’ 
overseas performance 
 
 
Empirical.  
Panel data on EMMNEs 
investing in least 
developed countries 
(LDCs) 
 
 
WGI indicators 
 
 
EMMNEs are likely to show greater 
competitiveness than developed country 
MNEs when operating in LDCs 
 
 
Duanmu & Guney (2009) 
 
 
Determinants of FDI 
outflow 
 
 
Empirical.  
Panel data on Chinese and 
Indian MNEs  
 
 
ICRG index 
 
 
Chinese FDI is likely flow to host countries 
with good institutional environments 
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Satyanand (2010) How MNEs perceive 
and manage risk 
Conceptual. N/A EMMNEs tend to perceive higher level of 
political risk in underdeveloped institutional 
environments than developed country 
MNEs. EMMNEs tend to encounter 
political risk beyond host country’s 
governance conditions 
 
 
Quer et al. (2012) 
 
 
Determinants of FDI 
outflow 
 
 
Empirical.  
Panel data on Chinese 
MNEs 
 
 
ICRG index 
 
 
Chinese MNEs are unlikely to be 
discouraged by host countries with high 
levels of political risk 
     
 
Guo et al. (2014) 
 
Determinants of FDI 
outflow 
 
Empirical. 
Panel data on Chinese 
FDI outflow 
 
China’s political risk 
index  
 
Impact of host-country political risk and 
Chinese FDI’s locational choice vary with 
time. Chinese investment shows an irregular 
locational pattern during 2004-2006 but 
directed to low risk countries since 2007. 
By 2011, the proportion of Chinese FDI in 
high risk countries was lower than the world 
average.  
 
 
Buckley et al. (2016) 
 
 
Determinants of FDI 
outflow 
 
 
Empirical.  
Panel data on Chinese 
MNEs  
 
 
ICRG index 
 
 
Chinese MNEs are likely to invest in 
countries with a high level of political risk 
 
 
Liu et al. (2016) 
 
 
Determinants of MNEs’ 
overseas performance 
 
 
Empirical.  
Questionnaire survey with 
Chinese MNEs  
 
 
WGI indicators 
 
 
Chinese MNEs are likely to achieve greater 
performance in countries with high level of 
political risk 
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3.2.2 Legitimacy and political risk 
Research rests upon the institutional perspective which has long argued that firms need to 
gain legitimacy from a range of social groups and actors including government, business 
partners, customers, and the general public to increase their chances of survival (Meyer & 
Peng, 2016; Webb et al., 2009). Inability to establish legitimacy with any of these groups 
may undermine business operations and entail political hazards such as regulatory 
speculation, conflicts between interested political parties, and consumer boycotts (Kostova & 
Zaheer, 1999).  
Previous studies looking at firms operating in the domestic context have uncovered the 
importance of gaining (losing) legitimacy from key social stakeholders in affecting the level 
of political risk being imposed on business operations. For instance, Deephouse (1996) 
established the relevance of gaining regulatory and public endorsements in allowing U.S. 
commercial banks to avoid interference from the external political environment. Ahlstrom, 
Bruton and Yeh (2008) posited that the lack of legitimacy of Chinese private firms and 
entrepreneurs in the early reform period exposed them to considerable political and social 
scepticism. Additionally, Marquis and Qian (2014) used a sample of Chinese publicly listed 
companies to explicate the importance of establishing legitimacy with the state government in 
enabling business operations. Thus, past research suggested that gaining or losing legitimacy 
from interested social stakeholders plays a critical role in determining the level of political 
obstacles faced by firms operating in the domestic context. The political implications of 
legitimacy can become more salient for MNEs venturing into the international market context 
(Stevens et al., 2015).  
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Legitimacy and developed country MNEs 
MNEs represent a more complex organizational form than purely domestic firms as they are 
exposed to multiple external environments and interested stakeholders (Meyer & Peng, 2016). 
Research through the institutional lens has observed that failure to obtain legitimacy from key 
social actors in the host country can lead MNEs to experience political obstacles which 
jeopardize business survival and success (Fiaschi et al., 2016).  
Kostova and Zaheer (1999) observed that the inability to gain acceptance among the local 
community in India has exposed some U.S. MNEs to intense political opposition. Bucheli 
and his co-authors postulated that MNEs’ ties with political elites no longer ruling the host 
country can generate problems of legitimacy for firms when the host country experiences 
significant social and institutional changes (Bucheli & Kim, 2012; Bucheli & Salvaj, 2013). 
Stevens et al. (2015) suggested that U.S. companies’ inability to align business objectives 
with the Chinese government’s long-term agenda has triggered political interventions in 
business operations. Taken together, a key message revealed by this line of literature suggests 
that the political risk faced by MNEs can be heightened as they are exposed to a broader 
range of host-country social stakeholders that apply varying criteria to evaluate what is 
legitimate practice.  
Legitimacy and EMMNEs 
The establishment or deterioration of legitimacy with host-country interested social 
stakeholders has been found to be a key determinant in shaping the level of political risk 
experienced by developed country MNEs. Yet, limited theoretical and empirical attention has 
examined its effect on EMMNEs’ perceived level of such risk when competing abroad.  
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International business literature has established that firms conducting business abroad carry 
the image of their home countries (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011; Hobdari et al., 2017). The lower 
levels of economic and institutional development in many emerging markets have made the 
establishment of legitimacy a particular hurdle for EMMNEs (Marano et al., 2017). Existing 
research has reported that EMMNEs’ home-country legitimacy deficit can make their 
products and safety standards subject to resistance by host-country customers (Madhok & 
Kayhani, 2012). Marano et al. (2017) suggested that EMMNEs from less institutionally 
developed countries are likely to encounter scepticism in host countries about these firms’ 
ability to conduct legitimate business. By comparing Chinese, Indian, and developed country 
MNEs operating in East Africa, Stevens and Newenham-Kahindi (2017) showed that home-
country origin may generate legitimacy or illegitimacy spill-over effects to influence the 
political risk being imposed on firms’ operations in the host country.  
While research has highlighted the relationship between legitimacy and MNEs’ international 
expansion, its role in affecting the level of political risk faced by EMMNEs has been 
underexplored. The weaker political and regulatory governance conditions of the home 
country, lower levels of economic development and standard of living compared with 
advanced economies can become political baggage that travels abroad with these new 
contenders (Globerman & Shapiro, 2009). Yet, the theoretical importance of home-country 
legitimacy in explaining EMMNEs’ perceived level of political risk has not been 
systematically investigated. With few exceptions (e.g. Stevens & Newenham-Kahindi, 2017), 
the majority of existing research has examined firms from developed countries. However, the 
political implication of legitimacy for these new players operating in the international context 
remains an underexplored area. Table 3.2 summarizes research that looks at the effect of 
legitimacy on the level of political risk encountered by MNEs from both developed and 
emerging markets. 
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Table 3.2 A summary of existing research on the relationship between MNEs’ legitimacy and their perceived level of political risk in the host country 
Author(s) (Year) Theme(s) Methodology and Sample Measurement of Political Risk Key Findings       
Panel A: Outward FDI by developed country MNEs 
       
Kostova & Zaheer (1999) 
 
How MNEs’ legitimacy 
affects their perceived 
level of political risk 
 
Conceptual. 
 
N/A 
 
U.S. MNEs’ legitimacy with 
host-country social stakeholders 
critically affects the political risk 
faced by these firms in the local 
market. 
   
Bucheli & Kim (2012) How MNEs’ legitimacy 
affects their perceived 
level of political risk 
Case study.                                                       
United Fruit Company in 
Central America 
N/A U.S. MNEs’ alliance with 
political elites or political 
systems no longer ruling the host 
country entails problems of 
legitimacy for firms when 
macro-level institutional or 
political regime changes take 
place. 
   
Bucheli & Salvaj (2013) How MNEs’ legitimacy 
affects their perceived 
level of political risk 
Case study.                                                      
International Telephone and 
Telegraph Company in Chile 
N/A U.S. MNEs’ ties with political 
elites no longer ruling the host 
country can lead firms to 
experience a loss of reputation 
and illegitimacy when the host 
country experiences significant 
social and institutional changes. 
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Stevens et al. (2015) How MNEs’ legitimacy 
affects their perceived 
level of political risk 
Case study.                                                         
Google and Yahoo in China 
N/A U.S. MNEs’ legitimacy 
influences host-government 
motivations to intervene, hence 
the level of political risk that 
these firms faced in China. 
   
 
Panel B: Outward FDI by EMMNEs 
    
Madhok & Kayhani (2012) 
 
How MNEs’ legitimacy 
influences their 
international expansions 
 
Conceptual. 
 
N/A 
 
EMMNEs’ underdeveloped home-country 
institutional and economic environments 
can deter their access to resources and 
markets in the host country. 
Marano et al. (2017) Determinants of 
EMMNEs’ corporate 
social responsibility 
reporting intensity 
Empirical. 
Panel data of 157 EMMNEs 
N/A The less developed home-country 
institutional environment can lead 
EMMNEs to face scepticism in host 
countries about these firms’ ability to 
conduct legitimate business. 
 
Stevens & Newenham-
Kahindi (2017) 
 
How MNEs’ legitimacy 
influences the political 
risk that they encounter 
abroad 
 
Case study.                                         
Chinese, Indian, American and 
European MNEs in East African 
countries. 
 
 
N/A 
 
Home-country origin can generate within-
country and across-country legitimacy or 
illegitimacy spill-over effects to influence 
the political risk faced by MNEs.  
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In sum, extant research that builds upon the institutional perspective has mainly analysed the 
impact of host-country institutional governance conditions on the level of political perils 
faced by MNEs. Yet, the complicated political issues faced by EMMNEs in the international 
market have called for complementing extant literature with an alternative conceptual lens 
(Buckley et al., 2007; Stevens et al., 2015). Although previous research has commonly noted 
the role of legitimacy in determining firms’ prosperity, its relevance in shaping EMMNEs’ 
perceived level of political risk in overseas markets has not been adequately investigated. The 
underdeveloped home-country institutional environment implies ‘legitimacy deficit’ and 
represents political liability when EMMNEs venture into the international marketplace 
(Marano et al., 2017). This is different from the traditional host-country political and 
regulatory governance deficiencies that have been reported by their developed country 
counterparts. Yet, as existing research on EMMNEs is largely rooted in theoretical models of 
developed country firms (Child & Marinova, 2014), we know little about the political 
implications of home-country legitimacy for EMMNEs’ perceived level of host-country 
political risk. Therefore, this chapter is prompted to provide a more comprehensive account 
of the determinants of MNEs’ perceived level of political risk in light of their home-country 
legitimacy with key stakeholders in the host country. 
3.3 Theoretical Background 
This chapter builds upon the institutional perspective to capture factors that determine 
Chinese MNEs’ perceived level of political risk when competing in the international 
marketplace. Moreover, the role of legitimacy and its interactions with host-country 
institutional governance conditions will be examined.  
The institutional perspective brings together several lines of research with shared interest in 
the role of contextual forces in shaping firms’ strategies and behaviours (see Meyer & Peng, 
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2016 for review). In this study, we define institutions as the shared norms and rules that 
determine socially acceptable behaviours for members within an organizational field 
(Kostova et al., 2008). The core idea is that firms adapt their behaviours according to a 
country’s regulatory, normative and cognitive systems that may not grant them efficiency, but 
make them more acceptable in the eyes of key stakeholders (Bruton et al., 2010). 
While regulatory forces are composed of explicitly stated laws, normative and cognitive 
forces include more implicit and taken-for-granted values and norms (Scott, 2003). The 
relationships among these institutional forces are complex and endogenous (Bruton et al., 
2010). Political and regulatory reforms may be made to accept what are viewed as legitimate 
practices by influential social actors (Webb et al., 2009). The institutional governance 
framework may reinforce a society’s values and impact individual mindsets and behaviours 
(Bruton et al., 2010). Therefore, MNEs not only have to comply with host-country political 
and regulatory governance rules, but also make sense of those widely shared societal values 
to obtain a legitimate status to operate.  
Unlike changes of political and regulatory regimes that are observable, the underlying 
societal norms are more implicit and part of the ‘deep structures’ of a country (Gersick, 1990). 
Hence, it is more difficult for outsiders to grasp. In addition to regulatory compliance, MNEs 
are subject to the continuous evaluations by interested social stakeholders in the host country. 
Their assessment about MNEs’ legitimacy is a process characterized by bounded rationality 
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). The lack of information about a particular MNE may prompt 
them to use stereotypes by referring to the legitimacy or illegitimacy of certain classes of 
organizations to which the MNE is perceived to belong (Bitektine, 2011). Such stereotypes 
are largely rooted in a host-country’s long-established assumptions about MNEs from 
specific industries and/or home countries (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011). Thus, although a strong 
governance framework on the surface may foster a transparent and equal playing field, MNEs 
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may perceive these to be only as important as the acceptance or resistance by key 
stakeholders in the host country (Trevino, Thomas & Cullen, 2008).  
Given the growing interest in understanding the relationship between legitimacy and political 
risk (Stevens & Newenham-Kahindi, 2017; Stevens et al., 2015), it presents important 
opportunities for conceptual and empirical examination. Thus, this study complements extant 
research focus on host-country governance conditions by underscoring the role of legitimacy 
in affecting MNEs’ perceived level of political risk in foreign markets. 
Existing literature has defined legitimacy in a number of different ways. For example, 
legitimacy has been defined as the acceptance of an organization by its environment which is 
vital for organizational success (Fiaschi et al., 2016), as social actors accept the 
organization’s means and ends as desirable, proper, and appropriate (Suchman, 1995), and as 
an organization’s structure and activities congruent with the social actors’ values and 
expectations (Cui & Jiang, 2012). Yet, they tend to converge on gaining acceptance from 
social stakeholders; this constitutes the most critical element of legitimacy. MNEs, as 
socially-embedded actors, have to obtain acceptance for their existence from host-country 
interested stakeholders (Boddewyn, 2016). Unlike formal laws, which have a legally-binding 
power, the legitimacy conferred by these stakeholders is a social contract in nature (Stevens 
et al., 2015). Yet, the granting or withholding of such ‘social license’ may profoundly affect 
the political risk faced by MNEs as it represents an alternative mechanism to a host country’s 
governance framework that either enables or hinders firms’ survival (Cui & Jiang, 2012).  
It has been established that firms’ responses toward external environmental pressures may 
vary depending on the availability of alternative legitimating mechanisms (Kostova et al., 
2008). The legitimacy judgement made by host-country interested stakeholders provides a 
viable legitimating channel that may reduce the impact of institutional governance 
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arrangements on MNEs’ perceived level of political hazards (Stevens et al., 2015). An MNE 
with a lower degree of legitimacy in the eyes of social stakeholders may limit the 
effectiveness of established rules and laws in the host country. In other words, the legitimacy 
assessment by host-country social stakeholders may moderate the influence of institutional 
governance conditions on MNEs’ perceived level of political risk. Despite the importance of 
legitimacy, its role and the interaction with host-country governance rules have not been 
adequately understood.  
This study examines the role of legitimacy in affecting the level of political risk faced by 
Chinese MNEs abroad. The unique home-country institutional environment of Chinese firms 
can substantially affect their degree of acceptance by host-country legitimacy-granting actors, 
thus generating political consequences. By underscoring the notion of legitimacy under the 
institutional perspective, the present study allows us to develop better understanding about 
the importance of social acceptance and its interplay with a host-country’s governance rules 
in shaping the level of political risk faced by MNEs in the global arena. 
3.4 Hypotheses Development 
Based on the theoretical assumptions and arguments discussed above, we can see that the 
establishment of legitimacy in the host country may have critical implications for the level of 
political risk faced by MNEs operating abroad. Here, the author develops a number of 
hypotheses concerning the relevance of the host-country institutional governance conditions 
and its interactions with a range of legitimacy-granting actors in affecting Chinese MNEs’ 
perceived level of political risk. 
3.4.1 Direct effect of host-country institutional governance conditions 
A country’s institutional governance conditions cover ‘public institutions and policies created 
by governments as a framework for economic, legal, and social relations’ (Globerman & 
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Shapiro, 2003: 20). It includes the process by which governments are selected and monitored, 
governments’ competences to formulate and implement policies, and the extent to which 
citizens and governments respect the institutions that govern economic and social interactions 
(Kaufmann et al., 2009). A robust institutional governance framework is paramount in 
determining a country’s attractiveness to inward FDI (Oh & Oetzel, 2011). For Chinese 
MNEs venturing abroad, the author suggests that strong host-country institutional governance 
arrangements alleviate Chinese firms’ perceived level of political risk for two reasons. 
First, on the host country side, a favourable institutional governance framework helps to 
promote inward FDI (Globerman & Shapiro, 2003). A ‘positive’ governance framework 
involves an impartial and transparent legal system that protects property rights, strong 
enforcement of court decisions, and creditable policy commitment that favours competition 
for both domestic and foreign companies (Lu et al., 2014). The presence of these conditions 
can provide institutional support to boost MNEs’ operational confidence (Oh & Oetzel, 2011). 
Hence, Chinese firms’ perceived level of host-country political risk may be reduced in 
countries characterized by strong institutional governance conditions.  
Second, on the home country side, the ‘institutional escapism view’ provides that firms 
respond to the misalignment between their business objectives and home-country institutional 
environment through outward FDI (Lu et al., 2011). The international expansion of Chinese 
MNEs has largely been deemed as a response to such misalignment (Boisot & Meyer, 2008). 
The burdensome domestic institutional governance conditions as exemplified by inconsistent 
legal interpretations and political instability can increase Chinese MNEs’ perceived level of 
political risk at home, hence prompt them to escape abroad in search of favourable treatment 
and efficient governance conditions (Luo & Tung, 2007). Therefore, Chinese firms’ 
perceived level of political risk may be reduced in host-countries with a strong institutional 
governance framework. Although some research has reported that Chinese MNEs tend to be 
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indifferent or prompted by operating in underdeveloped institutional contexts (Liu et al., 
2016), empirical evidence suggests that host-country institutional governance arrangements 
matter on these firms’ perceived level of political risk. Based on survey data, the World 
Investment and Political Risk Report (2009) showed that EMMNEs, especially those from 
China, worry most about the breach of contract, war and civil turbulence, and transfer and 
convertibility restrictions taking place in the host country. Hence,  
Hypothesis 1: The stronger the host-country institutional governance conditions, the 
lower the level of political risk perceived by Chinese MNEs. 
3.4.2 The moderating role of legitimacy 
Extant research drawn from the institutional perspective tends to focus on host-country 
political and regulatory governance factors. Yet, a country’s institutional governance 
conditions and legitimacy judgements by interested social stakeholders may interact with 
each other to influence cross-border business operations (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Trevino et 
al., 2008). At least two factors explain their interdependence. First, the political and 
legislative framework may be implemented to account for the broader sociocultural norms 
and technological trends in society (Webb et al., 2009). Second, interested social groups may 
lobby successfully for shifts in a country’s established laws to account for their interests 
(Estrin & Prevezer, 2011). Thus, a country’s institutional governance framework and the 
legitimacy evaluation by key social stakeholders may interact to affect the level of political 
risk encountered by MNEs.  
This chapter looks at a range of legitimacy-granting actors in affecting Chinese MNEs’ 
perceived level of political risk in the host country. Legitimacy represents an overall 
evaluation by some groups of observers towards organizational activities, but there is no need 
for a consensus of opinion within or across these groups (Suchman, 1995). This implies that 
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the issuing or denying of a legitimate status to MNEs are dependent upon specific contexts or 
audiences (Henisz & Zelner, 2005). As gaining legitimacy from certain institutional 
constituents may have more profound influence in alleviating the political hazards faced by 
MNEs (Darendeli & Hill, 2016), it is fundamental to identify key social groups and actors in 
the host country. A central set of such stakeholders are host-country governments who 
possess the power in determining the existence of MNEs within their borders (Bitektine, 2011: 
152). A second group of key stakeholders are host-country industrial agencies which set the 
entry and operational barriers for different industries (García-Canal & Guillén, 2008). 
Another vital group of legitimacy-conferring actors are the general public in host countries 
who can influence MNEs’ survival through societal values and expectations (Deephouse, 
1996). This study considers Chinese MNEs’ legitimacy in the eyes of these three sets of 
stakeholders and their interactions with host-country governance conditions on firms’ 
perceived level of political risk.  
Chinese MNEs’ home-country government legitimacy with host-country government 
The institutional lens recognizes that firms conducting business abroad not only need to 
respond to within-country institutional forces, but also the interplay of their home and host 
countries in the international arena (Makino & Tsang, 2011). MNEs are often viewed as 
informal representatives of their home countries or home-country governments, hence 
receiving country-specific treatment when expanding to overseas markets (Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2011).  
The literature on legitimacy has noted that a firm’s home-country origin may have important 
implications for its international expansion (Stevens & Newenham-Kahindi, 2017). The 
condition of bounded rationality can make people judge particular events by referring to their 
experiences with similar events that fall into the same cognitive category (Kostova & Zaheer, 
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1999). The host-country government may evaluate an MNE’s legitimacy or illegitimacy by 
associating the firm with its home country in general and home-country government in 
particular (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011). The high degree of legitimacy enjoyed by an MNE’s 
home-country government with the host-country government because of the trustworthy and 
friendly interstate political relations may generate positive legitimacy spill-over effect into 
cross-border business operations (Stevens & Newenham-Kahindi, 2017). Firms are likely to 
benefit from the legitimacy of their home-country government, being awarded with 
preferential treatment. On the contrary, the lack of legitimacy of an MNE’s home government 
can lead the firm to be perceived as detrimental, being imposed with country-specific 
restrictions by the host government (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011).  
Governments’ actions in signalling what are socially acceptable practices can be as powerful 
as codified laws (Marquis & Qian, 2014). Their judgement towards the legitimacy or 
illegitimacy of MNEs’ home-country governments may act as an alternative institutional 
device which offsets the relevance of explicitly stated rules and laws to enable or deter firms’ 
access to resources and information (Stevens et al., 2015). Thus, the legitimacy of MNEs’ 
home-country governments in the eyes of host-country governments may compromise the 
role of institutional governance rules in shaping the political hazards experienced by MNEs.  
Although Chinese MNEs may venture abroad in pursuit of more efficient institutional 
environments, the image of their home country is not always separable from firms (Madhok 
& Kayhani, 2012). Governments of host countries tend to associate Chinese MNEs with their 
home-country origin, which can have a broad impact on the legitimate status of these new 
competitors (Stevens & Newenham-Kahindi, 2017). The greater legitimacy enjoyed by the 
Chinese government with certain host-country governments because of the shared views in 
foreign policies may foster a more conducive political environment. Governments of these 
countries tend to view Chinese MNEs as more acceptable and bring desirable resources such 
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as capital and employment opportunities (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011). Such positive legitimacy 
spill-over effect enables Chinese MNEs to receive favourable treatment and concessions 
which reduce their reliance on explicitly stated rules. Conversely, the weak legitimacy of the 
Chinese government in the eyes of some host-country governments due to the lack of trust 
and co-operation in international political affairs may expose Chinese firms to hostile 
treatment and speculation (Child & Marinova, 2014). Hence, we posit that:  
Hypothesis 2: A high degree of Chinese MNEs’ home-government legitimacy in the eyes 
of the host-country government will reduce the importance of the institutional governance 
framework in shaping firms’ perception about host-country political risk.  
Chinese MNEs’ legitimacy in host-country regulated industries 
In addition to the macro-level political and regulatory frameworks that apply to all foreign 
investors, firms doing business abroad have to account for the requirements set by host-
country industrial agencies. The political science literature has maintained that governments 
are not unitary actors but consist of many individuals and subunits with varying interests 
(Kistruck, Morris, Webb & Stevens, 2015). When a country’s overall governance framework 
cannot adequately accommodate their goals, they may compete with macro-level governance 
rules by signalling their own norms and standards of legitimacy (Helmke & Levitsky, 2003). 
While laws may be established at national level to regulate all foreign investments, 
considerations over the competitiveness of domestic firms may prompt industrial agencies to 
set policies targeting different sectors. Hence, industry-specific incentives and restrictions 
may serve as a competing mechanism for legitimacy to a host-country’s macro-level 
governance framework.  
While industrial policies may affect every sector of the economy, their impact can be more 
salient for firms in regulated industries such as natural resources, extraction, 
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telecommunications, banking, and utilities (García-Canal & Guillén, 2008). Unlike MNEs in 
more liberalized sectors which primarily compete on the merit of market demands, those in 
regulated industries are critically dependent on munificent industrial policies in the host 
country (Henisz & Zelner, 2001). Instead of relying on governance rules that apply to all 
foreign investors, firms in regulated industries may perceive gaining acceptance from host-
country industrial agencies as an alternative legitimating channel to enable their survival. 
Although host countries’ overall governance conditions may play a key role in Chinese 
MNEs’ perceived level of political risk, their influence may be constrained by the presence of 
industry-specific policies for those operating in regulated sectors. Given the prominent role of 
industrial agencies in setting a wide array of industry-specific requirements, their assessment 
about Chinese firms’ motives and influence on the local economy may become a viable 
legitimating instrument that reduces the relevance of macro-level governance frameworks for 
those in regulated industries (Bremmer, 2014).  
Hypothesis 3: The importance of host-country institutional governance frameworks in 
shaping Chinese MNEs’ perception about political risk will be reduced for firms 
operating in regulated industries.  
Chinese MNEs’ legitimacy with the general public in the host country  
As societies are composed of groups that may have different opinions about what is socially 
acceptable practice, a firm’s legitimacy is subject to the assessment of interested social 
groups including local communities, consumers, and other members of civil society (Webb et 
al., 2009). These actors are constituents of the institutional environment, which defines, 
diffuses, and enforces prevailing norms and requirements of acceptable business conduct 
(Deephouse, 1996; Fiaschi et al., 2016). MNEs thus need to align activities with the 
expectations of these key stakeholders to gain the right to do business.  
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The lack of acceptance by the general public in the host country not only risks an MNE’s 
brand value, but also induces political consequences. The literature on legitimacy has 
contended that government requires legitimacy for themselves from their own constituents 
and stakeholders (Henisz, Zelner & Guillén, 2005). The way that the public reacts to 
governmental regulations targeting a firm or specific group of firms may substantially 
augment or lessen the effectiveness of such regulations (Prno & Slocombe, 2012). When the 
general public in the host country view an MNE as less legitimate, the government tends to 
be reluctant to enforce rules in favour of the firm as doing so may trigger public anger and 
damage the government’s own legitimacy. Conversely, when firms enjoy greater legitimacy 
with the general public in the host country, the government is less likely to implement a 
regulatory framework against business operations as it may cause key social stakeholders to 
withdraw their support for the government (Stevens et al., 2015). Therefore, demands exerted 
by the general public in the host country may act as a competing mechanism to institutional 
governance rules in shaping MNEs’ perceived level of political risk.  
Chinese MNEs venture abroad in search of more efficient institutional environments, but at 
the same time they face unique legitimacy challenges (Madhok & Keyhani, 2012). The lack 
of established reputation and an underdeveloped home-country institutional environment may 
lead the general public in the host country to engage in ‘adverse institutional attribution’ 
when assessing firms’ legitimacy (Ramachandran & Pant, 2010: 247). The lower level of 
economic development and standards of living at home may lead the host country’s 
consumers to distrust EMMNEs’ product quality and safety standards (Klein, 2002). 
Moreover, host-country civil societies may be wary of EMMNEs due to their reluctance to 
engage in environmental and labour rights protection (Fiaschi et al., 2016). Additionally, 
host-country media may be suspicious towards the activities of EMMNEs because of the lack 
of transparency and weak corporate governance disclosure (Marano et al., 2017). These 
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controversies can make the general public in the host country perceive EMMNEs as harmful 
to the local economy and environment. As a result, they may lobby their government to 
introduce specific requirements targeting Chinese MNEs that hinder the effectiveness of host-
country institutional governance conditions. 
Hypothesis 4: A low degree of Chinese MNEs’ legitimacy in the eyes of the general 
public in the host country will reduce the importance of the institutional governance 
framework in shaping firms’ perception about host-country political risk.  
3.5 Data and Measurement 
3.5.1 Sample 
To test the abovementioned hypotheses, the author employs the same CCPIT survey data as 
the previous chapter. Sample selection criteria and characteristics have been described in 
Section 2.5.  
3.5.2 Measurement of variables 
Chinese MNEs’ perceived level of host-country political risk 
The dependent variable is Chinese MNEs’ perceived level of host-country political risk. It 
was operationalized by asking the respondents to evaluate the political environment of their 
companies’ most recently established overseas branch on a 7-point scale (1 = very risky, to 7 
= very safe) regarding the following items: (i) the implementation of rules and laws in the 
host country, (ii) the protection of private property in the host country, (iii) the settlement of 
commercial disputes in the host country, and (iv) the control of corruption and bribery in the 
host country.  
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Host-country institutional governance conditions 
To operationalize host-country institutional governance conditions, the author follows 
previous research by using the WGI index (Globerman & Shapiro, 2003; Liu et al., 2016). 
Details of the WGI index including dimensions being included, geographical coverage, and 
ranking method have been described in Section 2.5.2.  
Chinese MNEs’ home-country government legitimacy with the host-country government 
As conceptual and empirical understanding about the role of legitimacy in shaping the 
political risk faced by MNEs remain at an early stage (Stevens et al., 2015), Chinese firms’ 
legitimacy is captured by following previous research and fieldwork interviews with 
managers of Chinese companies that are active in conducting outward FDI. Evidence from 
the interviews consistently revealed that Chinese MNEs’ legitimacy in the eyes of host-
country interested stakeholders, such as government and the general public plays a key role in 
explaining the political perils that firms experience in overseas markets. 
The political hazards faced by MNEs have evolved from a narrow focus on host-country 
political and regulatory factors to the global interplay between firms’ home- and host-country 
governments (Child & Marinova, 2014). Favourable and trusting political relations between 
home and host countries may help MNEs to be perceived as more acceptable whereas they 
may be imposed with discriminatory treatment as interstate political relations become hostile 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011). Evidence from our interviews corroborated these arguments. For 
example, one interviewee disclosed that: “The way [the host-country government] sees China 
and the Chinese government can fundamentally affect how we are treated. Of course, it 
would enhance our degree of acceptance if they have a good impression towards our country.” 
A similar response was provided by another manager from a Chinese food processing firm: 
“We thought that European countries would promote fair competition but it is not the case in 
reality. No matter whether we are private or state-owned, [some European country 
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governments] don’t really trust us and think the Chinese government stands behind us.” 
Therefore, this study measures Chinese MNEs’ home-country government legitimacy in the 
eyes of host-country government by the strength of interstate political relations. The survey 
respondents were asked to evaluate the importance of political relations between China and 
the host country to their investment on a 7-point scale (1 = very unimportant, 7 = very 
important).  
Chinese MNEs’ legitimacy in host-country regulated industries 
MNEs in regulated industries, including natural resources, telecommunication, utilities, 
petroleum, and financial services, may be subject to a higher degree of political intervention 
than those in less-regulated industries (García-Canal & Guillén, 2008). The present study 
adopts a dummy variable to distinguish Chinese firms operating in the abovementioned 
regulated industries (1) and otherwise (0).  
Chinese MNEs’ legitimacy with the general public in the host country  
Previous research has highlighted the importance of acquiring acceptance from a broad set of 
social stakeholders in addition to the government (Bucheli & Salvaj, 2013; Deephouse, 1996). 
Evidence from our fieldwork interviews supports this argument. For instance, one manager 
who is in charge of a Chinese textile company’s international strategy reflected that: “It is 
crucial to let the locals [in Egypt] accept our specific payroll and reward policies. Otherwise, 
it can cause big damage to our image and lead to public outcry against us.” Other 
interviewees provided similar responses. Thus, Chinese MNEs’ legitimacy in the eyes of the 
general public in the host country is captured by asking the respondents to evaluate the 
reaction of the general public in the host country to firms’ investment (1 = very low degree of 
negative reaction; 7 = very high degree of negative reaction). 
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Control variables 
A number of country-level factors may influence Chinese MNEs’ perceived level of political 
risk abroad. First, coastal provinces in China have been offered more policy incentives to 
attract FDI since the earlier days of economic reform. Hence, market-supporting institutions 
in these places are more established and firms tend to receive more support than inland 
regions. Following previous research (Wu & Chen, 2014), this study employed the 
marketization index to measure the regional market-based policy heterogeneities in China 
(Fan et al., 2010). Second, it has been found that the Chinese government has played an 
active role in helping Chinese MNEs to deal with hazardous political situations in overseas 
markets (Luo et al., 2010). The present analysis has controlled for Chinese MNEs’ home-
government support using six items from the survey: (i) financial and capital access, (ii) 
simplifying the approval of foreign investment, (iii) simplifying the procedures for 
demonstrating firms have sufficient capital in foreign investment projects, (iv) the provision 
of investment guidelines by industries, (v) the protection of firms’ rights in overseas markets, 
and (vi) the provision of investment guidelines by countries. The respondents were asked to 
evaluate these items on a 7-point scale (1 = very low support; 7 = very high support).  
At industry level, this study has controlled the degree of host-country industry competition 
using three items from the survey: (i) difficulty of obtaining raw materials, (ii) difficulty of 
obtaining technology for innovation, and (iii) completeness of upstream and downstream 
industries in the host country.  
As larger companies may enjoy advantages of establishing ties with relevant political 
stakeholders, firm size is controlled using the natural logarithm value of firms’ total number 
of employees (Deephouse, 1996). Moreover, MNEs with greater international and country-
specific experiences may cope with risky political situations more effectively (Delios & 
Beamish, 2001). This study measures a Chinese firm’s international experience as the number 
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of years it has engaged in international activities. Country-specific experience is 
operationalized by the number of years that it has been established in a host country (Wu & 
Lin, 2010). Furthermore, effective risk assessment may allow MNEs to employ more 
appropriate strategies to manage the political hazards in overseas markets (Holburn & Zelner, 
2010). The author employs a dummy variable to capture Chinese MNEs’ risk assessment by 
assigning the value of 1 to firms that have employed risk assessment strategies and 0 
otherwise. Additionally, Chinese MNEs’ perception of host-country political risk may be 
affected by their degree of affiliation with the home-country government (Cui & Jiang, 2012). 
The present study controls for the effect of state ownership using a dummy variable and 
assigning value 1 to SOEs and 0 otherwise. (See Appendix 2 for a summary of questionnaire 
survey items).  
3.6 Results 
3.6.1 Common method bias 
Since a number of variables have been taken from the questionnaire, it may result in the 
possibility of common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003). To deal with this issue, the 
author employed the objective measurement of WGI to capture host-country governance 
quality. Moreover, Harman single-factor test has been performed to examine common 
method variance. The result of Harman single-factor test indicates that the single-factor 
model shows a poor fit to the data. Hence, the issue of common method bias does not pose a 
major threat to this study.  
3.6.2 Construct reliability and validity 
Descriptive statistics and variable correlations are displayed in Table 3.3. To identify 
potential multicollinearity, this study looked at the VIF for all the variables. The results of 
VIF for all the variables were well below the acceptable level of 10 (Neter et al., 1985), 
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which indicates no multicollinearity. Moreover, the author performed the reliability test for 
those multi-item constructs, home-government support, host-country governance quality, 
Chinese MNEs’ perceived level of host-country political risk, and degree of host-country 
industry competition, to look at their internal consistency with Cronbach’s alpha. The values 
of internal consistency for these constructs were from 0.766 to 0.975. Therefore, the 
reliabilities of our multi-item constructs have met the recommended level of 0.70 (Pallant, 
2005). Furthermore, this study conducted CFA to examine the convergent and discriminant 
validities of these multi-item constructs. The CFA model shows a good fit with the data (see 
Table 3.4). All indices meet their respective criteria (χ2(146)=247.380; P<0.001; 
CMIN/DF=1.69; CFI=0.97; NNLI=0.96; RMSEA=0.07; SRMR=0.05). The CFA test 
supports the convergent validities of our multi-item constructs. The results are presented in 
Table 3.5.  
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Table 3.3 Correlation matrix 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Chinese MNEs’ perceived level of host-country political risk 4.57 1.23                         
2. Host-country institutional governance conditions 0.44 1.17 0.42**                       
3. Chinese MNEs’ home-government legitimacy 4.12 1.62 0.01 0.02                     
4. Chinese MNEs’ legitimacy in host-country regulated industries 0.49 0.50 0.21* 0.05 0.12                   
5. Chinese MNEs’ legitimacy with the general public in the host country                   3.31 1.44 -0.07 -0.12 0.24** -0.15         
6. Degree of marketization 9.36 1.41 0.10 0.07 0.01 0.16* -0.06               
7. Ownership 0.26 0.44 -0.08 0.04 -0.04 -0.29 0.01 -0.16             
8. International experience 3.01 5.42 -0.01 -0.10 -0.04 0.11 -0.10 0.05 0.03           
9. Local experience 2.86 2.47 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.15 -0.12 -0.02 -0.13         
10. Risk assessment 0.70 0.46 0.22** 0.05 -0.09 0.20* 0.00 0.11 -0.18 0.08 0.22**       
11. Firm size 6.29 2.19 0.10 0.11 -0.14 0.22** 0.00 0.16* 0.29** 0.24** 0.04 -0.03     
12. Host-country industry competition 3.21 0.94 0.42** 0.34** 0.13 0.14 0.19* -0.07 -0.08 -0.26 0.00 0.04 0.03   
13. Home-country government support 4.59 1.09 0.29** 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.16* 0.02 -0.04 0.04 -0.08 0.05 0.13 0.22** 
Sample = 148 
*P<0.05; **P<0.01; ***P<0.001 
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Table 3.4 CFA model 
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Table 3.5 Measurement model and CFA results 
Constructs  Operational Measures of Construct Factor 
Loadings 
t-value 
Chinese MNEs’ perceived level of host-country political risk    
(Cronbach’s alpha=0.940) Implementation of rules and laws in the host country 0.91 15.18 
 Protection of private property in the host country 0.93 15.88 
 Settlement of commercial disputes in the host country 0.89 14.68 
 Control of corruption and bribery in the host country 0.85 Fixed 
Home-country government support    
(Cronbach’s alpha=0.938) Financial and capital access 0.79 13.28 
 Simplifying the approval of foreign investment 0.85 15.78 
 Provision of investment guidelines by countries 0.81 13.91 
 Simplifying the procedures for demonstrating sufficient capital in foreign investment projects 0.83 14.84 
 Provision of investment guidelines by industries 0.87 16.79 
 Protection of firms’ rights in overseas markets 0.93 Fixed 
Host-country institutional governance conditions    
(Cronbach’s alpha=0.975) Voice and accountability 0.82 16.55 
 Political instability 0.85 18.56 
 Government effectiveness 0.98 38.46 
 Regulatory quality 0.98 37.79 
 Rule of law 0.99 45.50 
 Control of corruption 0.97 Fixed 
Host-country industry competition    
(Cronbach’s alpha=0.766) Difficulty of obtaining raw materials 0.78 6.71  
 Difficulty of obtaining technology for innovation 0.72 6.80 
 Completion of upstream and downstream industries 0.69 Fixed 
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In addition to the test of convergent validities, the discriminant validities in relation to the 
above multi-item constructs have been considered to make sure that each of them captured 
the phenomena that others did not. Following previous research, the value of variance 
extracted for any construct in a pair of comparisons should be greater than 0.50 and greater 
than the squared correlations between the two constructs (Lyles, Li & Yan, 2014). Table 3.6 
reports the results of discriminant validity test. The variance extracted values ranged from 
0.73 to 0.94, with all values greater than their corresponding inter-construct squared 
correlations (Hair et al., 2006). Thus, the discriminant validities of our multi-item constructs 
are supported. 
Table 3.6 Discriminant validity 
 
Chinese MNEs’ 
perceived level of host-
country political risk 
Home-country 
government 
support 
Host-country 
institutional 
governance 
conditions 
Host-country 
industry 
competition 
Chinese MNEs’ 
perceived level of host-
country political risk (0.896)       
Home-country 
government support 0.272 (0.847)     
Host-country 
institutional governance 
conditions 0.407 0.100 (0.935)   
Host-country industry 
competition 0.367 0.186 0.304 (0.728) 
3.6.3 Hypotheses tests and results 
This study employs the OLS regression to test the hypotheses. The results are presented in 
Table 3.7. Model 1 in Table 3.7 contains only the control variables. In Model 2, the 
independent variable, host-country institutional governance quality, and the direct effects of 
the moderators include Chinese MNEs’ home-government legitimacy, Chinese MNEs’ 
legitimacy in host-country regulated industries, and Chinese MNEs’ legitimacy in the eyes of 
the host-country public are introduced. Models 3–6 tested the hypothesized interaction effects.  
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For the control variables, a firm’s risk assessment strategy is positively related to their 
perception about host-country political risk at 5% significance level in Models 1, 2, 5, and 6. 
But its level of significance dropped to 10% in Models 3 and 4. The degree of host-country 
industry competition is positively associated with Chinese MNEs’ perception about host-
country political risk at the 0.001% significance level across all models. Additionally, there is 
a positive association between the level of home-country government support and Chinese 
firms’ perception about host-country political risk at the 5% level of significance in Models 
1–4 and 6, and 1% significance level in Model 5.  
In relation to the independent variable – host-country institutional governance conditions – it 
shows a positive sign to Chinese MNEs’ perception about host-country political risk in all 
models (p<0.01 in Models 2, 4, 5; p<0.001 in Models 3 and 6). Thus, it lends support to 
Hypothesis 1, that the stronger the host-country institutional governance conditions, the lower 
the level of political risk perceived by Chinese MNEs. Moreover, the direct effects of our 
moderators in Model 2 are not statistically significant which rules out the effect of reverse 
interaction between the independent variable and moderators.  
Hypothesis 2 concerns the interaction effect between host-country institutional governance 
conditions and Chinese MNEs’ home-government legitimacy with host-country government. 
As shown in Table 3.7, the interaction term is negative and statistically significant in Model 3 
and remains at the same level of significance in Model 6 when all the variables are included. 
This suggests that higher degrees of home-government legitimacy in the eyes of the host 
government will reduce the importance of institutional governance conditions in affecting 
Chinese MNEs’ perceived level of political risk. Hence, Hypothesis 2 is supported.  
For the interaction effect between institutional governance conditions and Chinese MNEs’ 
legitimacy in host-country regulated industries, the coefficient of the interaction term in 
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Model 4 is negative but statistically insignificant. It remains the same sign with only 10% 
significance level in Model 6. Thus, Hypothesis 3, that Chinese MNEs operating in regulated 
industries will reduce the importance of host-country institutional governance conditions in 
shaping firms’ perceived level of political risk, does not receive support in the OLS 
regression.  
With regards to the joint effect between host-country institutional governance conditions and 
Chinese MNEs’ legitimacy in the eyes of the general public in the host country, their 
interaction term shows a negative sign at the 5% significance level in Models 5 and 6. 
Therefore, it lends support to Hypothesis 4, which posits that low degree of Chinese MNEs’ 
legitimacy with the general public in the host country will reduce the importance of 
institutional governance conditions in shaping firms’ perceived level of political risk.  
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Table 3.7 Result of OLS regression 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Main Variable       
Host-country institutional governance conditions  0.28** 0.77*** 0.37** 0.63** 1.14*** 
  (0.08) (0.20) (0.11) (0.18) (0.25) 
Moderators       
Chinese MNEs’ home-country government legitimacy   -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 
  (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Chinese MNEs’ legitimacy in host-country regulated industries   0.17 0.19 0.26 0.22 0.36Ɨ 
  (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.19) (0.21) 
Chinese MNEs’ legitimacy with the general public in the host country  -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.05 -0.02 
  (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
Interactions       
Host-country institutional governance conditions * Chinese MNEs’ home-country government legitimacy   -0.12*   -0.09* 
   (0.05)   (0.05) 
Host-country institutional governance conditions * Chinese MNEs’ legitimacy in host-country regulated industries    -0.19  -0.26Ɨ 
    (0.15)  (0.15) 
Host-country institutional governance conditions * Chinese MNEs’ legitimacy with the general public in the host country     -0.09* -0.09* 
     (0.05) (0.05) 
Control Variables       
Degree of marketization 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.06 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Ownership -0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
International experience 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Local experience  0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Risk assessment 0.48* 0.43* 0.38Ɨ 0.39Ɨ 0.48* 0.39* 
 (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) 
Firm size  0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Host-country industry competition 0.51*** 0.41*** 0.42*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.38*** 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) 
Home-country government support 0.20* 0.21* 0.21* 0.21* 0.21** 0.20* 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Observations (N) 148 148 148 148 148 148 
R-square 0.23 0.30 0.33 0.31 0.32 0.35 
ƗP < 0.10; *P < 0.05; **P < 0.01; ***P<0.001 
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3.6.4 Robustness checks 
Robustness checks have been conducted to test the validity of the OLS regression results. 
First, the author considered the significance of those conditional hypotheses by examining the 
marginal effect of the independent variable host-country institutional governance conditions 
on Chinese MNEs’ perceived level of political risk at different values of the moderating 
variables. To interpret the significance of the interaction effects, this study follows Brambor 
et al. (2006) who pointed out that the effect of an interaction term should not be determined 
merely by looking at the magnitude and significance of its coefficient alone. As the 
regression results report only the marginal effect of the independent variable by assuming the 
interaction term is zero, it is necessary to consider the marginal effect of a change in the 
independent variable on the dependent variable when the moderating term has different 
values (Chizema et al., 2015; Kingsley et al., 2017). The marginal effects have been plotted 
to show a change in host-country institutional governance conditions on Chinese MNEs’ 
perceived level of political risk at different values of the moderating variables. The plotting 
graphs are explained and displayed below.  
Figure 3.1 presents the marginal effect of host-country institutional governance conditions on 
Chinese MNEs’ perceived level of political risk when Chinese MNEs’ home-government 
legitimacy in the eyes of the host government becomes greater. As displayed in Figure 3.1, 
the marginal effect of host-country governance conditions on Chinese MNEs’ perceived level 
of political risk diminishes as the Chinese government enjoys a higher degree of legitimacy 
with the host-country government. The downward slope corresponds to Hypothesis 2, 
suggesting that high degree of Chinese government legitimacy in the eyes of the host 
government reduces the relevance of institutional governance conditions in affecting Chinese 
MNEs’ perception about host-country political risk. Specifically, as the Chinese government 
degree of legitimacy reached a score of 7, the marginal effect of institutional governance 
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conditions on Chinese firms’ perception about host-country political risk becomes 
insignificant. This suggests that as the home-country government enjoys a higher degree of 
legitimacy with the host-country government, the conditions of host-country institutional 
governance in shaping Chinese firms’ perceived level of political risk may become negligible. 
Thus, it lends further support to Hypothesis 2.  
Figure 3.1 Marginal effect of host-country institutional governance conditions on Chinese MNEs’ 
perceived level of political risk at different levels of Chinese MNEs’ home-government legitimacy with 
host-country government  
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Figure 3.2 shows the marginal effect of host-country governance conditions on Chinese 
MNEs’ perceived level of political risk for firms in less-regulated (more liberalized) 
industries and regulated industries. As Figure 3.2 illustrated, the upper and lower bounds of 
95% confidence intervals are located on the same side of the zero-line. The downward slope 
suggests that the positive effect of institutional governance arrangements on Chinese MNEs’ 
perceived level of host-country political risk becomes weaker for firms in regulated industries. 
Although the interaction term between host-country governance conditions and Chinese 
MNEs’ legitimacy in host-country regulated industries was not significant in the OLS 
regression, the marginal effect of institutional governance conditions in shaping Chinese 
firms’ perceived level of host-country political risk was reduced for those in regulated 
industries. Thus, this finding provides support to Hypothesis 3.  
Figure 3.2 Marginal effect of host-country institutional governance conditions on Chinese MNEs’ 
perceived level of political risk for firms operating in less-regulated industries and regulated industries 
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Figure 3.3 presents the marginal effect of host-country governance conditions on Chinese 
MNEs’ perceived level of political risk at different levels of Chinese MNEs’ legitimacy with 
the general public in the host country. The plotting graphic in Figure 3.3 suggested that the 
importance of the host-country governance framework in shaping firms’ perception about 
host-country political risk is reduced when the general public in the host country view 
Chinese MNEs more negatively. Thus, it lends support to Hypothesis 4.  
Figure 3.3 Marginal effect of host-country institutional governance conditions on Chinese MNEs’ 
perceived level of political risk when the general public in the host country view Chinese firms more 
negatively 
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Second, the author examined the robustness of results from the OLS regression to the 
alternative measure of Chinese MNEs’ home-country government legitimacy with host-
country government. The Affinity of Nations Index (Gartzke 2006; Voeten et al., 2013) has 
been used to capture Chinese firms’ home-government legitimacy with the host-country 
government. The results are reported in Table 3.8.  
As observed in Models 1 to 6, the signs and coefficients of the control, independent, and 
conditional variables are similar to the initial OLS regression in Table 3.7. Thus, our 
hypotheses are robust to alternative measures of Chinese MNEs’ home-government 
legitimacy with the host-country government.  
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Table 3.8 Robustness tests – Alternative measure of Chinese MNEs’ home-country government legitimacy with the host-country government  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Main Variable       
Host-country institutional governance conditions   0.23* 1.47* 0.32* 0.58** 2.04** 
  (0.10) (0.59) (0.12) (0.20) (0.62) 
Moderators       
Chinese MNEs’ home-country government legitimacy   -0.15 1.92Ɨ -0.13 -0.12 1.99* 
  (0.20) (1.01) (0.21) (0.20) (0.98) 
Chinese MNEs’ legitimacy in host-country regulated industries   0.19 0.23 0.27 0.22 0.41Ɨ 
  (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.19) (0.21) 
Chinese MNEs’ legitimacy with the general public in the host country  -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.05 -0.01 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Interactions       
Host-country institutional governance conditions * Chinese MNEs’ home-country government legitimacy    -1.29*   -1.29* 
   (0.61)   (0.60) 
Host-country institutional governance conditions * Chinese MNEs’ legitimacy in host-country regulated industries    -0.18  -0.29Ɨ 
    (0.15)  (0.15) 
Host-country institutional governance conditions * Chinese MNEs’ legitimacy with the general public in the host country     -0.09* -0.12* 
     (0.05) (0.05) 
Control Variables       
Degree of marketization 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.05 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Ownership -0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.02 -0.06 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
International experience  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Local experience  0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Risk assessment  0.48* 0.44* 0.48* 0.40* 0.48* 0.48* 
 (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Firm size  0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Host-country industry competition 0.51*** 0.41*** 0.38*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.35** 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) 
Home-country government support 0.20* 0.21* 0.23** 0.20* 0.21* 0.23** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Observations (N) 148 148 148 148 148 148 
R-square 0.23 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.35 
ƗP < 0.10; *P < 0.05; **P < 0.01; ***P<0.001
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A third concern is that the results of the present research may be subject to potential selection 
bias. To deal with this issue, this study performed Heckman’s (1976) two-stage test. In the 
first stage, a probit model is employed to estimate the likelihood of Chinese MNEs entering 
countries with an underdeveloped institutional environment. The author generates the IMR by 
regressing firms’ characteristics and home-country government support on host-country 
institutional governance conditions. Due to the absence of classification about countries’ 
institutional governance quality, this study adopts the mean value of China’s governance 
score under the WGI’s six dimensions in 2010 as a benchmark (WGI, 2010).6 Hence, for the 
present research, countries scored no greater than -0.55, indicating weak governance quality.   
In the second stage, the author examines Chinese MNEs’ perception about host-country 
political risk by accounting for IMR as a regressor that captures the potential sample selection 
bias. As shown in Table 3.9, the coefficient of IMR is insignificant in all models. Thus, it 
suggested the absence of potential selection bias. In addition, the coefficient of the 
independent variable, its interactions with Chinese firms’ home-government legitimacy in the 
eyes of host government, Chinese firms’ legitimacy in host-country regulated industries, and 
Chinese firms’ legitimacy with the general public in the host country remain similar to those 
in the initial OLS regression.  
 
 
                                            
6 Under the WGI’s six dimensions in 2010, China received a score of -1.63 for voice and accountability,                
-0.66 for political stability, 0.10 for government effectiveness, -0.22 for regulatory quality, -0.33 for rule of law, 
and -0.60 for control of corruption. We adopted their sum of average -0.55 as a benchmark. 
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Table 3.9 Robustness tests – Sample selection bias 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Main Variable       
Host-country institutional governance conditions  0.28** 0.77*** 0.37** 0.63** 1.15*** 
  (0.08) (0.20) (0.11) (0.18) (0.26) 
Moderators       
Chinese MNEs’ home-country government legitimacy   -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 
  (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Chinese MNEs’ legitimacy in host-country regulated industries  0.39 0.34 0.56 0.52 0.74 
  (1.00) (0.98) (1.01) (0.99) (0.98) 
Chinese MNEs’ legitimacy with the general public in the host country  -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.05 -0.02 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Interactions       
Host-country institutional governance conditions * Chinese MNEs’ home-country government legitimacy   -0.12*   -0.09* 
   (0.05)   (0.05) 
Host-country institutional governance conditions* Chinese MNEs’ legitimacy in host-country regulated industries    -0.19  -0.27Ɨ 
    (0.15)  (0.16) 
Host-country institutional governance conditions* Chinese MNEs’ legitimacy with the general public in the host country     -0.10* -0.10* 
     (0.05) (0.05) 
Control Variables       
Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) -1.34 1.51 1.02 2.13 2.15 2.65 
 (1.42) (7.04) (6.89) (7.04) (6.96) (6.84) 
Degree of marketization 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.10 
 (0.07) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) 
Ownership 0.05 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 
 (0.24) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22) 
International experience  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Local experience  0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 
 (0.05) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Risk assessment  0.72* 0.13 0.18 -0.04 0.05 -0.14 
 (0.32) (1.42) (1.39) (1.43) (1.41) (1.39) 
Firm size  0.12 -0.12 -0.07 -0.17 -0.16 -0.19 
 (0.11) (0.55) (0.54) (0.55) (0.55) (0.54) 
Host-country industry competition 0.78* 0.10 0.21 -0.38 -0.04 -0.15 
 (0.29) (1.44) (1.41) (1.44) (1.42) (1.40) 
Home-country government support 0.17Ɨ 0.25 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.26 
 (0.09) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Observations (N) 148 148 148 148 148 148 
R-square 0.24 0.30 0.33 0.31 0.32 0.35 
ƗP < 0.10; *P < 0.05; **P < 0.01; ***P<0.001
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3.7 Discussion 
This study aims to advance our knowledge of political risk in international business literature. 
It addresses the research question ‘How can we explain Chinese MNEs’ perceived level of 
host-country political risk in light of their home-country legitimacy with key stakeholders in 
the host country?’ Existing research presents a gap in this area, as most attention has been 
devoted to how host-country governance arrangements influence cross-border business 
operations. To the extent that any international expansion involves at least two countries – 
firms’ home and host countries – the role of the home country in shaping MNEs’ perceived 
level of political risk has not been systematically investigated. 
This chapter extends research on the relationship between contextual forces and MNEs’ 
international success by unveiling the implications of home-country legitimacy for the level 
of political risk faced by Chinese MNEs. Legitimacy has been regarded as a central notion 
under the institutional perspective as it helps to justify an organization’s role in the social 
system and maintain continued support from important social stakeholders (Deephouse, 1996; 
Marano et al., 2017). The condition of bounded rationality has led host-country social 
stakeholders to assess firms’ legitimacy using cognitive shortcuts (Bitektine, 2011). As a 
result, their legitimacy judgements towards MNEs are largely dependent upon other firms 
that are perceived to belong to the same cognitive categories (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). An 
important cognitive attribute is firms’ home-country origin as it not only signals product 
quality, but also reflects the degree of firms and their home-country’s social acceptance in the 
host country. The political implications of home-country legitimacy can be particularly 
salient for EMMNEs owing to their weakly developed home-country institutional 
environments. By looking at outward FDI from China, this study tests the impact of host-
country governance conditions on Chinese MNEs’ perceived level of political risk, as well as 
the moderating effects of firms’ legitimacy with host-country interested stakeholders.  
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Research built upon the institutional perspective maintains that firms need to conform to the 
external isomorphic pressures to legitimately survive within an organizational field (Meyer & 
Peng, 2016). Yet, the presence of alternative legitimating mechanisms may change firms’ 
responses towards such pressures without having to be isomorphic (Kostova et al., 2008). Our 
study indicates that the legitimacy judgements made by a host-country’s interested social 
stakeholders serve as viable legitimating devices to compete with the country’s governance 
rules in shaping MNEs’ perceived level of political risk. The asymmetry of information can 
prompt host-country social stakeholders to assess MNEs’ legitimacy based on their home-
country origins. Such legitimacy judgements provide an alternative channel in conferring or 
withholding firms’ ‘social license to operate’ (Boddewyn, 2016), which reduces the relevance 
of a country’s institutional governance rules in determining the political risk faced by MNEs.  
Using survey data on Chinese MNEs in 2011, this study empirically tested the direct effect of 
host-country institutional governance conditions on the level of political risk perceived by 
Chinese firms. The results show that host-country institutional governance arrangements 
remain a key predictor of the level of political hazards experienced by Chinese MNEs abroad. 
This finding departs from previous research which maintained that Chinese MNEs tend to be 
indifferent or proactive to locate their investment in risky political contexts (e.g. Buckley et 
al., 2016; Quer et al., 2012). The finding of this study suggests that the lack of acceptance 
within host-country interested social groups and actors can lead Chinese firms to face higher 
levels of political risk at post-entry stage. This issue has also emerged from our fieldwork 
interviews. One interviewee reflected that: “Our understanding of political risk was far too 
superficial and general when making the investment decisions. We did not account for many 
social and political issues once our company was on the ground.” Additionally, the findings 
of this study indicate that the legitimacy judgements made by host-country government, 
industrial agencies, and social public can limit the effectiveness of governance rules in 
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explaining Chinese MNEs’ perceived level of political risk. Hence, it complements extant 
research by unveiling the interaction between a country’s institutional governance rules and 
the legitimacy assessment made by key social stakeholders in affecting cross-border business 
survival and operations.  
3.8 Summary 
The political risk faced by EMMNEs has been and continues to be a key topic in international 
business research. A sizable body of literature has looked at the impact of host-country 
political and regulatory conditions on these firms’ international expansion and success. 
However, little has been said about the importance of EMMNEs’ home country in shaping 
their perceived level of political risk in overseas markets. By underscoring the notion of 
legitimacy under the institutional perspective, this chapter investigates the role of home-
country legitimacy in explaining Chinese MNEs’ perceived level of such a risk when 
competing in the global arena. Chinese firms’ weakly developed home-country institutional 
environment can undermine their social acceptance in the host country. Such home-country 
legitimacy deficit with host-country interested stakeholders can reduce the effectiveness of 
explicitly stated rules and laws, which ultimately augment the political risk faced by Chinese 
firms. This chapter uncovers the implications of home-country legitimacy for Chinese MNEs’ 
perceived level of political risk in overseas markets. As firms’ perception of their external 
environment, including political risk may change over time, it is necessary to systematically 
explore the extent of their conceived political risk in overseas markets using a longitudinal 
dataset. Additionally, our sample firms are relatively new to international marketplaces 
(mean value of international experience = 3.01 years and host-country experience = 2.86 
years, as presented in Table 3.3). This demands us to conduct systematic examination with 
firms that have sufficient length of internationalization in order to capture the effect of time 
on perceived political risk from EMMNEs’ perspective.  
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4. Conceptualizing Political Risk from Chinese MNEs’ Perspective 
4.1 Introduction 
After uncovering the effect of home-country legitimacy on the level of political risk 
encountered by Chinese MNEs, one may question the way that these new players perceive 
political risk in overseas markets? This chapter systematically addresses the third research 
question of the thesis – ‘How is political risk conceived by Chinese MNEs when operating in 
diverse institutional contexts such as developed and developing countries?’ 
How is political risk perceived by EMMNEs doing business abroad? Extant research drawing 
on the experience of developed country MNEs has commonly defined political risk as the 
unexpected change of the ‘rules of the game’ by host-country governments that can adversely 
affect business operations (Butler & Joaquin, 1998; Casson & Lopes, 2013; Daredeli & Hill, 
2016). While this line of enquiry has generated insights regarding how EMMNEs respond to 
and manage host-country political risk (Buckley et al. 2007; Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; 
Liu et al. 2016; Ringov, 2012), extant research implicitly assumes the notion is universal, and 
EMMNEs face the same types of political risk as their developed country counterparts. Thus, 
our knowledge about how political risk is conceived from the viewpoint of these new 
contenders remains limited. 
The flourish of EMMNEs in general and Chinese firms in particular has generated much 
interest to understand the variety of political challenges that they have encountered abroad. 
Existing literature in this field can be divided into two streams. The first stream of research 
looks at the impact of political risk on Chinese MNEs when venturing into other developing 
host countries. Drawing on conceptual models of developed country MNEs, this stream of 
research assumes that these new players are tempted by, and show greater competitiveness, in 
risker political environments (Liu et al., 2016; Quer et al., 2012). A second, small but 
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growing stream of research concerns Chinese MNEs expanding into more advanced 
economies. Although these countries are renowned for their well-established market systems 
and institutions, this does not imply that firms operating in these contexts are shielded from 
changing external circumstances (Bremmer 2014; Globerman & Shapiro, 2009). However, 
extant literature has mainly applied the established concept of political risk based on MNEs 
from developed countries. Little attention has been devoted to the fundamental issue of how 
Chinese MNEs perceive political risk in overseas marketplaces, given their unique attributes 
such as the involvement of home country in firms’ international expansions (Hoskisson et al., 
2013; Peng 2012). Thus, this study explicitly examines the question as to how Chinese firms 
perceive political risk when operating in diverse institutional environments, including 
developed and developing host countries. 
To address the above research question, the author systematically explores the political risk 
perceived by Chinese MNEs operating in the EU and in African countries employing a 
qualitative case study approach. While much has been reported about the political obstacles 
faced by Chinese MNEs in international marketplaces (Globerman & Shapiro 2009; Kang & 
Jiang, 2012), the EU as the world largest single market, and Africa as an increasingly 
important economic power, have not been thoroughly investigated. Therefore, the present 
study focuses on these two regions.  
The rest of this chapter is organized in the following way. Section 4.2 provides an account of 
how risk has been understood in previous research, with particular attention paid to the 
meaning and theoretical boundaries of political risk. Section 4.3 introduces the research 
methodology, followed by the findings of this study in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 draws on the 
findings to discuss the way that political risk is framed by Chinese MNEs and derives 
propositions accordingly. Section 4.6 concludes the chapter.  
 133 
 
4.2 Literature Review 
To understand how political risk is conceived by Chinese MNEs, this section starts by 
reviewing existing literature concerning the notion, especially its nature and definition. 
Furthermore, the author looks at the boundary conditions when conceptualizing political risk.  
4.2.1 What is risk? 
While scholars have generally recognized the critical role of risk in affecting MNEs’ 
international operations, little agreement has been reached with regard to the 
conceptualization and scope of risk (Buckley 2016; Casson & Lopes, 2013; Liesch, Welch & 
Buckley, 2011; Miller, 1992). Extant literature has offered various definitions. One stream of 
research uses a statistical probability approach to define risk as the quantifiable probability 
that events will occur and influence business operations (Knight 1921; Jakobsen, 2010). The 
other looks at the potential loss vis-à-vis the potential gain of a decision, and frames risk as 
the negative variation in business outcomes (March & Shapira, 1987). Yet, another group of 
researchers focuses on the unknowability of the external environment and defines risk as 
significant contingencies that reduce performance predictability (Miller, 1992; 2007). 
Confusion about the notion of risk goes further as research has often used the terms risk and 
uncertainty interchangeably (Buckley, Chen, Clegg & Voss, 2016). Some studies have 
treated risk and uncertainty as a composite variable and label them as synonymous (Alvarez 
& Barney, 2005). This has resulted in misconceptions about their roles in international 
business as risk and uncertainty are related but distinct concepts (Liesch et al., 2011; 
McKelvie, Haynie & Gustavsson, 2011). While both can arise from firms’ external 
environments, their underlying assumptions and their impact on MNEs’ international 
operations are different (Buckley, 2016; Friedmann & Kim, 1988).  
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Under Knight’s (1921) statistical metaphor, risk refers to a set of possible outcomes, and the 
likelihood of each occurring can be calculated, whilst uncertainty refers to outcomes where 
the likelihood of each taking place is unknown. Yet, this approach has been challenged due to 
its neglect of the role of decision makers (Miller, 2007). Hence, the emphasis of human 
judgement in the decision-making process has given rise to research that distinguishes risk 
and uncertainty by drawing on transactional cost economics (TCE). Studies anchored within 
TCE assume that decision-makers are bounded-rational, and the lack of information makes 
them hesitate to make decisions or act under uncertain situations (Buckley & Carter, 2004; 
Williamson, 1985). 
Additionally, another group of researchers drawing on the real option (RO) theory assumes 
that decision-makers are rational and risk-averse, thus being able to choose among a set of 
future states with relevant information (Billitteri, Lo Nigro & Perrone, 2013). It has been 
suggested that decision-makers are not strictly rational since they are bounded by cognitive 
limitations, but this does not imply that they are irrational (Miller, 2007; Payne, Bettman & 
Johnson, 1993). Rather, when decision-makers have accumulated more information they can 
convert some uncertainties to risk, hence allowing them to make decisions and take action 
(Sarasvathy, 2001). This evolving view of managerial rationality is a key step which can help 
bridge the existing research on risk and uncertainty, drawing on the seemingly contradictory 
TCE and RO perspectives. Hence, the conversion from uncertainty to risk may be moderated 
by the possession of information (Buckley, 2016). When there is more information available, 
firms can make investment decisions. Thus, it may be more appropriate to conceive of 
uncertainty as a general environmental phenomenon, whilst risk is investor- and investment-
specific (Liesch et al., 2011; March & Shapira, 1987). As Friedmann and Kim (1988) 
suggested, risk cannot exist without the presence of an organizational entity or activity in a 
host country, but uncertainty as an environmental character can. This corresponds to Kobrin’s 
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(1979) argument that research on political risk in MNEs’ international operations should 
focus on the impact of political events upon firms rather than the events per se. Thus, this 
study follows previous research (Casson & Lopes, 2013; Friedmann & Kim, 1988) by 
focusing exclusively on political risk. Table 4.1 offers a summary of how risk has been 
defined in previous literature.  
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Table 4.1 A summary of existing research on the definition of risk 
Key studies Main arguments and findings Theoretical approach(es) 
Knight (1921) Risk refers to the quantifiable probability that an 
event will occur 
Statistical probability 
   
March & Shapira (1987)  Negative variation in business outcomes Decision-making science 
   
Williamson (1985) Bounded rationality of decision makers and 
information asymmetry make them hesitate to act 
under uncertain situations. 
TCE 
   
Billitteri et al. (2013) Decision makers are rational and risk averse, but 
are able to choose among a set of future possible 
outcomes with relevant information. 
RO 
   Kobrin (1979)                                                          
Friedmann & Kim (1988)            
Sarasvathy (2001)                                                   
Buckley (2016) 
Decision-makers are neither rational nor irrational 
because the accumulation of information allows 
them to take actions. Uncertainty is a general 
environmental phenomenon, but risk is investment- 
and/or project-specific.  
Management and international business literature 
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4.2.2 What is political risk? 
Although the term ‘political risk’ appears frequently in international business literature, 
agreement about its definition remains limited (Butler & Joaquin, 1998; Casson & Lopes, 
2013; Kobrin, 1979). Research in the field can be generally divided into two groups. The first 
group assumes an adversarial relationship between the government and business (Alon & 
Herbert, 2009). Research built upon this assumption has offered a variety of definitions. For 
example, political risk has been defined as host government interference with MNEs’ 
operations (Butler & Joaquin, 1998; Casson & Lopes, 2013), as constraints imposed on firms 
from specific countries or industries (Arikan & Shenkar, 2013; Robock, 1971), and as 
discontinuities occurring in the business environment due to political changes (Fitzpatrick, 
1983).  
More recent literature tends to assume a co-operative relationship between MNEs and host-
country governments by underscoring the potential for mutual gain (Darendeli & Hill, 2016; 
Jiménez, Osorio & Palmero-Cámara, 2015; Stevens & Newenham-Kahindi, 2017), as 
political interference in MNEs’ operations, tempted by short-term gains, may jeopardize the 
government’s own objectives, such as economic growth generated as a result of FDI (Luo, 
2001). This group of researchers suggests that the perceived political risk by MNEs depends 
on whether their business objectives are consistent with the host government’s long-term 
political, economic and social agendas (Boddewyn, 2016; Stevens et al., 2015). Firms may 
perceive a lower degree of political risk when their activities are more aligned with the 
government’s long-term goals (Henisz & Zelner, 2005; Marquis & Qian, 2014). Thus, this 
strand of research regards political risk as a complex and multidimensional phenomenon that 
may arise from a variety of host- and home-country sources (Child & Marinova, 2014; 
Stevens et al., 2015). MNEs are not only affected by governmental actions and political 
changes in host countries, but are also increasingly under scrutiny from host-country 
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stakeholders regarding, for example, whether they acknowledge their corporate social 
responsibilities towards natural environmental protection, sustainable development and fair 
treatment for local employees (Marano et al., 2017; Meyer & Peng, 2016; Scherer, Palazzo & 
Seidl, 2013). The author summarizes how the notion of political risk has been defined in 
existing research in Table 4.2.  
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Table 4.2 A summary of existing research on the definition of political risk 
Key studies Assumption Main arguments and findings 
Robuck (1971)                    Adversarial business-government relations Political risk can be imposed on either all foreign investors or firms from 
selected countries, industries, and/or undertaking specific activities 
   
Fitzpatrick (1983) Adversarial business-government relations Discontinuities in the business environment due to external political 
changes 
   Butler & Joaquin (1998)  Adversarial business-government relations Host-country government interference with MNEs' operations 
   Steven et al. (2015)                               Cooperative business-government relations MNEs' perceived political risk depends on whether their business 
objectives are aligned with the host-country's long-term political, 
economic and social interests 
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4.2.3 Conceptualization of political risk 
While research on the role of political risk in MNEs’ international success has progressed, its 
conceptualization and theoretical boundaries remain a fragmented and narrowly defined area 
(Jakobsen, 2010; Sottilotta, 2015). In this study, the author considers how political risk has 
been conceptualized when MNEs operate in heterogeneous institutional and industrial 
contexts.  
Institutional boundaries of political risk for developed country MNEs and EMMNEs 
Initial research has adopted the above-mentioned definitions to capture how political risks are 
perceived by developed country MNEs. Several conceptual frameworks have been proposed 
to examine the political perils faced by American, European and Japanese MNEs in 
developing countries. Simon (1984) noted that political risk in a host country depends on its 
stage of institutional and economic development. MNEs tend to face non-violent political 
hazards, such as unfavourable legal rulings and stringent entry requirements, in countries 
with well-established socio-political and economic systems (Bremmer, 2014; Simon, 1984). 
By contrast, more severe risks, such as the overthrow of political regimes, wars, and 
expropriations are likely to occur in host countries with an underdeveloped socio-political 
and economic environment (Busse & Hefeker, 2007; Casson & Lopes, 2013). Jensen (2008) 
maintained that MNEs investing in developing countries with democratic regimes tend to 
face a lower degree of political risk and are less likely to experience expropriation and 
political violence risks. Drawing from the political science literature, a number of studies 
proposed that hostile political relations between home and host countries may impose 
political obstacles on developed country MNEs’ overseas operations (Desbordes & Vicard, 
2009; Li & Vashchilko, 2010).  
In addition, the rapid growth of FDI conducted by EMMNEs has stimulated research to 
analyse how these new players perceive political risk in overseas markets (Buckley et al., 
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2007; Liu et al., 2016; Quer et al. 2012). This newer stream of research suggests that the 
types of political risk faced by EMMNEs tend to be more heterogeneous than those of 
developed country MNEs (Satyanand, 2010). A number of studies have found that EMMNEs 
are not discouraged, but show a greater willingness to expand into risky environments 
(Buckley et al., 2016; Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). By contrast, for those expanding into 
developed countries, EMMNEs tend to face stringent government investigation and political 
opposition (Child & Marinova, 2014; Globerman & Shaprio, 2009; Satyanand, 2010). 
Moreover, such hurdles are more intensive for SOEs than private firms (Cui & Jiang, 2012; 
Meyer et al., 2014; Hobdari et al., 2017). A significant portion of these risks arise from 
EMMNEs’ country-of-origin (Globerman & Shapiro, 2009), which has been largely 
overlooked in the existing literature (Stevens & Newenham-Kahindi, 2017). Yet the adoption 
of conceptual frameworks based on developed country MNEs’ experience may lead 
researchers to oversimplify the way that political risks are perceived by EMMNEs. As the 
rapid internationalisation of EMMNEs may challenge the existing theories of 
internationalisation (Liu, Buck & Shu, 2005; Ramasamy, Yeung & Laforet, 2012), it is 
important to re-conceptualize political risk from the perspective of these new players. A 
summary of existing research concerning the institutional boundaries of political risk for 
developed country MNEs and EMMNEs is presented in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3 A summary of existing research on the institutional boundaries of political risk for MNEs 
Author(s) (Year) Institutional Boundaries and Sources of Political Risk Methodology and Sample Key Findings 
Panel A: Outward FDI by developed country MNEs     
Simon (1984) Host-country sourced political risk Conceptual.                                                
Political risk faced by MNEs in 
South Africa was used as 
examples 
The level of political risk faced by 
MNEs depends on a host-country's 
level of economic development and 
the degree of openness in the 
political system 
Busse & Hefeker (2007) Host-country sourced political risk Empirical.                               
Panel data on FDI inflow to 
developing countries  
Host-country government stability, 
internal and external conflict, 
corruption, ethnic tensions, law and 
order, democratic accountability of 
government, and quality of 
bureaucracy are key determinants of 
FDI inflows to developing countries 
Jensen (2008) Host-country sourced political risk Empirical.                                    
Cross-sectional data on 134 
countries and 28 interviews with 
investors, political risk insurers, 
consultants, and lawyers 
The presence of democratic 
institutions and constraints placed on 
executives in democratic regimes 
lead to lower levels of expropriation 
risk faced by MNEs 
Desbordes & Vicard (2009) Interstate relational sourced political risk Empirical.                                       
Panel data on bilateral FDI stock 
among OECD countries, and 
between OECD countries and 
non-OECD countries 
Political risk can arise from 
deteriorating interstate political 
relations 
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Li & Vashchilko (2010) Interstate relational sourced political risk Empirical.                               
Panel data on FDI outflow from 
OECD countries to other OECD 
countries and non-OECD 
countries  
Political risk can arise from 
deteriorating interstate political 
relations 
 
Panel B: Outward FDI by EMMNEs     
Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc (2008) Host-country sourced political risk Empirical.                                   
Panel data on EMMNEs investing 
in LDCs 
EMMNEs show greater capabilities 
in dealing with defective host-
country institutional conditions 
Globerman & Shapiro (2009) Political risk can arise from a variety of sources   Conceptual.                                  
Chinese MNEs in the U.S. were 
used as examples 
Chinese MNEs face stringent 
investigations and political 
opposition in the U.S. due to 
economic and national security 
concerns 
Satyanand (2010) Political risk can arise from a variety of sources  Conceptual.                                  
Chinese MNEs in the U.S. 
Host-country political volatilities are 
top concerns for EMMNEs. They 
face political risk from other sources 
such as sudden policy shift and 
protectionist pressure in developed 
countries 
Quer et al., (2012) Host-country sourced political risk Empirical.                                       
Panel data on Chinese MNEs 
investing abroad 
Chinese MNEs are unlikely to be 
discouraged by host-country 
political volatilities 
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Child & Marinova (2014) Political risk can arise from a variety of sources  Conceptual.  The political risk faced by Chinese 
MNEs abroad depends upon 
different combinations of home- and 
host-country contexts, taking into 
account how the political and 
institutional systems in those 
contexts affect cross-border business 
operations 
Meyer et al. (2014) Political risk can arise from a variety of sources  Empirical.                                    
Cross-sectional data on listed 
Chinese MNEs investing abroad 
Chinese SOEs face greater political 
pressures due to their weak 
legitimacy of state ownership in 
countries with strong technological 
endowment and rule of law than 
private firms 
Buckley et al. (2016) Host-country sourced political risk Empirical.                                     
Panel data on Chinese MNEs 
investing abroad 
Chinese MNEs are likely to invest in 
countries with a high level of 
political risk 
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Industrial boundaries of political risk for developed country MNEs and EMMNEs  
Political risk can be experienced either by all firms of an entire country or by those from 
selected countries, industries, or those undertaking specific activities (Desbordes, 2010; 
Robock, 1971). While extant literature has yielded insights into the political risks associated 
with the host-country’s macro environment, research on industry-related political risks is still 
at an early stage (Alon & Herbert, 2009; Lawton & McGuire, 2005). Existing studies have 
examined developed country MNEs operating in key regulated industries, such as extraction, 
petroleum, banking, telecommunications and utilities, and reported that these industries are 
subject to greater government intervention than those more liberalized industries with fewer 
restrictions, and thus exposed those MNEs to a higher degree of political risk (Doh, Teegen 
& Mudambi, 2004; García-Canal & Guillén, 2008). Yaprak and Sheldon (1984) showed that 
MNEs operating in natural resources and financial service industries experienced a higher 
degree of political risk than those in technologically dynamic industries. Jakobsen (2010) 
found that in the global aluminium industry, substantial political risks are present in 
developing host countries despite their welcoming attitude to FDI. Despite previous research 
showing that operating in key regulated industries may have important political implications 
(Bremmer, 2014), an in-depth examination of how such industry-related political risks are 
perceived by EMMNEs is absent. The author summarizes research on the industrial 
boundaries of political risk for developed country MNEs and EMMNEs in Table 4.4 below.  
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Table 4.4 A summary of existing research on the industrial boundaries political risk for MNEs 
Author(s) (Year) Industrial Boundaries and Sources of Political Risk Methodology and Sample Key Findings 
Panel A: Outward FDI by developed country MNEs     
Yaprak & Sheldon (1984) Industry-sourced political risk Conceptual MNEs in natural resources and 
financial service industries face a 
higher degree of political risk than 
those in technologically dynamic 
industries 
Doh et al. (2004) Industry-sourced political risk Empirical.                               
International telecommunication 
projects in emerging markets 
MNEs in regulated sectors tend to be 
influenced by the degree of host-
country trade policy liberalization, 
sector openness, and investment 
policy hazards 
García-Canal & Guillén (2008) Industry-sourced political risk Empirical.                                             
Panel data on Spanish firms 
operating in regulated industries in 
Latin American countries 
MNEs in regulated industries tend to 
vary in their responses toward host-
country political risk depending on 
firms' ownership form and foreign 
market experience 
Jakobsen (2010) Industry-sourced political risk Conceptual MNEs in regulated industries face 
industry-specific sets of political 
risks in addition to host-country 
political volatilities 
 
Panel B: Outward FDI by EMMNEs     
Bremmer (2014) Industry-sourced political risk Conceptual Governments in both developed and 
developing countries have become wary 
of opening more industries to MNEs  
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To summarize, extant research has offered insightful explanations regarding the role of 
political risk in MNEs’ international success. Despite the progress in this area, we still know 
little about: (1) how the notion is conceived by EMMNEs operating in different institutional 
environments; and (2) the way that EMMNEs operating in different industries perceive 
political risk in overseas markets. Drawing on developed country MNEs’ experience, 
conventional wisdom holds that firms tend to associate developed countries with a stable and 
pro-FDI political environment and to perceive more radical political risks in developing 
countries (Casson & Lopes, 2013). As Aulakh (2007) noted, research on EMMNEs has 
mostly reflected theories of developed country firms and deductive inference, rather than a 
systematic body of analysis. To date, we have limited knowledge regarding the way that these 
new players perceive political risk in countries with different levels of institutional 
development. Additionally, research which systematically addresses the more nuanced 
aspects of the notion, for example, industry-related political risks associated with EMMNEs’ 
overseas operations has received little attention. Thus, it presents us with the opportunity to 
fulfil these research gaps and contribute to the research in this area by consolidating current 
thinking and exploring the concept of political risk from EMMNEs’ perspective.  
4.3 Research Methodology 
This study employs the qualitative case study method to explore Chinese MNEs’ perception 
of political risks when operating in the EU and African countries. Inductive theorizing can 
generate a deeper understanding of the phenomena being examined than deductive inference 
(Doz, 2011). Hence, it provides the basis for theory building (Buckley & Lessard, 2005). The 
objective of this chapter is to: (1) enrich the understanding of political risk from the 
perspective of Chinese MNEs and; (2) delineate the boundary conditions of perceived 
political risk by Chinese MNEs in different institutional and industrial contexts. Qualitative 
exploratory research is particularly effective in opening the ‘black box’ of what lies behind 
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the phenomenon and helping to answer the how and why questions (Doz, 2011: 583). In 
particular, the use of qualitative data enables us to better understand the neglected aspects of 
risk perception by Chinese MNEs, thus helping us to draw new theoretical insights, and 
systematically re-conceptualize the notion of political risk based on the experience of Chinese 
firms.  
4.3.1 Sampling 
Following Yin (2003), two criteria have been used to select the sample firms and 
interviewees. First, the length of internationalization should be sufficient for us to collect 
meaningful information on firms’ perception of political risk. Therefore, we selected firms 
with an overseas presence of at least five years to allow us to explore the issues related to 
political risk that they have encountered (Gao et al. 2015). Second, the interviewees need to 
be familiar with their companies’ international strategies and operations. Thus, those who 
worked in the international investment department of the corporate headquarters, or were 
responsible for international operations, were considered to be the most appropriate 
participants. The unit of analysis in this study is individual Chinese firms that operate in the 
EU and African countries. These two markets are our research contexts which enable us to 
compare and contrast the perceptions of political risk of the sample firms.  
Potential companies were approached through contacts in government agencies, academic 
institutions, and the author’s personal networks. Initial communication with the interviewees 
was made to explain the nature of this study, with the promise of anonymity. This research 
included a variety of firms with different ownership forms (SOEs vs. private-owned firms), 
various lengths of international experience and different industries in order to capture the 
variations in perceived political risks by these firms. Eighteen companies agreed to 
participate in the study. The author then checked their suitability and excluded two operating 
outside the EU or Africa. As a result, the sample consisted of sixteen companies that have an 
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established presence in the EU and/or African countries. Detailed characteristics of the 
sample companies are presented in Table 4.5.  
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Table 4.5 Sample characteristics  
Firm(s) Interviewee(s) Industry Host country(ies) Years of 
international 
operation 
Ownership 
A A1; A2 Aircraft leasing Ireland 5 years SOE 
B B1; B2 Telecommunication – Operator  Spain; UK 10 years SOE 
C C1 Telecommunication – Equipment 
provider  
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, 
UK 
11 years Private 
D D1 Oil prospecting Angola, Uganda 11 years SOE 
E E1 Telecommunication – Equipment 
provider 
Austria, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Sweden, UK 
15 years Private 
F F1; F2 Real estate; Hospitality Spain, UK 5 years Private 
G G1; G2 Agriculture – Dairy  Ireland, Netherlands 6 years SOE 
H H1 Manufacturing – Infrared camera Germany, Ireland 8 years Private 
I I1; I2 Manufacturing – Textile  Egypt 7 years Private 
J J1; J2 Manufacturing – Elevator  Egypt 9 years Private 
K K1; K2 Manufacturing – Personal care Nigeria; Tanzania 8 years Private 
L L1; L2 Construction Rwanda; Tanzania; Uganda 7 years SOE 
M M1; M2 Construction Angola; Congo; Mauritius; Poland; Rwanda; Tanzania; UK 25 years SOE 
N N1 Pharmaceutical  Netherlands; South Africa 20 years Private 
O O1; O2 Agriculture – Dairy and Beverage France; UK 8 years SOE 
P P1; P2 Construction Algeria; Angola; Cameroon; Sudan; Tunisia 5 years SOE 
Sample = 16 firms 
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4.3.2 Data collection 
Re-conceptualizing political risk requires the consideration of a multitude of factors (Alon & 
Herbert, 2009). Hence, the interview guide for this study was structured around the broad 
theme of how Chinese MNEs perceive political risk in their overseas operations. Based on 
five pilot interviews with industrial experts, the author revised the interview guide in order to 
avoid inappropriate questions. Semi-structured interviews were carried out to encourage the 
interviewees to provide their opinions regarding the questions. (Appendix 3a and 3b presents 
the interview questions).  
The author conducted two rounds of interviews to safeguard the reliability of the data. Over a 
four-month period, sixteen face-to-face interviews were conducted in the first round. At the 
end of these interviews, the author asked the interviewees to introduce colleagues who could 
also participate in this research. A total of eleven interviewees provided their colleagues’ 
contact information and those people were interviewed in the second round. In total, this 
study included twenty-seven interviews. The interviews were conducted in Mandarin (24) 
and English (3) and were recorded. The length of interviews varied from fifty minutes to 
three and a half hours. All interviews were transcribed within 24 hours to minimize 
information loss. The author also collected archival data from multiple sources, including 
corporation websites, television interviews and newspapers. In addition, government agencies 
and professional associations, such as the Industrial Development Authority in Ireland, the 
Medicines and Healthcare Product Regulatory Agency in the UK, the Dutch Dairy 
Association in the Netherlands, and the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce in Africa, 
have been contacted to enquire about specific investment policies. These data complement 
the information from the interviews and facilitate an in-depth understanding of the political 
risks faced by the sample firms in overseas markets.  
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4.3.3 Data analysis 
The author started by coding and analysing each interview transcript, i.e. within-case analysis. 
As this study compares Chinese MNEs in European and African markets, transcripts were 
classified into two groups according to their host region. For companies having a presence in 
both, the author coded their European and African operations separately. Within-case 
analysis was followed by cross-case analysis that aimed at classifying emerging categories.  
Each interview transcript was studied for similarities and differences (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967). The author merged similar codes into the same first-order category and continued 
coding the transcripts in this manner until no further distinct or shared patterns could be 
detected. Alongside developing first-order categories, linkages among these categories were 
identified that could lead to the development of more theoretically-oriented second-order 
themes. This study then distilled the second-order themes into more aggregated dimensions, 
which enabled us to understand how Chinese MNEs view political risk at country, industry 
and firm level.  
Figures 4.1a and 4.1b provide an overview of the data structure. As the author coded Chinese 
MNEs operating in the EU and African countries in two groups, a three-step process in data 
analysis was used in each group (Gioia, Corley & Hamilton, 2013). As shown in Figure 4.1a, 
for Chinese MNEs operating in the EU, we identified thirteen categories in the first-order 
analysis. In the second-order codes, we identified six themes. We then distilled these themes 
into three theoretical dimensions: home-country sourced political risks, industry-sourced 
political risks, and firm-behaviour sourced political risks. Figure 4.1b reported the types of 
political risk encountered by Chinese MNEs in African countries. We identified nine 
categories in the first-order analysis, while the second-order codes were classified into four 
themes. Finally, we aggregated these themes into two theoretical dimensions: host-country 
sourced political risks and firm-behaviour sourced political risks.  
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Threats to host-country 
national security 
Home-country sourced 
political risks
Firm-behaviour sourced 
political risks
Unfair competition
Key regulated industries
Liberalized industries
Negative local public attitude
Negative local government 
attitude
Industry-sourced 
political risks
Figure 4.1a Political risks in developed countries (EU) 
1st order codes 2nd order codes                          Aggregated dimensions 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 Leakage of strategic assets, resources, and technologies to 
Chinese MNEs  
 Chinese government involvement in business operations 
 Chinese MNEs’ carriage of political agenda 
 
 Direct financial support through subsidies 
 Indirect financial support through cheap loans 
 
 
 Regulatory barriers at entry level 
 Regulatory barriers at operational level 
 
 
 
 Low level of regulatory barriers 
 Open competition  
 Tense industrial relations with local employees 
 Unethical conduct 
 Disregard of local history and culture 
 Victims of Chinese counterfeit products’ / poor reputation 
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Volatile political 
environment in the host 
country
Host-country sourced 
political risks
Firm-behaviour sourced 
political risks
Regional conflicts
Negative local government 
attitude
Negative local public 
attitude
Figure 4.1b Political risk in developing countries (Africa) 
1st order codes                                                                                            2nd order codes                                            Aggregated dimensions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Political regime change and politically 
motivated social violence 
 Weakly enforced law and regulations 
 
 
 Interstate wars and territorial disputes 
 Spread of socio-democratic movements   
 Tense industrial relations with local employees 
 Unethical conduct 
 Disregard of local history, religious ritual and 
culture 
 Victims of Chinese counterfeit products’ / poor 
reputation 
 Seizing local employment and business 
opportunities 
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4.4 Findings 
Political risks perceived by Chinese MNEs in their European and African operations can arise 
at country, industry, and firm-behaviour levels. At the country level, the evidence reveals that 
Chinese MNEs perceive political risks differently in European and African markets. While 
the more stable institutional environment in the EU has presented MNEs with opportunities, 
the ‘baggage’ that Chinese MNEs carry from home has subjected them to subtler and more 
implicit home-country sourced political risks. By contrast, the volatile institutional context in 
Africa has exposed Chinese MNEs to more drastic political changes, and hence the political 
risks that they face have tended to arise from the unstable political and regulatory 
environment in the host country. The industrial context can have important implications for 
Chinese MNEs’ venturing into the European market. Chinese MNEs operating in more 
regulated sectors face a wider array of rules imposed by the host country and the EU than 
those in more liberalized industries. At firm level, a common type of political risk faced by 
Chinese MNEs in overseas markets largely resulted from their own inappropriate behaviour.  
4.4.1 Home-country sourced political risks in the EU 
Findings from the interviews revealed that differences in ideologies, concerns over national 
security, and competition for economic dominance can put Chinese MNEs under political 
pressure even when expanding into developed countries where well-established market 
institutions provide a sound environment. The ‘hand’ of the home-country government can 
travel abroad with its MNEs and acts as a political barrier to firms’ overseas expansion. For 
Chinese MNEs venturing into the EU, their home-country origin was considered by our 
interviewees to be a major source of political risk, impeding their firms’ overseas operations. 
Such home-country sourced political risks mainly result from potential threats to the host-
country’s national security as perceived by the host-country government, and the unfair 
financial advantages conferred by the home-country government.  
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Threats to the host-country’s national security 
The evidence reveals that host government concerns over the national security of strategic 
assets, ongoing competition for economic dominance, and different political ideologies have 
made Chinese MNEs subject to substantial political and regulatory screening. The view of 
our interviewees was that host governments were concerned about losing strategic resources 
and technologies to Chinese competitors, which in turn could undermine their country’s 
economic security and competitiveness. For example, the demand for high-quality food 
products has prompted Chinese MNEs to enter the European dairy sector. This has posed 
significant threats to the availability of some dairy products for European consumers and thus 
has led some EU member states to introduce additional purchase quotas and regulatory 
screening for acquisitions proposed by Chinese companies. Similarly, the capability of 
reverse engineering and economies of scale possessed by Chinese MNEs allow them to enter 
the European market at lower costs. This represents a critical threat to the host-country’s 
competitiveness. Hence, stricter regulations on Chinese MNEs have been introduced by the 
EU to secure their technological assets.  
“European (country) governments are very suspicious of us. They do not want to waive these 
industries into the hands of Chinese firms because they do not want to see customers or products from 
China occupy their market.” (Firm O, Interviewee O1)  
Moreover, the free market economy is the dominant economic ideology in the EU where 
most business transactions are shaped by market-based mechanisms. It is therefore difficult 
for the policymakers of these countries to accept the excessive involvement of the Chinese 
government in business activities when that involvement could harm free-market competition. 
As our interviewees reflected, the appointment of government officials and the heavy 
involvement of the Chinese government in FDI projects are likely to result in barriers to 
Chinese investment being approved by the host government.  
 157 
 
“When we met the mayor of XXX (a French city), we were asked by a French official about whether 
our project needs to be approved by the Chinese government and whether there will be Chinese 
officials sitting on the executive board. … As you know, Western countries are sensitive to, and very 
averse about political involvement in commercial activities.” (Firm O, Interviewee O2) 
In addition, Chinese MNEs are perceived to be linked to China’s national objectives and 
interests. They are considered not only as commercial entities, but also as carriers of home-
government political missions. This has made the EU member states wary of Chinese MNEs 
as they may pose threats to host countries by spreading competing political ideologies. Many 
interviewees suggested that the competing political ideologies between European countries 
and China have resulted in greater political resistance with regard to Chinese MNEs in the 
belief that they represent the Chinese government.  
“When we conduct business in European countries, some of their governments are very cautious 
because they think that the Chinese government stands behind us.” (Firm C, Interviewee C1)  
This is especially salient with regard to Chinese SOEs, which are more likely to cause EU 
government concerns and political opposition than their private counterparts. This has largely 
resulted from Chinese SOEs’ closer affiliation with their home government.  
“We can access the European market but merely doing property investment. We cannot bid for 
infrastructure or national security-related projects in these countries. Their (EU members) 
governments will not allow Chinese companies, especially SOEs, to enter these industries because 
they are concerned about our political intentions and links with the Communist Party at home.”      
(Firm M, Interviewee M2)  
Unfair competition 
In addition to concerns over national security, Chinese MNEs’ access to funds provided by 
the home-country government has been a controversial issue as it is considered an unfair 
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advantage for Chinese MNEs. Such access to financial support at home has been perceived 
by the host-country government to harm market competition. Thus, it could trigger host-
government speculation regarding capital offered by the Chinese government, which in turn 
could become a source of political risk. Home-government subsidies and cheap loans are 
deemed a key source of unfair advantage that can distort market competition within the EU. It 
is well known that the ambition to establish world-class MNEs has prompted the Chinese 
government to offer subsidies to boost Chinese firms’ competitiveness so that their products 
can be sold at lower prices in overseas markets. However, the subsidies violate the EU 
competition rules and put other companies at a greater competitive disadvantage. Several 
cases have been filed by the EC targeting Chinese products and firms including textiles, 
solar-panels, steel, and high-tech products that are subsidized by the Chinese government. As 
our interviewee explained, anti-subsidy investigations launched by the EC represent an 
important political obstacle that has discouraged them for further investment.  
“We would like to expand our investments in Europe. But the anti-subsidy case filed by the EC has 
discouraged us and made us feel very uncomfortable.” (Firm E, Archive) 
In addition, the financial market imperfections in China enable Chinese MNEs to access 
cheap finance that reduces their costs. Chinese policy banks have launched low-interest loans 
and export credit schemes to foster the competitiveness of Chinese high-tech, electronic, and 
manufacturing equipment firms. Such cheap funds have been perceived as unfair competition 
and against free-market competition. A number of our interviewees indicated that the EU 
host-country governments tended to be suspicious of their companies’ source of funds. Cheap 
finance from the home government thus constitutes a home-country sourced political risk 
faced by Chinese MNEs in Europe.  
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“Abundant capital provision from China is not an absolute advantage but a drawback sometimes. We 
have been asked by the French government to explain whether we have got cheap loans from China. 
Some governments in the EU are very cautious that Chinese firms’ cheap capital access can damage 
the market order and put other firms in a disadvantaged position.” (Firm O, Interviewee O2) 
4.4.2 Host-country sourced political risks in African countries 
Chinese MNEs were prompted by the opportunities presented in African countries, such as 
first-mover advantages and less sophisticated consumer demands. However, the volatile 
political environments within and across some African states have imposed daunting 
challenges on Chinese MNEs. Our evidence shows that radical conflicts at national and 
regional levels have been Chinese MNEs’ major sources of political concern.  
Volatile political environment in the host country 
The changing political regimes in some countries can cause social unrest, thus putting foreign 
MNEs’ personnel and asset safety at greater risk. In almost all of our interviews, a change of 
political regime is considered to be a critical issue for Chinese MNEs operating in Africa. 
Several interviewees reflected that their firms were reluctant to undertake investment 
initiatives in countries where governments were unstable, primarily due to security concerns.  
“For Africa, our main worry is still about risk and associated safety issues of our personnel, financial 
and non-financial assets. There are nearly 400,000 Chinese people in Angola. If a civil war takes 
place, it would be impossible to evacuate all of our workers. … The general election in African 
countries can be another sensitive time and there may be curfews. Our construction sites would be 
closed. Our workers are told to limit their outdoor activities” (Firm M, Interviewee M1).  
The volatile political and regulatory environment in the host country can also take the form of 
a poorly enforced legal framework that subjects Chinese MNEs to inconsistent interpretations 
of investment regulations. The weakly enforced regulatory frameworks in some African 
countries have exposed Chinese MNEs to risks, such as a breach of contract by the host 
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government and discretionary legal enforcement by local judiciary bodies. Many of our 
interviewees indicated that their African operations have been subject to the cancellation of 
payments and discretionary interpretation of regulations by the host-country government. 
“The police and judiciary in Sudan have great discretion and are very tough towards foreign 
companies. Various fees and fines can be levied on us for different reasons whenever they want.” 
(Firm P, Interviewee P2).  
Regional conflicts 
Beside a generally volatile political environment within the host country, conflicts at 
interstate and regional levels are regarded by our interviewees as another source of political 
risk when venturing into Africa. Political shocks, such as the outbreak of interstate wars and 
territorial disputes, have led Chinese MNEs to suffer significant loss.  
“The separation of North Sudan and South Sudan has caused wars at the border and territorial 
disputes. Many of our construction sites were located in South Sudan, but now we cannot go back.” 
(Firm P, Interviewee P2) 
The spill-over of socio-democratic conflicts at the regional level can result in greater turmoil 
across neighbouring states that in turn can expose Chinese MNEs to political risk and disrupt 
their operations. One example that was repeatedly pinpointed by our interviewees was the 
spread of the ‘Arab Spring’ across the region of North Africa. The socio-political movement 
has reshaped the political environment of the region. The overthrow of political regimes and 
associated social unrest that took place simultaneously in several countries has seriously 
affected the proper functioning of market institutions. As a result, such regional-wide 
political shocks have exposed Chinese MNEs’ operations to extensive risks. 
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“We have seen a major deterioration of the social and political environment in North Africa in recent 
years. Riots during the ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011 affected our exports to other countries in the region.” 
(Firm I, Interviewee I1)  
4.4.3 Industry-sourced political risks in the EU 
Despite the progress in global market liberalization, industrial regulations and restrictions 
remain in place to oversee MNEs’ activities in most countries. While such restrictions can 
potentially affect the operations of all sectors, their impact on the ‘key industries’, including 
telecommunications, utilities, pharmaceuticals, healthcare, energy and financial services are 
particularly salient (García-Canal & Guillén, 2008) as these industries are heavily regulated 
by the government. As a result, the demand and supply of goods and services in these 
industries can be influenced by government policies such as product safety rules, entry 
requirements and capacity control. Thus, the industrial sectors in which MNEs operate can 
have important implications for firms’ perceived risk in overseas markets. Evidence from our 
interviews indicates that Chinese MNEs operating in more liberalized industries hold very 
different views from those operating in more regulated industries in the EU.  
Regulated industries 
The European Single Market Act came into force in the 1980s and resulted in a number of 
industries being regulated at the regional level to ensure internal market prosperity                   
(EC, 2012). For MNEs seeking opportunities in some of the abovementioned regulated 
sectors, restrictions have been levied at both market entry and operational levels. At market 
entry level, rules of entry, product testing requirements and the conversion of industrial 
standards have been imposed by the EC and other relevant authorities to regulate investment 
from outside the EU. The evidence reveals that such restrictions have resulted in Chinese 
MNEs having to face more complicated registration issues, which in themselves represent an 
important form of market entry barrier. For example, the herbal medicine sector has been 
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regulated by the EC regarding product testing standards and registration procedures since 
2004. Yet, the sophisticated procedures of registration have made Chinese pharmaceutical 
firms subject to greater market entry barriers and obliged them to incur much higher costs in 
order to market their products.   
“The registration process for herbal medicines is extremely complex in the EU and we have to pay 
huge fees to test our products. Maybe the testing procedures are feasible for medicines from Western 
countries because there is normally only one single ingredient in their products. But for Chinese 
medicines there are often multiple ingredients and we have to pay testing fees for each one. This is 
unaffordable for us.” (Firm N, Interviewee N1)  
Restrictions can also be imposed at the operational level to regulate business activities. For 
Chinese MNEs, the enforcement of output limits has made them subject to a higher degree of 
political intervention. A well-known example was the milk quota restriction that was 
introduced in 1980s which aimed to regulate competition within the European dairy sector. 
The milk quota system was still in place at the time of our interviews. As one interviewee 
noted, the output quantity restrictions imposed by the EU authority constituted a key political 
obstacle to their expansion in the European dairy industry.  
“Our plant in Ireland is limited by the EU milk quota restrictions. Once we exceed the quota, there 
will be a risk of fines. So, we only keep one production line in Europe.” (Firm G, Interviewee G1) 
Liberalized industries 
In the past few decades, de-regulation has taken place in most industries in the EU and has 
resulted in reduced regulatory barriers and simplified administrative procedures. For Chinese 
MNEs operating in more liberalized industries characterized by fewer regulatory restrictions 
and policy interventions, the well-established market and industry infrastructure has provided 
them with a sound environment which has facilitated these firms’ operations in the EU.  
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“Our businesses are in real estate and entertaining. These are consumption industries. There aren’t 
many policy restrictions from the UK or other European country governments.”                                        
(Firm F, Interviewee F1) 
Furthermore, the enforcement of the Single Market Act, which promotes the free movement 
of goods and services, has provided an open ground for firms to compete within the EU              
(EC, 2012). The open market established by the Single Market Act is regarded as an 
important advantage by the majority of the interviewees. As one interviewee explained, the 
Single Market Act has facilitated their company’s access to a greater consumer base across 
the EU member states at much lower risk.  
“We manufacture our products in Ireland and can export to other EU states without worrying about 
tax or tariffs thanks to the free movement in the EU.” (Firm H, Interviewee H1)  
4.4.4 Firm-behaviour sourced political risks in both markets 
Despite the stark contrast in institutional environments between the EU and African states, 
our evidence revealed that the inappropriate behaviour of a small number of Chinese MNEs, 
such as ignorance of sustainable development, a lack of respect towards the local culture and 
hostile industrial relations, can trigger adverse local responses, thus exposing all Chinese 
MNEs to political risks in both markets. As our interviewees regularly pointed out, such 
inappropriate practices and behaviour have led to negative attitudes towards some Chinese 
MNEs by the host government and the general public.  
Negative local government attitude 
A lack of professional training can lead some Chinese MNEs to run the risk of violating local 
Employment Acts and engaging in unethical conduct. Such inappropriate behaviour can lead 
to a poor opinion about all Chinese MNEs in the eyes of the local government, which could 
be followed by more stringent regulatory treatment of all Chinese MNEs investing in the 
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local market. For example, tense industrial relations with local employees experienced by 
Chinese MNEs in both European and African markets can result in legal disputes. This may 
undermine the host government’s intention of attracting Chinese investment in order to 
generate greater economic prosperity and employment opportunities. The host government 
may come to view Chinese MNEs as exploiting the local labour force rather than contributing 
to economic growth, especially in African countries. Such a negative attitude may lead to a 
stricter regulatory environment in which Chinese MNEs’ operate. 
“Managing industrial relations is critical because it can drag us into trouble with the French 
government if we cannot get along with the local employees. For example, we had a problem of 
paying pensions to local staff and it almost took us to court. This can potentially damage our image 
with the French government and result in more regulations imposed on our business.”  (Firm O, 
Interviewee O2)  
“Injuries and accidents at our construction sites can make the Rwandan government think that 
Chinese companies do not care about protecting the local workers. They would certainly view this 
very unfavourably.” (Firm L, Interviewee L2) 
The weakly enforced regulatory framework in China has provided some Chinese MNEs with 
opportunities to exploit institutional voids and get away with unethical behaviour. However, 
such conduct is not tolerated by governments in the EU and African countries. As a result, 
tougher and sometimes dyadic-specific treatments have targeted unethical business practices 
which can form a critical source of political risk faced by all Chinese MNEs.  
“The degree of enforcement of the EC Act (Directive on Herbal Medicinal Products) varies in 
different member states…In some countries like the UK and Netherlands, the governments did not 
introduce many restrictions. But a number of counterfeits were found to be supplied by firms from 
China. They used toxic ingredients and caused serious side effects. After these scandals were reported, 
the UK government imposed stricter rules to regulate herbal medicines.” (Firm N, Interviewee N1)  
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“There are many Chinese construction workers in Africa and they have a lot of troubles due to their 
behaviour. So the biggest issue that we have now is to get working visas for our workers because 
many African country governments have implemented a quota system to restrict the number of 
Chinese workers, which has caused problems with our operations there.” (Firm M, Interviewee M1) 
Negative local public attitude 
The disregard of local history, culture and religious rituals has frequently been mentioned by 
the interviewees as a critical issue that has caused Chinese MNEs trouble in European and 
African markets. Such ignorance can make the local public view these firms as socially 
irresponsible, hence damaging the overall image of Chinese MNEs and can result in the 
boycotting of Chinese products. Political activities can be organized by local interested 
parties to influence their government’s attitude against Chinese MNEs’ operations. As one of 
the interviewees from Firm F explained, negligence of the host-country’s history and culture 
by a small number of Chinese MNEs can lead to local public aversion. As a result, they may 
lobby the government to impose stricter regulations on all Chinese MNEs or protest against 
their operations.  
“Our company has not realized the importance of having good public relations in Europe, so the 
locals tend to see us as disrespectful to their culture which can cause problems. The local public have 
voting power, so their attitude towards us to a great extent can influence their government’s attitude 
especially at the time of a general election. When the locals do not like us, they can lobby the 
government to suspend our operations. The government would also view us more negatively and treat 
our operations unfavourably.” (Firm F, Interviewee F2)  
“There were some Chinese businessmen who disregarded the local culture and religious rituals, 
which gave the locals a very bad impression and caused negative feedback towards all Chinese firms. 
Some local stakeholders have already attempted to persuade their government to put stricter controls 
on us.” (Firm I, Interviewee I1) 
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Furthermore, a lack of attention to local economic development by some Chinese MNEs, as 
well as the loss of business opportunities and profits by the locals, have triggered adverse 
responses from the local interested public, and thus caused social disapproval of Chinese 
MNEs. As a result, the host-government’s sensitivity towards Chinese MNEs’ inappropriate 
conduct may be augmented by these local interested parties.  
“Overall, the relationship between our company and the local African people has become 
increasingly unfavourable. In countries like Tanzania, the locals are very hostile to us because they 
cannot gain from doing business with us. They think that the Chinese have taken all the profits away 
from them.” (Firm L, Interviewee L2) 
The lack of protection over intellectual property rights at home has provided some Chinese 
MNEs with the incentive to produce and sell counterfeit products. However, when expanding 
into overseas markets, the adoption of home-country practices can harm their reputation and 
cause greater distrust of their products among the local public. Such inappropriate practices 
lead to a negative view of Chinese companies by the host-country public. Public sentiments 
and distrust towards counterfeit products supplied by a small number of Chinese companies 
can prompt the local consumer associations and media to lobby their government to more 
carefully control all Chinese MNEs’ operations by introducing new legislation or stricter 
requirements on Chinese products. This has occurred in both markets.  
“Selling counterfeit products by a few Chinese firms has damaged the reputation of Chinese 
medicines and the European consumers do not trust us anymore. A number of new regulations have 
been introduced in the Netherlands to inspect medicines from China after those scandals had been 
reported.” (Firm N, Interviewee N1) 
“There were some Chinese businessmen who sold counterfeit products to African consumers. So now 
we are not trusted by the locals and it has brought us many problems from their government.”                  
(Firm M, Interviewee M1)  
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4.5 Discussion 
This chapter focuses on the way that Chinese MNEs conceive political risks when expanding 
into the EU and Africa. The findings suggest that their perceived political risks are related to 
country, industry and firm-behaviour. Such risks are more complex than those reported by 
developed country MNEs. Hence, it highlights the importance of unpacking the notion of 
political risk from the viewpoint of these new players. In this section, the author draws on the 
findings from the multiple case studies to discuss how Chinese MNEs perceive political risk 
and derive propositions accordingly.  
Propositions 
Home-country sourced political risks 
While the existing literature on political risk tends to focus on host-country factors, the rise of 
Chinese MNEs has challenged this conventional wisdom (Child & Marinova, 2014). Since 
MNEs cannot always separate themselves from the image and influence of their home 
country when expanding abroad (Fiaschi et al., 2016; Stevens & Newenham-Kahindi, 2017), 
it is important to take into account the impact of country-of-origin on the political risks faced 
by Chinese MNEs in foreign marketplaces. The country-of-origin, or home-country origin, 
refers to ‘the country where the corporate headquarters of the company marketing the product 
or brand is located’ (Johansson, Douglas & Nonaka, 1985: 391) and host-country 
governments are likely to react to the country-of-origin of MNEs (Stevens et al. 2015). Host-
country governments may encourage MNEs from certain countries as they bring desirable 
resources; equally, they may be wary of other nationalities due to potential threats to a host-
country’s national security and competitiveness (Cuervo-Cazurra 2011). Thus, the home-
country origin of EMMNEs can have critical implications for the way that they are perceived 
by the governments of both developed and developing countries.  
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Our findings complement extant research by revealing that Chinese MNEs’ perceived 
political risks in the EU tend to originate from their home-country origin as they are treated 
as representatives of their home country (Desbordes, 2010). Concerns over national security 
that result from political resistance and competing economic interests can make the host 
government seek to ring-fence their national strategic assets from Chinese investment. 
Furthermore, access to home-government financial support can lead the host government to 
fear the unfair competition associated with investment by Chinese MNEs. Such concerns 
have resulted in extra scrutiny from the EU member governments. Hence, Chinese MNEs are 
exposed to risks caused by their ‘Chinese’ label, representing a critical and endogenous 
source of political risk in developed countries.  
Additionally, the evidence shows that political scrutiny has been more intensively exercised 
by host-country governments in the EU on Chinese SOEs than private firms due to their close 
affiliation with the Chinese government. This is consistent with Globerman and Shapiro’s 
(2009) observation that Chinese SOEs are more likely to face government speculation in the 
U.S. than their private counterparts. This reinforces the view that SOEs not only serve the 
economic purpose, but more importantly, the ideological purpose of projecting their home-
government political and economic influence in overseas markets (Cuervo-Cazurra, Inkpen, 
Musacchio & Ramaswamy, 2014).  
Proposition 1: Chinese MNEs are likely to encounter political risks when a host-country 
government perceives them as posing potential threats to national security and 
competitiveness.  
Host-country sourced political risks 
Despite the increasing integration of global economic activities, the volatile political 
environment remains a critical concern that inhibits economic efficiency and national 
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competitiveness in the developing world (Jakobsen, 2010). The frequently changing political 
regimes and the weak legal framework in some developing countries can lead to the 
deterioration of living standards and loss of life. Moreover, regional political turbulence can 
profoundly disrupt social and economic activities. As a result, MNEs operating in these 
markets tend to face severe political turmoil and inconsistent regulatory treatment which can 
jeopardize their operations (Darendeli & Hill, 2016).  
Our findings explicitly show that Chinese MNEs’ perceived political risks in African markets 
mainly result from exogenous political shocks and events. Such turmoil at domestic and 
regional levels represents a significant political challenge and can undermine firms’ 
operational confidence. The findings are consistent with the view that host-country political 
volatilities tend to be a top concern for MNEs from both advanced and developing countries 
(Satyanand, 2010). This concern may be explained by the traditional bargaining mechanism 
which suggests that the host-government’s bargaining power tends to increase vis-à-vis 
MNEs once the latter’s capital is sunk in the host country (Jakobsen, 2010). The authoritarian 
political environment and discretionary policymaking process in some African states have 
enabled Chinese MNEs to negotiate favourable terms before their entry. Yet, they have 
tended to underestimate the costs when the ‘rules of the game’ in the host country are 
changed at the post-entry stage (García-Canal & Guillén, 2008). Findings from this study 
suggest that Chinese MNEs at the post-entry stage mainly perceive political risk in Africa as 
stemming from the volatile political environment in the host country and the region. This 
shows that Chinese MNEs’ perceptions of political risk in Africa are similar to developed 
country MNEs (Casson & Lopes, 2013). Thus, the traditional way of conceptualizing 
political risk by focusing on the deficiencies of a developing host-country’s political and 
regulatory environment is still relevant to Chinese MNEs operating in such a country.  
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Proposition 2: Chinese MNEs are likely to encounter political risks in a developing host 
country with a volatile political environment and regional conflict. 
Industry-sourced political risks 
During the last few decades, technological changes and the reduction of trade barriers in most 
parts of the world have encouraged MNEs from virtually all industries to participate in 
international competition. However, such global economic integration does not replace the 
importance of national governments in regulating industrial policies and business activities. 
Industry-related regulations are still enacted by national governments to supervise and 
sometimes intervene in business operations. The impact of such policy interventions is 
particularly striking for MNEs operating in regulated industries (Holburn & Zelner, 2010). 
Hence, industry-related regulations levied by the host-country government represent a key 
source of political risk for foreign MNEs (García-Canal & Guillén, 2008).  
Our findings revealed that the enforcement of industrial policies by the EU can be a mixed 
blessing for Chinese MNEs. On the positive side, several waves of de-regulation by the EU 
member states have allowed Chinese MNEs to compete on more equal terms within the EU. 
On the other hand, those operating in regulated industries are subject to restrictions imposed 
at the regional level which has resulted in greater entry barriers and operational complexities. 
It is recognized that MNEs in highly regulated industries require greater research attention 
(Holburn & Zelner, 2010). Yet, extant literature has mainly focused on developed country 
MNEs expanding into the regulated industries of developing host countries (Bremmer, 2014). 
The implication of industry-related political risks for EMMNEs has received scant attention. 
The findings from our research help to fill this gap by showing that industrial restrictions 
imposed by the EU can substantially affect Chinese MNEs’ expansion into those regulated 
industries. Thus, our findings not only confirm that the traditional conceptualization of 
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industry-related political risks still applies to Chinese MNEs, but also highlight the role of 
regional institutions in regulating foreign investment activities.  
Proposition 3: Chinese MNEs operating in more regulated industries are likely to 
encounter a higher degree of industry-sourced political risks than in more liberalized 
industries.   
Firm-behaviour sourced political risks                                                                                  
Extant literature has stressed that the different levels of economic development between 
developed and developing countries have created contrasting environments, and hence 
different political risks for MNEs to deal with (Jakobsen, 2010). A more nuanced aspect of 
political risk that stems from firms’ own behaviour has been under-explored. Our findings 
indicate that by importing unsuitable home-country practices, Chinese MNEs have 
commonly experienced firm-behaviour related political risks regardless of the stage of 
economic development of the host countries. While Chinese MNEs are prompted by the 
opportunities presented in European and African markets, inappropriate or self-destructive 
behaviour by a few Chinese firms may drag them into hostile relations with the host 
government. They may be perceived as failing to deliver their promise of boosting local 
economic growth, thus making their presence less acceptable in the eyes of the government 
(Fiaschi et al., 2016). The failure to achieve legitimacy, i.e. aligning business objectives with 
the political and economic agenda of the host-country government, can motivate the latter to 
intervene in business activities (Henisz & Zelner, 2005). Specifically, unacceptable conduct 
by a small number of Chinese MNEs can prompt the local government to take political and 
regulatory actions. In other words, when firms are deemed to be untrustworthy with regard to 
self-regulation, the host-country government can impose rules in order to maintain market 
order and regulate firms’ behaviour. This has become an extra layer of political risk faced by 
Chinese MNEs in both developed and developing countries.                    
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Our findings further suggest that the host-country government’s evaluation of MNEs can be 
reinforced by the attitude of the public. As the government consists of individual 
policymakers and branches (Zelner, Henisz & Holburn, 2009), these constituents constantly 
interact with other interested stakeholders, including consumers, political parties and media. 
Hence, the way that these social groups and actors perceive Chinese MNEs can subsequently 
influence government and policymakers. Ignorance of the local norms by Chinese MNEs can 
undermine their social approval. Such unfavourable responses from the local interested 
parties can exert a powerful influence over government decisions through lobbying and 
demonstrations. As a result, the political risks faced by Chinese MNEs are heightened 
through the interplay between the government and the public.                          
Proposition 4: Chinese MNEs are likely to encounter political risks when the 
government and public in a host country are critical of their behaviour.  
4.6 Summary 
The notion of political risk has occupied a central place in the study of MNEs’ international 
expansion and success. This study investigates an under-explored yet fundamental question 
as to how Chinese MNEs perceive political risk in the EU and Africa. It complements extant 
research that has largely drawn on conceptual models of developed country MNEs. Using a 
qualitative analysis approach, the author finds that political risks can root in a set of country, 
industry and firm-behaviour sources for Chinese MNEs operating in both markets. The 
findings reveal that the way that Chinese MNEs perceive political risk is substantially 
different from their developed country counterparts. Therefore, this chapter develops a more 
complete conceptualization of political risk from the viewpoint of Chinese MNEs.  
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5. Conclusion 
This chapter concludes the thesis by discussing the main findings, contributions, as well as 
implications for managers and policymakers. It also acknowledges the research limitations 
and suggests potential avenues for future research. The chapter consists of four sections. 
Section 5.1 summaries the main findings of this study. Section 5.2 highlights the major 
contributions. Section 5.3 provides the research implications for the business and 
policymaking communities. Finally, Section 5.4 discusses the limitations and points to 
directions for future research.  
5.1 Summary of the Main Findings 
This thesis examines the relationship between external environmental forces and Chinese 
MNEs’ post-entry operations, hence success. Chinese MNEs have become increasingly active 
players in conducting outward FDI over the past few decades. Their home-country 
institutions play a critical role in shaping the global expansion and success of these new 
contenders. In this thesis, the author attempts to uncover the importance of home-country 
institutions by looking at the implications of home-country government support for Chinese 
MNEs’ post-entry performance (Chapter 2); examining the role of home-country legitimacy 
in shaping Chinese MNEs’ perceived level of political risk in overseas markets (Chapter 3); 
and conceptualizing the notion of political risk from the perspective of these new players 
(Chapter 4). The main findings of each chapter will be discussed in the following parts.  
5.1.1 Main findings from the study of home-country government support on 
Chinese MNEs’ post-entry performance 
Chapter 2 examines the impact of home-country government financial and non-financial 
policy support on Chinese firms’ overseas performance and the extent to which their effects 
are moderated by interstate political and economic relations. The research has obtained 
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several interesting findings. First, empirical evidence from this study shows that supportive 
home-government policies in non-financial domains enhance EMMNEs’ overseas subsidiary 
performance, whereas financial support does not have such an impact. This suggests that the 
supportive schemes provided by the home-country government have different implications 
for firms’ post-entry operations. Non-financial policy measures, such as information support, 
streamlining of administrative process and increasing protection in overseas markets can 
directly enhance Chinese firms’ post-entry performance through increasing efficiency and 
reducing operational costs. Unlike developed country MNEs, EMMNEs rely substantially on 
government support to build their competitive advantages and pursue international growth 
(Hong et al., 2015). This finding complements previous research (e.g. Luo et al., 2010; Lu, et 
al., 2014) by demonstrating that home-country government non-financial support not only 
motivates firms to undertake outward FDI but also generates a performance-enhancing effect. 
Such support in the forms of information provision and institutional protection for overseas 
business is vital for newcomers like EMMNEs to compete in the global marketplace. It also 
implies that EMMNEs may not lack financial resources, but face challenges in understanding 
of host countries due to the lack of foreign market knowledge. Home-country government 
non-financial support helps address their weakness in post-entry operations, thus improving 
firm performance.  
Second, this research pays particular attention to the role of interstate relations in EMMNEs’ 
cross-border operations and finds empirical support for the view that interstate relations can 
interact with domestic institutional environmental forces to influence cross-border business 
operations (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011). Specifically, interstate political relations can serve as a 
promoting device to augment the positive link between home-country government non-
financial policy support and EMMNEs’ international success. The findings reflect the fact 
that firms are embedded in both home and host countries, and thus their international 
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activities are influenced by interactions between governments at interstate levels (Child & 
Marinova, 2014). Existing studies predominantly stress the relevance of within-country 
institutions for MNEs’ operational effectiveness (Makino & Tsang, 2011). However, 
government involvement in firms’ cross-border operations can raise political concerns 
(Globerman & Shapiro, 2009) and makes EMMNEs suffer from the liability of country of 
origin. This is particularly true with Chinese firms, which are often considered to carry their 
home-country identity and political missions with their outward FDI (Cui & Jiang, 2012). 
Therefore, investing in countries with good interstate political relations with their home 
country can help firms minimise negative images associated with their national identities, as 
home-country government support may be seen as less intrusive or represents a positive 
signalling in these countries. Furthermore, the Chinese government and embassies are more 
likely to be influential in countries with close interstate political relations. As such, they can 
provide protection and help for their firms when needed. Our findings imply that strong 
interstate political relations serve as an institutional device to amplify the effect of home-
country government policy support which helps EMMNEs embed in the local institutional 
environment. Increased local embeddedness enables these firms to gain public support and 
have greater access to local knowledge and market know-how, thus enhancing subsidiary 
performance.  
Third, the findings of this research also suggest that interstate economic treaties and non-
financial policy support by the home-country government substitute each other in affecting 
Chinese MNEs’ overseas success. When strong interstate economic relations are in place, 
firms can gain access to economic benefits, such as tax reduction and tariff exemption. 
Additionally, interstate economic treaties serve as an alternative source of country-specific 
information which can be more beneficial than the guidelines issued by the home-country 
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government. Therefore, strong interstate economic relations can replace the promotional 
measures of home-country government in helping firms achieve overseas success.  
5.1.2 Main findings from the study of home-country legitimacy on the level of 
political risk faced by Chinese MNEs abroad 
Chapter 3 investigates the question ‘How can we explain Chinese MNEs’ perceived level of 
host-country political risk in light of their home-country legitimacy with key stakeholders in 
the host country?’ The author leverages insights from the institutional perspective to pinpoint 
the role of home-country legitimacy in shaping Chinese firms’ perceived level of such risk in 
overseas markets. The results show that Chinese MNEs’ social acceptance in the host country 
can have important political implications for firms’ survival and success.  
The author finds that backwardness of the home-country institutional environment can 
undermine Chinese MNEs’ acceptance among host-country social stakeholders including 
government, industrial agencies, and the general public. As a result, these legitimacy-granting 
actors tend to withhold from firms the ‘social license to stay’, which can be translated into 
political challenges to obstruct Chinese MNEs’ survival abroad.  
Our findings further reveal that a host-country’s institutional governance conditions and the 
legitimacy judgements of influential social groups and actors are closely intertwined to affect 
cross-border investment activities. The legitimacy of Chinese firms’ home government with 
host government provides an alternative channel to explicitly stated governance rules and 
laws in determining firms’ access to resources and markets, hence their perceived level of 
political risk. Moreover, the legitimacy evaluation of host-country industrial agencies tends to 
offset the relevance of institutional governance rules on firms operating in regulated 
industries. Additionally, the effectiveness of a host-country’s governance conditions in 
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shaping Chinese MNEs’ perceived level of political risk can be limited owing to the lack of 
acceptance of these firms amongst the general public in the host country.  
5.1.3 Main findings from the study of conceptualizing political risk from Chinese MNEs’ 
perspective 
Chapter 4 explores how the notion of political risk is conceived from the viewpoint of 
Chinese MNEs. The study employed a multiple case study method to analyse the 
heterogeneous types of political risk faced by Chinese firms operating in institutionally more 
stable and economically more advanced EU markets versus less-developed African countries. 
The findings show that the way Chinese MNEs perceive political risk considerably departs 
from their developed country counterparts. These new contenders tend to view political risk 
as a multidimensional concept and can arise from a broad array of country, industry, and 
firm-related sources.  
At country level, this study finds that although the well-established market system in the EU 
has created opportunities for MNEs to pursue growth, Chinese firms are exposed to implicit 
political pressures due to the ‘baggage’ they carry from home. The host-country government 
concerns over the threats to national security and distortion of market competition due to 
Chinese MNEs’ home-government involvement have subjected these firms to home-country 
sourced political risk in the EU. In contrast, the volatile political regimes in some African 
states and regional turmoil have exposed Chinese MNEs to host-country sourced political risk. 
These findings indicate that the conventional analysis of political risk needs an overhaul as 
Chinese firms’ unique home-country institutional background can have critical implications 
for the way that they perceive political risk in international markets.  
In addition, the findings of this chapter corroborate the arguments from Chapter 3 which 
highlights the importance of home-country acceptance in shaping the way that MNEs’ 
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perceive political environment in overseas markets. In particular, as emerging markets evolve, 
and EMMNEs’ international experience develops, their perception of political risk in 
international marketplaces may change over time. Adopting the qualitative research method 
enables the author to systematically conceptualize the notion of political risk from these new 
contenders’ perspective. In doing so, it helps to develop a holistic account of political risk 
and validate the results obtained in Chapter 3 based on cross-sectional data analysis. The 
findings from Chapter 4 complement those of Chapter 3, showing that Chinese MNEs with 
longer exposure in overseas markets perceive a different degree of political risk compared 
with those with shorter international exposure.  
At industry level, our findings reveal that the industrial contexts can considerably influence 
Chinese companies’ perception of political risk in the European market. Firms operating in 
liberalized industries tend to hold very different views from those in key regulated industries 
with regards to the enforcement of the European Single Market Act and its associated 
industrial regulations. On the one hand, reforms of industrial policies and privatization that 
have taken place in the EU have created a level of playing field for Chinese MNEs in 
liberalized industries that seek further expansion and market base. On the other hand, 
restrictions introduced by the EU regional and national authorities have imposed greater entry 
and operational barriers for Chinese MNEs operating in regulated industries. As a result, they 
tend to regard such obstacles as industry-sourced political risks.  
In addition, despite the contrasting institutional environments and stages of economic 
development between the EU and African markets, a common type of political risk has been 
reported by Chinese firms related to their own behaviours. The findings show that the 
ignorance of local economic development, hostile industrial relations, and lack of respect for 
local culture by some Chinese MNEs can damage the overall image and reputation of 
Chinese investment in both markets. Hence, the host-country government and public tend to 
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develop negative attitudes and impose tougher treatments towards Chinese MNEs, which 
give rise to firm-behaviour sourced political risk.  
5.2 Research Contributions 
5.2.1 Contributions from the study of home-country government support on 
Chinese MNEs’ post-entry performance  
This study focuses on the role of home-country government support on Chinese firms’ 
overseas subsidiary performance and it makes three contributions to the existing literature. 
First, it goes beyond examination of what motivates EMMNEs to undertake outward FDI by 
focusing on their post-entry performance. More specifically, the author differentiates the 
generic home-country government support into financial and non-financial policy measures. 
Thus, the findings not only advance our knowledge of the importance of the home-country 
government, but also the differing impact of supportive measures in shaping EMMNEs’ post-
entry success. In particular, the findings of this research contribute to a better understanding 
of the factors affecting EMMNEs’ overseas success. As EMMNEs are in the early stage of 
internationalization, they rely more on government non-financial support to compensate for 
the lack of knowledge about host countries. Knowledge provision and institutional protection 
are more important elements than financial support in shaping the post-entry performance of 
EMMNEs.  
Second, this study broadens the existing research on EMMNEs by combining insights from 
the institution perspective in terms of institutional embeddedness and the GPE perspective. 
Our integrative framework offers a broader perspective for understanding the origins of a 
firm’s competitive advantage and allows us to capture the impact of interconnection between 
domestic institutions and interstate relations. Thus, this approach enables us to expand the 
theoretical boundary of the institutional perspective to interstate contexts. Firms operating 
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across state borders face multiple institutional pressures that arise from home and host 
countries, as well as their interplay in the international realm (Meyer & Peng, 2016). Extant 
research drawing on the institutional perspective has focused on the impact of within-country 
contextual forces by assuming such contextual factors are internationally immobile 
(Demirbag et al., 2010; Makino & Tsang, 2011). The present research addresses this 
omission by bringing in the GPE perspective which emphasises that countries are embedded 
in the broader international context, and thus interstate relations can augment the 
effectiveness of domestic policy (Jandhyala & Weiner, 2014). The author proposes and finds 
empirical evidence that the institutional influence of the home-country government can be 
channeled through interstate political and economic relations that affect firms’ overseas 
activities. By bridging the institution perspective with the GPE perspective, this thesis moves 
beyond identifying the direct effect of the domestic institutional environment by highlighting 
its interface with interstate relational factors in explaining EMMNEs’ post-entry performance. 
In an international context, interstate relations may serve as a specific institutional link 
between countries that influence EMMNEs’ institutional embeddedness in host countries, 
thus indirectly affecting cross-border business operations. This thesis complements existing 
research in this area by showing that EMMNEs’ international success not only directly links 
to their home-country government support, but also is indirectly related to the strength of 
interstate political and economic relations. 
Third, the findings reveal that home-country government non-financial policy support 
interacts with interstate political and economic relations in different ways to influence 
EMMNEs’ post-entry performance. While there is a complementary effect between interstate 
political relations and home-government non-financial policy support, interstate economic 
relations substitute for the impact of home-government supportive policies. Thus, this 
research systematically delineates the moderating effects of interstate political and economic 
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relations in EMMNEs’ international success. The impact of home-country government 
support on EMMNEs’ post-entry performance is not universal but depends on interstate 
contextual factors. The findings offer a more nuanced understanding of the heterogeneous 
effects of interstate relational factors (Makino & Tsang, 2011), and shed new light on existing 
research by highlighting the importance of taking into account the distinct effects of different 
elements of interstate relations on EMMNEs’ post-entry performance.  
5.2.2 Contributions from the study of home-country legitimacy on the level of 
political risk faced by Chinese MNEs abroad 
By looking at the relationship between home-country legitimacy and Chinese MNEs’ 
perceived level of political risk in overseas markets, this study contributes to the research in 
this area in two main ways. First, while a voluminous literature has examined the effect of 
host-country political and regulatory arrangements on the level of political risk experienced 
by MNEs, research has mostly been silent regarding the role of home-country institutions. 
This study captures the importance of home-country legitimacy in shaping the level of 
political risk experienced by Chinese firms venturing abroad. The findings imply that the 
weakly developed home-country institutional environment can generate negative spill-over 
effect on Chinese companies’ social acceptance in the host country, which heightens their 
perceived political risk. The present research complements existing literature that focuses on 
host-country governance conditions by showing that home-country legitimacy is a key 
determinant in explaining EMMNEs’ perceived level of political risk when competing in the 
global arena. Thus, it offers a holistic account of contextual forces, especially home-country 
institutions in shaping MNEs’ survival and success in the international marketplace.  
Second, the author delineates the role of a range of host-country legitimacy-granting actors 
and their interactions with the country’s institutional governance arrangements in affecting 
cross-border business operations. The research identified the moderating effects of legitimacy 
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judgements by host-country government, industrial agencies, and the general public on the 
relationship between the country’s institutional governance conditions and Chinese MNEs’ 
perceived level of political risk. The findings enhance our understanding about the 
interdependence between a host country’s institutional governance framework and firms’ 
social acceptance in shaping their operations, hence success abroad.  
5.2.3 Contributions from the study of conceptualizing political risk from Chinese 
MNEs’ perspective 
By systematically exploring the heterogeneous types of political risk perceived by Chinese 
MNEs in the global marketplace, this study advances international business literature in a 
number of ways. First, it departs from mainstream research and challenges the assumption 
that political risks are exogenous and result from a host-country’s volatile political and 
regulatory environment. Our findings suggest that political risk can arise endogenously from 
MNEs’ home-country identity and firms’ own inappropriate behaviours. The present study 
contributes to extant literature by revealing how specific characteristics of the home country 
can influence the way that Chinese firms frame political risks in foreign markets. In doing so, 
it highlights the theoretical importance of reconceptualising political risk from the 
perspective of Chinese MNEs.  
Secondly, focusing on Chinese MNEs operating in the EU and in African countries, this 
study finds that these new players tend to encounter more subtle and complex political risks 
than developed country MNEs which are grounded in a wide array of home and host country, 
industry and firm-behaviour sources. This enriches the existing research on political risk 
which overly focuses on host-country political turmoil or industry characteristics. Thus, our 
reconceptualization of political risk provides a more complete understanding of its 
multidimensional nature and complex components.  
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Third, by examining Chinese MNEs operating in developed and developing countries, this 
study finds that the boundary of political risk from the viewpoint of Chinese firms is broader 
than developed country MNEs and varies with the external contextual environments. Despite 
the well-established regulatory systems and market supporting institutions in the EU, these 
new contenders still face political risks that are rooted in their home-country origin and 
regional industrial regulations. By contrast, the less-developed African markets have imposed 
more traditional host-country sourced political perils on Chinese companies. Some Chinese 
MNEs’ inappropriate practices represent a common concern that can lead these new players 
to encounter political obstacles in both markets. Thus, this study shows that the boundary of 
political risk analysis should be expanded to reflect the perspective of Chinese MNEs.  
5.3 Implications for Managers and Policymakers 
5.3.1 Implications from the study of home-country government support on Chinese 
MNEs’ post-entry performance 
This study has a number of implications for practitioners and policymakers. For managers, 
first, our findings show that Chinese MNEs’ overseas performance is boosted by home-
government non-financial policy support but not financial support. This suggests that Chinese 
firms should leverage non-financial supportive measures to enhance their overseas 
performance while reducing reliance on cheap finance from the home government. Second, 
the findings from this study indicated that the impact of non-financial policy impetus is 
moderated by interstate political and economic relations. This implies that Chinese firms 
should utilize various non-financial schemes such as diplomatic and information support 
when operating in countries that have good political relations with China. Additionally, they 
should develop a better understanding of the interstate economic treaties enforced between 
China and other countries. The presence of BITs and DTTs may help Chinese firms to obtain 
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more specific information regarding host-country investment and taxation policies compared 
with the general guidelines provided by the home government.  
For policymakers, the findings from the present research suggest that the Chinese 
government may consider increasing the degree of non-financial policy support such as the 
streamlining of administrative processes, enhancing diplomatic protection, facilitating 
communications between Chinese MNEs and host government, and offering personnel 
training to enable their firms to compete globally. Moreover, active engagement at interstate 
governmental levels is desirable as it may be used as institutional leverage to extend the 
influence of domestic policy support in helping Chinese MNEs to achieve international 
success. Establishing favourable political relations with the host country may augment the 
effectiveness of non-financial policy support across national borders, which helps to boost the 
confidence of firms seeking to operate in overseas markets. Additionally, the enforcement of 
BITs and DTTs with clauses to deal with investment and tax matters can provide firms with 
alternative channels of information access which enhance their commercial orientation.  
5.3.2 Implications from the study of home-country legitimacy on the level of 
political risk faced by Chinese MNEs abroad 
This study provides several implications for the business and policymaking communities. 
First, the research draws attention to the role of Chinese MNEs’ acceptance among host-
country interested social groups and actors. The author finds that the legitimacy evaluations 
made by the industrial agencies and general public may compete with the institutional 
governance framework in the host country to affect Chinese MNEs’ perceived level of 
political risk. This implies that firms should develop better understanding of industry-specific 
policies and engage in legitimacy-building activities such as corporate social responsibility 
programmes in addition to conforming to explicitly stated laws and rules in the host country.  
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Second, the evidence suggests that the legitimacy of the Chinese MNEs’ home-country 
government with the host-country government reduces the relevance of institutional 
governance rules in facilitating or constraining firms’ access to markets and resources, hence 
their perceived degree of political risk. This suggests that Chinese MNEs should negotiate for 
preferential treatment when operating in countries that regard their home-country government 
with a greater degree of legitimacy.  
Third, for home-country policymakers, the author finds that the weakly developed home-
country institutional environment can have a detrimental impact on Chinese MNEs’ 
acceptance in the host country. This implies that policymakers in China should consider 
enhancing domestic governance quality because doing so can generate positive spill-over 
effect to promote Chinese firms’ legitimacy when competing globally. For host-country 
policymakers, the findings from the present research indicate that host-country governments 
tend to judge MNEs’ legitimacy using cognitive shortcuts and associating Chinese firms with 
their home country. This suggests that host-country policymakers should pay attention to 
Chinese MNEs’ business competences rather than merely considering the legitimacy of their 
home country.  
5.3.3 Implications from the study of conceptualizing political risk from Chinese 
MNEs’ perspective 
By understanding political risk from the viewpoint of Chinese MNEs, this study provides 
several managerial and policy implications. First, host-country governments’ concerns about 
their national security and the financial support granted to Chinese MNEs by the Chinese 
government have exposed these companies to home-country sourced political risks when 
venturing into more advanced economies, like the EU. As Chinese MNEs unavoidably carry 
the shadow of their home government, the Chinese government should consider providing 
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firms with support in more internationally acceptable ways, such as updated information 
about a host-country’s market trends, instead of direct subsidies and/or cheap loans. 
Second, policymakers and governments of host countries should consider establishing stable 
political environments and/or consistent policies to accommodate cross-border business 
operations. A policy framework that clearly lists strategic industries that are sensitive to FDI 
may serve as an effective information guide to channel Chinese MNEs’ investment activities.  
Third, Chinese MNEs should adopt comprehensive risk assessment strategies when 
expanding overseas. In developed host countries with well-established market systems, they 
should pay attention to those implicit aspects of political risk, such as speculations and 
restrictions imposed by both the host-country and regional authorities. When operating in a 
developing country with a volatile political environment, they need to implement effective 
risk management strategies, for example purchasing political risk insurance to protect their 
business interests.  
Fourth, Chinese companies should provide more training for their personnel and avoid 
exporting unsuitable behaviours to their operations abroad since inappropriate conduct can 
lead to adverse attitudes towards Chinese investment by the host-country government and 
public. They may consider investing in public relations to build a more positive image in 
overseas markets.  
5.4 Limitations and Future Research Recommendations 
This section points out the limitations of the thesis, which presents opportunities for future 
research. Issues such as research context, data availability, and measurement of variables will 
be considered.  
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First, the present study has focused on outward FDI by Chinese MNEs. Thus, the findings 
may be specific to Chinese firms operating in international marketplaces. Future research 
may consider extending the sample to include firms from other emerging markets such as 
India, Russia, and Brazil. Owing to their varying stages of institutional and economic 
developments, a comparative study of EMMNEs from different home countries would allow 
us to identify possible variations among these new competitors and verify whether our 
findings are particular to the Chinese context.  
Second, when investigating the implications of home-government support for Chinese MNEs’ 
post-entry performance in Chapter 2, a number of variables have been operationalized using 
perceptual measures. For example, the author measured firms’ overseas subsidiary 
performance by the degree of managerial satisfactions towards their companies’ most 
recently established overseas branches. Given the multidimensional characteristics of 
business performance and possibility of memory bias (Hult et al., 2008), the use of objective 
measurement by drawing from home-country stock market data may complement our 
research and provide a holistic understanding of Chinese MNEs’ performance abroad. Future 
study may consider utilizing Chinese-listed companies’ overseas investment information, 
especially their annual reports, to measure firms’ performance with objective financial 
measures. Moreover, the study used survey data to capture the actual level of support that 
firms received from their home-country government. As government at various levels (e.g. 
central and local) exerts different degrees of influence on Chinese MNEs’ operations abroad, 
it is worthwhile to differentiate their impacts upon firms’ post-entry performance. Related to 
this, attention may be directed to Chinese MNEs’ headquarters-subsidiary links and how this 
relation influences the effect of home-government support. Hence, future research may 
consider utilizing databases that include richer information about Chinese-listed companies’ 
relationship with the home-country government to examine their influence in explaining 
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firms’ post-entry performance. Additionally, the author only considered two facets of 
interstate relations, i.e. political and economic relations on Chinese firms’ international 
performance. As an overall representation of the relationship between a pair of countries, the 
conceptualization of interstate relations should span the whole range of relational factors 
taking into account that interstate cooperation and conflict are not mutually exclusive 
(Desbordes, 2010). Hence, a more fine-grained measurement of interstate relations merits the 
attention of future studies.  
Thirdly, as research about the implications of home-country legitimacy for the political risk 
faced by MNEs remains at an early stage (Stevens & Newenham-Kahindi, 2017), the author 
only addressed the overall legitimacy of Chinese MNEs in Chapter 3. As Kostova and Zaheer 
(1999) established, the legitimacy of an MNE as a whole and its overseas subsidiaries is 
subject to the evaluations of different stakeholders. It is worthwhile for international business 
researchers to explore their interface, for example how the legitimacy of an MNE as a whole 
may generate spill-over effect to affect the post-entry success of its overseas subsidiaries, and 
vice versa. Moreover, the legitimacy of Chinese MNEs and their home-country government 
have both been measured using single items from the questionnaire survey. Because the 
legitimacy of MNEs is subject to the judgements of a broad set of institutional constituents, 
future research may consider developing a more fine-grained measurement of legitimacy. In 
addition, this thesis used cross-sectional data to examine Chinese MNEs’ perceived level of 
host-country political risk. Future research may consider adopting a longitudinal approach to 
investigate how EMMNEs’ perception of the external political environment evolves over 
time.  
Fourth, with regards to the conceptualization of political risk in Chapter 4, the author focused 
on the notion of political risk but did not consider an equally important and related concept: 
uncertainty. Thus, future research endeavours could address how EMMNEs perceive and 
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manage uncertainty in different institutional settings. In addition, the present study is based 
on qualitative analysis, thus we are unable to draw any statistical inference regarding whether 
firm size, age and international experience can moderate the perceptions of political risk by 
EMMNEs. Future research could test the propositions derived from this study by accounting 
for the relevance of these firm characteristics.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Survey Items 
Dependent variable: 
Chinese MNEs’ overseas subsidiary performance (7-point likert scale 1=very dissatisfied, 7= 
very satisfied). 
(1) Sales growth 
(2) Local market share growth 
(3) Sales margin growth 
Independent variable(s): 
Home-country government financial support (7-point likert scale 1=very low support, 7=very 
high support). 
(1) Financial and capital access for overseas investment 
Home-country government non-financial policy support (7-point likert scale 1=very low 
support, 7=very high support). 
(1) Simplifying the approval of foreign investment 
(2) Simplifying procedures for demonstrating firms have sufficient capital in foreign 
currency 
(3) Investment guideline by industries 
(4) Protection of firms’ rights in overseas markets 
(5) Investment guideline by countries 
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Control variable(s): 
Ownership:  A dummy variable assigns value 1 to SOEs and 0 otherwise 
Industry: A dummy variable assigns value 1 to manufacturing firms and 0 otherwise 
Risk assessment: A dummy variable assigns value 1 if firms have adopted risk assessment                       
                            strategies and 0 otherwise 
Firm size: Number of total employees (logged) 
International experience: Number of years a firm has engaged in international activities 
Local experience: Number of years that a firm has operated in a host country 
Host-country industry competition: (7-point likert scale 1= very low degree of competition, 
7=very high degree of competition) 
(1) Difficulties of obtaining raw materials 
(2) Technology for innovation 
(3) Completion of upstream and downstream industries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 207 
 
Appendix 2: Survey Items 
Dependent variable: 
Chinese MNEs’ perceived level of political risk in the host country: (7-point likert scale 
1=very risky, 7=very safe) 
(1) Implementation of rules and laws 
(2) Protection of private property 
(3) Settlement of commercial disputes 
(4) Control of corruption and bribe 
Moderator(s): 
Chinese MNEs’ home-country government legitimacy with host-country government  
(1) Importance of political relations between China and the host country to firms’ 
overseas investment (7-point likert scale 1=very unimportant, 7=very important) 
Chinese MNEs’ legitimacy in host-country regulated industries  
(1) Dummy variable: Assigning value 1 to firms operating in regulated industries include 
natural resources, telecommunication, utility, petroleum, and financial services; and 0 
otherwise 
Chinese MNEs’ legitimacy with host-country general public 
(1) Reactions of host-country public to firms’ investment (7-point likert scale 1= very 
low degree of negative reaction, 7=very high degree of negative reaction) 
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Control variable(s): 
Ownership:  A dummy variable assigns value 1 to SOEs and 0 otherwise 
Risk assessment: A dummy variable assigns value 1 if firms have adopted risk assessment                        
                            strategies and 0 otherwise 
Firm size: Number of total employees (logged) 
International experience: Number of years a firm has engaged in international activities 
Local experience: Number of years that a firm has operated in a host country 
Host-country industry competition: (7-point likert scale 1=very low degree of competition, 
7=very high degree of competition) 
(1) Difficulties of obtaining raw materials 
(2) Technology for innovation 
(3) Completion of upstream and downstream industries 
Home-government support: (7-point likert scale 1=very low support, 7=very high support) 
(1) Financial and capital access for overseas investment 
(2) Simplifying the approval of foreign investment 
(3) Simplifying procedures for demonstrating firms have sufficient capital in foreign 
currency 
(4) Investment guideline by industries 
(5) Protection of firms’ rights in overseas markets 
(6) Investment guideline by countries 
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Appendix 3a: Interview Questions (English) 
1. Could you talk about your company’s history of conducting overseas investment? For 
example, when you start doing business abroad? Where is your overseas subsidiary 
located and in which industry? 
2. How do you think about the political and social environment in the host country? 
3. How does the local political and social environment influence your firms’ operations? 
4. Could you give us some examples about the political and regulatory challenges that 
your company have encountered abroad? 
5. As a Chinese MNE (SOE/private firm), how does the host-country government treat 
your company? 
6. How the locals treat your company? 
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Appendix 3b: Interview Questions (Chinese) 
1. 能否请您介绍一下贵公司海外投资的历史? 比如贵公司是从什么时候开始进行
海外业务？贵公司海外分支机构设立在哪个国家，哪个行业？ 
2. 贵公司觉得这个国家的政治和社会环境怎么样？ 
3. 当地的政治和社会环境对贵公司开展业务有哪些影响？ 
4. 能否请您介绍一下贵公司在海外投资时遇到过哪些政治和法律方面的问题？ 
5. 作为一家中国（国有/私营）企业，当地政府是如何看待贵公司的？ 
6. 当地民众是如何看待贵公司的？  
 
 
 
 
